State v. Bradley

• Decision Date: 19 March 1918
• Docket Number: (No. 9927.)
• Citation: 96 S.E. 142
• Parties: STATE. v. BRADLEY.
• Court: South Carolina Supreme Court

96 S.E. 142

STATE.

v.BRADLEY.

(No. 9927.)

Supreme Court of South Carolina.

March 19, 1918.

[Ed. Note.—For other definitions, see Words and Phrases, First and Second Series, Storing.]

Appeal from General Sessions, Circuit Court of Barnwell County; H. F. Rice, Judge.

Josephine Bradley was convicted of violating the act to regulate shipment of intoxicating liquors into the state, and she appeals. Reversed.

J. O. Patterson, Jr., of Barnwell, for appellant.

R. L. Gunter, Sol., of Aiken, for the State.

HYDRICK, J. Defendant appeals from sentence on conviction for violation of section 5 of the act of 1915 (29 Stat. 140) entitled:

"An act to regulate the shipment of spirituous, vinous, fermented or malt liquors or beverages into this state, and to provide penalties for the violation of this act."

Section 5 reads:

"It shall be unlawful for any intoxicating liquors or beverages to be stored or kept in any place of business or clubroom or house in this state, whether for personal use or otherwise, and the liquors or beverages herein allowed to be imported, if stored, must be stored in the home or private room of the person or persons so ordering."

Defendant demurred to the indictment on eight grounds, alleging that the act violates as many provisions of the state and federal Constitutions. The demurrer was overruled, and the grounds thereof have been renewed by the exceptions. Only one of these grounds requires decision, since all the others were considered and decided adversely to the contention of appellant in Brennen v. Southern Express Co., 106 S. C. 102, 90 S. E. 402.

The ground of demurrer which was not considered in that case is that the act violates that provision of the state Constitu-tion (article 3, §17) which provides that every act shall relate to but one subject, which shall be expressed in the title. It is too plain to admit of doubt, or to require discussion, that the provisions of the act are germane to the subject expressed in the title thereof. That is all that is necessary, as will be seen by reference to any one of the many decisions of this court on that subject. The undisputed evidence shows that defendant kept a restaurant in which the officers of the law who searched her place, on May 20, 1916, found some whisky in a pitcher on a table, and some in a glass in a safe. Defendant admitted these facts, but testified that the whisky was given to her for her sick mother by a guest of the restaurant, who had taken a drink of whisky out of the glass found in the safe. She also admitted that she had received by express one gallon of whisky on April 27th, and one gallon on May 15th. The agent of the express company testified that she received one gallon of whisky on May 16th, possibly the same shipment that she testified to as of the 15th.

Defendant excepts to the ruling admitting the testimony of the agent of the express company, on the ground that it was prejudicial, because, under the law, she had the right to import one gallon a month for her own use, while the testimony of the agent tended to show that she was trafficking in liquor. We fail to see any force in this contention. The testimony was clearly competent, because it tended to prove that defendant had received whisky which she could have used unlawfully in her restaurant. It was tor the jury to decide whether she so used it or not, and also whether the whisky found in the pitcher and glass had been given to defendant, as she testified, or whether it was some that she had received by express and was keeping there in violation of the law. Besides, she had already testified herself that she had received a gallon from the express company on May 15th, and her own testimony was susceptible of the same inference as that of the agent. Defendant further excepts because the court refused to direct a verdict of acquittal on...