State v. Woodard
| Decision Date | 28 January 1980 |
| Docket Number | No. 65441,65441 |
| Citation | 387 So.2d 1066 |
| Parties | STATE of Louisiana v. Cecil A. WOODARD. |
| Court | Louisiana Supreme Court |
Carl A. Leckband, Jr., Miguez & Leckband, Lake Charles, for defendant-appellant.
William J. Guste, Jr., Atty. Gen., Barbara Rutledge, Asst. Atty. Gen., Leonard K. Knapp, Jr., Dist. Atty., Charles Richard, Abbott J. Reeves, Asst. Dist. Attys., for the State.
Defendant, Cecil A. Woodard, was convicted of operating a motor vehicle after being adjudged an habitual offender1 in violation of LSA-R.S. 32:1480. He was sentenced to three years in jail and has appealed to this court, relying upon thirteen assignments of error.
In February, 1976, Woodard, with advice of his attorney, Henry Liles, pleaded guilty to two counts of driving while intoxicated. In June, 1976, he was arraigned for running a red light, disturbing the peace and driving while intoxicated. Defendant, who stated that he had engaged the same counsel, waived the presence of his attorney at arraignment and pleaded not guilty. In February, 1977, defendant, without counsel, pleaded guilty to a bill of information which had been amended to read "First Offense." Since this was Woodard's third conviction of driving while intoxicated, he fit the description of an habitual offender in LSA-R.S. 32:1472(A)(1)(b):
On May 3, 1977, the State filed a petition for a rule to show cause why defendant's driving privileges should not be suspended. In the petition, it was alleged that:
Accompanying the petition was a certified conviction record from the Department of Public Safety. Defendant admits that he was served in the suit (Tr. 71), and the sheriff's return of service is in the record. However, defendant did not appear at the rule hearing on May 18, 1977, when judgment was rendered declaring him an habitual offender and suspending his driving privileges for five years. The court notified the Department of Public Safety of the judgment (as required by LSA-R.S. 32:1477) but no notice of the judgment was given to defendant himself.
On August 3, 1978, at approximately 3:30 A.M., defendant was observed driving with a headlight out and was stopped by a state trooper. A driver's license check revealed that defendant's license had been suspended. Defendant was cited for driving under revocation in violation of LSA-R.S. 32:415.
A bill of information was filed charging defendant with unlawful operation of a motor vehicle after being adjudged an habitual offender in violation of LSA-R.S. 32:1480. Defendant's motion to quash was denied. At trial the court found defendant guilty, denied his motion for a new trial, and sentenced him to three years in the Calcasieu Parish Jail.
Defendant contends that the bill of information should have been quashed because the habitual offender statute (LSA-R.S. 32:1471, et seq.) is unconstitutional in its failure to provide for notice of adjudication as an habitual offender. The statute is civil in nature, State v. Page, 332 So.2d 427 (La., 1976); State v. Bradley, 360 So.2d 858 (La., 1978); State v. Williams, 332 So.2d 432 (La., 1976). However, because of the potential criminal penalties for violation, defendant contends that notice was necessary for him to receive due process of law.
Defendant's contention is without merit. He was personally served with a rule to show cause, an order to appear in court to show why his driving privileges should not be suspended because of being an habitual offender. When defendant failed to appear, the rule was made absolute. Service of this petition and order notified defendant of the possible consequences of his non-appearance. Defendant was afforded an opportunity for a hearing and chose not to take it. The requirements of procedural due process are prior notice and a chance to be heard, which defendant received. Bell v. Burson, 402 U.S. 535, 91 S.Ct. 1586, 29 L.Ed.2d 90 (1971).
It is contended that the trial court erred in allowing into evidence a citation issued by a state trooper containing information furnished by defendant. Because the information, consisting of name, address, driver's license number and age, was essential in showing defendant to be an habitual offender and was obtained prior to any warning against self-incrimination, defendant contends it was inadmissible.
The information itself was not incriminating. Moreover, defendant was stopped for a valid reason (only one headlight), and the information was equally available to the state trooper from defendant's driver's license. LSA-R.S. 32:411(D) provides, in pertinent part:
The evidence was admissible.
ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR NUMBER THREE
Defendant contends that the three D.W.I. convictions were erroneously admitted into evidence without being properly identified as his. They were based upon citations issued to one with the same driver's license number, date of birth, height and weight.
LSA-R.S. 32:1476 provides the procedure to be followed if a defendant denies a prior conviction, but Woodard did not appear at the rule hearing to contest the convictions. See State v. Neathery, 357 So.2d 901 (La.App. 2 Cir. 1978). There was no error.
In these assignments, defendant complains of the use of his prior guilty pleas because: (1) he was unrepresented by counsel; and, (2) he was not advised of his rights as required by Boykin.
A person may be adjudged an habitual offender in a civil proceeding on the basis of prior uncounseled guilty pleas. State v. Free, 321 So.2d 50 (La.App. 3 Cir. 1975); State v. Love, 312 So.2d 675 (La.App. 2 Cir. 1975). However, a prior D.W.I. conviction may not be used to subject an accused to criminal prosecution and imprisonment as a second offender under LSA-R.S. 14:98, unless there was counsel or a knowing waiver of the right to counsel at the time of the first conviction. City of Monroe v. Fincher, 305 So.2d 108 (La., 1974); Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25, 92 S.Ct. 2006, 32 L.Ed.2d 530 (1972).
When Cecil A. Woodard pleaded guilty and was convicted of the first two charges of driving while intoxicated he was represented by counsel. At the time of his arraignment on the third charge of driving while intoxicated, Woodard informed the court that he had retained the same attorney, Henry Liles, although he later appeared without counsel and pleaded guilty. Thus, Woodard was either represented or waived counsel at all three convictions. Consequently, the convictions may be used to subject defendant to imprisonment for driving after adjudication as an habitual offender under LSA-R.S. 32:1481.
Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 89 S.Ct. 1709, 23 L.Ed.2d 274 (1969), holds that the record must disclose that a defendant...
To continue reading
Request your trial
-
Arita v. Cain
...Bureau of Criminal Identification.The Lee court cited as authority State v. Nicholas, 359 So.2d 965 (La. 1978) and State v. Woodard, 387 So.2d 1066 (La. 1980), cases pre-dating the Louisiana Code of Evidence, in which the Louisiana Supreme Court held that fingerprints on file with a police ......
-
State in Interest of A.C.
...of B.G.S., 556 So.2d 545 (La.1990); See also, Wilson v. City of New Orleans, 479 So.2d 891 (La.1985); State v. [93-1125 La. 10] Woodard, 387 So.2d 1066 (La.1980). In interpreting our state constitution by applying the Mathews v. Eldridge balancing test as we have done in the past, In re Ado......
-
State v. Jones
...Guilty Pleas, 93 Harv.L.Rev. 564 (1980).1 See State v. Vezina, 391 So.2d 450 (La.1980) (decided on other grounds); State v. Woodard, 387 So.2d 1066 (La.1980) (question avoided for lack of an apt objection); State ex rel Bishop v. Blackburn, 384 So.2d 406, 408 (La.1980) (Dixon, C. J., concur......
-
Adoption of B.G.S., In re
...v. Manzo, 380 U.S. 545, 85 S.Ct. 1187, 14 L.Ed.2d 62 (1965); Wilson v. City of New Orleans, 479 So.2d 891 (La.1985); State v. Woodard, 387 So.2d 1066 (La.1980). When the due process clauses are invoked in a novel context, the established practice is to begin the inquiry with a determination......