State v. Bradley
| Decision Date | 19 June 1978 |
| Docket Number | No. 61549,61549 |
| Parties | STATE of Louisiana v. Hayworth L. BRADLEY. |
| Court | Louisiana Supreme Court |
Earnest L. Johnson, Baton Rouge, for defendant-respondent.
William J. Guste, Jr., Atty. Gen., Barbara Rutledge, Asst. Atty. Gen., Ossie B. Brown, Dist. Atty., Marilyn C. Castle, Asst. Dist. Atty., for plaintiff-relator.
On February 17, 1976 Hayworth L. Bradley was charged by bill of information with driving while intoxicated in violation of R.S. 14:98. He was tried on October 21, 1976 and, after the presentation of the State's evidence, was granted a directed verdict of acquittal. 1 Following his acquittal, Bradley filed a "motion to expunge criminal records under provisions of LSA-R.S. 44:9." The State objected to the motion on grounds that the statute specifically prohibits the expungement of arrests for D.W.I. At the hearing on the motion the defendant successfully argued that the exclusion of D.W.I. arrests from the expungement statute constituted a denial of equal protection. We granted the State's application for supervisory writs to review the trial court's judgment declaring the last sentence of R.S. 44:9(A)(2) to be unconstitutional. 2
(1) The time limitation for the institution of prosecution on the offense has expired, and no prosecution has been instituted; or
(2) If prosecution has been instituted, and such proceedings have been finally disposed of by dismissal, sustaining of a motion to quash, or acquittal. If the court finds that the mover is entitled to the relief sought, for either of the above reasons, it shall order all agencies and law enforcement offices having any record of the arrest, whether on microfilm, computer card or tape, or on any other photographic, electronic or mechanical method of storing data, to destroy any record of arrest, photograph, fingerprint or any other information of any and all kinds or descriptions. The court shall order such custodians of records to file a sworn affidavit to the effect that the records have been destroyed and that no notations or references have been retained in the agency's central respository which will or might lead to the inference that any record ever was on file with any agency or law enforcement office. The original of this affidavit shall be kept by the court so ordering same and a copy shall be retained by the affiant agency which said copy shall not be a public record and shall not be open for public inspection but rather shall be kept under lock and key and maintained only for internal record keeping purposes to preserve the integrity of said agency's files and shall not be used for any investigative purpose. This Subsection does not apply to arrests for a first or second violation of any ordinance or statute making criminal the driving of a motor vehicle while under the influence of alcoholic beverages or narcotic drugs, as denounced by R.S. 14:98.
B. Any criminal court of record in which there was a nolle prosequi, an acquittal, or dismissal of a crime set forth above shall at the time of discharge of a person from its control, enter an order annulling, cancelling or rescinding the record of arrest, and disposition, and further ordering the destruction of the arrest record and order of disposition. Upon the entry of such an order the person against whom the arrest has been entered shall be restored to all civil rights lost or suspended by virtue of the arrest, unless otherwise provided in this section, and shall be treated in all respects as not having been arrested.
C. Notwithstanding any other provision of this section to the contrary, the provisions of this section shall in no case be construed to effect in any way whatsoever the practices and procedures in effect on July 29, 1970, relating to the administration of the implied consent law.
D. Whoever violates any provisions of this section shall be punished by a fine of not more than two hundred fifty dollars or by imprisonment of not more than ninety days, or both, if the conviction is for a first violation; second and subsequent violations shall be punished by a fine of not more than five hundred dollars or imprisonment of six months, or both. " (Emphasis added).
The clear language of the statute segregates only D.W.I. arrest records from those which may be expunged. The issue is whether the State may constitutionally accord different treatment to persons arrested but not convicted for driving while intoxicated from those with the same disposition of arrests for other misdemeanors.
1974 prevents the State in all cases from according different treatment to different classes. It is only when those classifications are not justified by valid State interests that a denial of equal protection may be found. Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71, 92 S.Ct. 251, 30 L.Ed.2d 225 (1971); McDonald v. Board of Election Commissioners, 394 U.S. 802, 89 S.Ct. 1404, 22 L.Ed.2d 739 (1968); Succession of Robins, 349 So.2d 276 (La.1977); Williams v. Williams, 331 So.2d 438 (La.1976). Both the State and the defendant agree that in the present case, there being no "suspect classification" nor "fundamental right" involved, the proper constitutional analysis to be applied is whether the classification created by the legislature bears a rational relation to a legitimate State interest. Hughes v. Alexandria Scrap Corp., 426 U.S. 794, 96 S.Ct. 2488, 49 L.Ed.2d 220 (1976); Marshall v. United States, 414 U.S. 417, 94 S.Ct. 700, 38 L.Ed.2d 618 (1974); McCormick v. Hunt, 328 So.2d 140 (La.1976); Chabert v. Louisiana High School Athletic Assn., 323 So.2d 774 (La.1975). The fact that a "privilege" is involved rather than a right is of no consequence. Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 91 S.Ct. 1848, 29 L.Ed.2d 534 (1971); Chabert v. Louisiana High School Athletic Assn., supra.
The general purposes of the expungement statute were recently discussed by this court in State v. Sims, 357 So.2d 1095 (La.1978). While the discussion also dealt with a related construction of C.Cr.P. 894, it is nevertheless pertinent to the present issues:
Two arguments have been advanced as justification for denying only those arrested for D.W.I. the benefits of expungement. The State first argues that D.W.I. arrest records must be retained...
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State v. Granger
......pretrial diversion participants the opportunity to have their arrest records expunged, while all other misdemeanor pretrial diversion participants can have their records expunged pursuant to La. R.S. 44:9 once the time to prosecute their offenses has run. Citing State v. Bradley, 360 So.2d 858 (La.1978), defendant argued that "affording different treatment to [defendant] because he was arrested for D.W.I., as opposed to some other misdemeanor charge, is not rationally related to a legitimate state interest and, therefore, is a violation of equal protection guaranteed ......
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