State v. Bradshaw, s. WD
| Decision Date | 28 December 1993 |
| Docket Number | Nos. WD,s. WD |
| Parties | STATE of Missouri, Respondent, v. Tom BRADSHAW, Appellant. Thomas BRADSHAW, Appellant, v. STATE of Missouri, Appellant. 46681, WD 48278. |
| Court | Missouri Court of Appeals |
Raymond L. Legg, Office of the State Public Defender, Columbia, for appellant.
Jeremiah W. (Jay) Nixon, Atty. Gen., Elizabeth L. Ziegler, Asst. Atty. Gen., Jefferson City, for respondent.
Before HANNA, P.J., and LOWENSTEIN and FENNER, JJ.
After a jury trial, Thomas Bradshaw (Bradshaw) stood convicted of two counts of promoting prostitution in the third degree, § 567.070, RSMo 1986. He was sentenced as a prior offender to two five-year prison terms to be served consecutively to each other and to a previously-imposed sentence. Bradshaw sought post-conviction relief under Rule 29.15; he was afforded an evidentiary hearing, but was denied relief. This appeal consolidates Bradshaw's direct and post-conviction appeals.
Bradshaw's convictions arose from his operation of a costume and novelty shop called "You're Kidding." The business also offered singing and dancing telegrams.
In the spring of 1991, Bradshaw began showing nude photographs to a patron who frequented the shop. As they developed a rapport, Bradshaw allowed the patron to watch exotic dances performed by women in a back room. In October and November of 1991, Bradshaw negotiated with the patron for the purchase of dances with individual women. During the negotiations, Bradshaw insinuated that sexual activity was available at additional cost. Bradshaw accepted money for the dances, and set up the appointments between the patron and the women. During the dances, Bradshaw observed from behind a two-way mirror, and informed the dancers when the time for the purchased dances had expired. The patron paid Bradshaw for six dances; three of those dances involved sexual activity; one dance ended in sexual intercourse.
In November of 1991, a journalism student, who was investigating a story, approached Bradshaw at his shop about providing entertainment for a fictional bachelor's party. After negotiations, Bradshaw agreed to provide a nude dancer for $300 an hour who would engage in manual sex and in sexual intercourse for additional $100 payments. The student gave Bradshaw a $200 down payment and the address of the "party."
Bradshaw contends that the trial court plainly erred in sustaining the state's objection to his cross-examination of the patron. The patron testified to previous criminal convictions involving solicitation. He made "a deal with the State so that [he] would not be prosecuted for any of this stuff." His complaint concerns the following:
Q. [Defense counsel] You are on probation?
A. [The patron] Yes, I am.
Q. And a condition of your probation that you're aware of is that you are not to commit other offenses; is that correct?
MS. GARLAND [Assistant prosecutor]: Objection, Your Honor.
THE COURT: The objection will be sustained. Let's proceed, please[ ].
Bradshaw failed to preserve his complaint for appellate review. He made no offer of proof to show the materiality and relevancy of the excluded testimony. State v. Hurtt, 836 S.W.2d 56, 58-59 (Mo.App.1992). Yet, according to Bradshaw, the trial court's ruling denied him an adequate opportunity to cross-examine the patron, thereby violating his constitutional rights to confrontation, a fair trial, and due process. Bradshaw insists that the patron's answer would have demonstrated the patron's expectancy of favorable treatment for furthering the state's case. Bradshaw also maintains that the excluded testimony would have exposed the reason for the patron's bias, and would have discredited the patron's testimony. Contrary to his assertions, Bradshaw makes no showing approaching plain error. In plain error review, the appellant bears the burden of demonstrating that the trial court's action was not only erroneous, but that the error so substantially impacted upon his rights so as to result in manifest injustice or a miscarriage of justice. State v. Shaline, 793 S.W.2d 167, 170 (Mo.App.1990). The record reveals that Bradshaw was afforded ample...
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