State v. Bradley

• Decision Date: 17 June 1891
• Citation: 13 S.E. 315,34 S.C. 136
• Parties: State v. Bradley.
• Court: South Carolina Supreme Court

13 S.E. 315

34 S.C. 136

State v. Bradley.

Supreme Court of South Carolina

June 17, 1891

Appeal from common pleas circuit court of Aiken county; Hudson Judge.

McIver J.

Under an indictment for the murder of Jasper Craig, the appellant was convicted of manslaughter, and sentenced to confinement in the penitentiary for the term of three years. From this judgment he appeals upon the several grounds set out in the record. It appeared that, in an altercation between these parties which took place in the yard of the deceased about dark in the evening, the deceased received a mortal wound inflicted by a knife, and was soon after carried into his house, where he died, some time near the middle of the next day. One witness, the son of the deceased, testified that he saw the prisoner strike the mortal blow, while other by-standers testified that they did not see prisoner strike any blow, but that they saw or heard deceased fall. All the parties were drinking more or less, and the defense was that the deceased, being much under the influence of liquor, in striking at the prisoner fell upon his own knife, and thus received the mortal wound. The first, second, and third grounds of appeal impute error to the circuit judge in his rulings as to the admissibility of certain testimony, while the fourth ground, which has very properly been abandoned, as it manifestly could not be sustained, complains of error in the charge to the jury. The testimony alleged to have been erroneously admitted by the first and second grounds of appeal was as to what passed between the deceased and the prisoner, shortly after the wound had been inflicted, and after deceased had been carried into his house, and the prisoner had been brought in. When this testimony was first offered, the judge, conceiving that the proper foundation had not been laid for the admission of such testimony as a dying declaration, declined to receive it as such, but ruled that it was competent as a conversation between the deceased and the prisoner; and it is to this ruling that exception is taken by the first ground of appeal. Afterwards, however when the circuit judge considered that a proper foundation had been laid, he ruled such testimony competent as a dying declaration; and to this ruling the second ground of appeal is directed. If, therefore, this testimony was admissible as a dying declaration, it is unimportant to consider whether it was competent as a conversation between the parties. We will therefore confine our attention to the question whether the testimony in question was admissible as a dying declaration. The rules upon this subject are so well settled that we need not do more than state them briefly: (1) Death must be imminent at the time the declaration is made. (2) The declarant must be so fully aware of this as to be without hope of life. (3) The subject of the charge must be the death of the declarant, and the circumstances of the death must be the subject of the declaration. State v. Johnson, 26 S.C. 152, 1 S.E. Rep. 510, and the cases therein cited. ...