State v. Bradsher
| Decision Date | 04 November 2022 |
| Docket Number | 13PA21 |
| Citation | 382 N.C. 656,879 S.E.2d 567 |
| Parties | STATE of North Carolina v. Wallace BRADSHER |
| Court | North Carolina Supreme Court |
Joshua H. Stein, Attorney General, by James W. Doggett, Deputy Solicitor General, for the State-appellant.
Glenn Gerding, Appellate Defender, and Michele A. Goldman, Assistant Appellate Defender, for defendant-appellee.
¶ 1 In this matter, we consider whether the Court of Appeals erred by vacating defendant's conviction of felony obstruction of justice. Upon careful review, we conclude that the Court of Appeals erred. Therefore, we reverse the Court of Appeals’ decision.
¶ 2 By superseding indictment, a grand jury indicted defendant Wallace Bradsher for conspiracy to commit obtaining property by false pretenses, obtaining property by false pretenses, aiding and abetting obtaining property by false pretenses, three counts of felony obstruction of justice, and willful failure to discharge the duties of office. After a nearly three-week-long trial, a jury returned a guilty verdict on obtaining property by false pretenses, aiding and abetting obtaining property by false pretenses, one count of misdemeanor obstruction of justice, one count of felony obstruction of justice, and willful failure to discharge duties of office. The jury acquitted defendant of the remaining charges. The trial court arrested judgment on the charge of obtaining property by false pretenses and entered judgment on the remaining convictions. After being sentenced, defendant appealed.
¶ 3 On appeal to the Court of Appeals, defendant presented multiple arguments, but the sole issue before this Court is whether there was sufficient evidence to convict defendant of felony obstruction of justice based on his false statements to the State Bureau of Investigation (SBI). Thus, the appeal before this Court only concerns Count V of the superseding indictment. Count V alleged that defendant "commit[ted] the infamous offense of obstruction of justice by knowingly and intentionally providing false and fabricated statements to David Whitley, agent of the [SBI] ... designed to mislead the agent thereby impeding, delaying and obstructing the investigation, and legal and public justice."
¶ 4 As to this issue, the Court of Appeals concluded that when taking the evidence in the light most favorable to the State, the evidence presented at trial supported a determination that defendant's statement that Cindy Blitzer worked on special projects was false. State v. Bradsher , 275 N.C. App. 715, 724, 852 S.E.2d 716 (2020). However, the Court of Appeals concluded that defendant's statement that Cindy Blitzer worked on conflict cases was not false given that a particular time period was not specified. Id. The Court of Appeals viewed this as an omission, not a false or fabricated statement. Id. Then, the Court of Appeals concluded that "the State did not provide substantial evidence of obstruction to support the conviction for felony obstruction of justice." Id. at 725, 852 S.E.2d 716.
¶ 5 The State petitioned this Court for discretionary review pursuant to N.C.G.S. § 7A-31, arguing that the Court of Appeals erred by vacating the felony obstruction of justice conviction for insufficient evidence. This Court allowed the State's petition for discretionary review.
¶ 6 "Whether the State presented substantial evidence of each essential element of the offense is a question of law; therefore, we review the denial of a motion to dismiss de novo." State v. Crockett , 368 N.C. 717, 720, 782 S.E.2d 878 (2016). The question for a court on a motion to dismiss for insufficient evidence "is whether there is substantial evidence (1) of each essential element of the offense charged, or of a lesser offense included therein, and (2) of defendant's being the perpetrator of such offense." State v. Powell , 299 N.C. 95, 98, 261 S.E.2d 114 (1980). "If so, the motion is properly denied." Id. Substantial evidence is the same as more than a scintilla of evidence. Id. at 99, 261 S.E.2d 114.
In reviewing challenges to the sufficiency of evidence, we must view the evidence in the light most favorable to the State, giving the State the benefit of all reasonable inferences. Contradictions and discrepancies do not warrant dismissal of the case but are for the jury to resolve. The test for sufficiency of the evidence is the same whether the evidence is direct or circumstantial or both. Circumstantial evidence may withstand a motion to dismiss and support a conviction even when the evidence does not rule out every hypothesis of innocence. If the evidence presented is circumstantial, the court must consider whether a reasonable inference of defendant's guilt may be drawn from the circumstances. Once the court decides that a reasonable inference of defendant's guilt may be drawn from the circumstances, then it is for the jury to decide whether the facts, taken singly or in combination , satisfy it beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant is actually guilty.
State v. Barnes , 334 N.C. 67, 75–76, 430 S.E.2d 914 (1993) (cleaned up). In making this determination, a court "is to consider all evidence actually admitted, competent or incompetent, which is favorable to the State, disregarding defendant's evidence unless favorable to the State." State v. Baker , 338 N.C. 526, 558–59, 451 S.E.2d 574 (1994). "When ruling on a motion to dismiss, the trial court should be concerned only about whether the evidence is sufficient for jury consideration, not about the weight of the evidence." State v. Fritsch , 351 N.C. 373, 379, 526 S.E.2d 451 (2000).
¶ 7 "At common law it is an offense to do any act which prevents, obstructs, impedes or hinders public or legal justice." In re Kivett , 309 N.C. 635, 670, 309 S.E.2d 442 (1983) (quoting 67 C.J.S. Obstructing Justice § 2 (1978) ). When this common law offense is done with deceit and intent to defraud, it is a felony. N.C.G.S. § 14-3(b) (2021) ; State v. Ditenhafer , 373 N.C. 116, 128, 834 S.E.2d 392 (2019).
¶ 8 On appeal to this Court, the State argues that the Court of Appeals erred in the same manner as the Court of Appeals erred in Ditenhafer , 373 N.C. 116, 834 S.E.2d 392 (2019). According to the State, by reversing the Court of Appeals’ holding concerning the sufficiency of the evidence for a felony obstruction of justice conviction in Ditenhafer , this Court "showed that courts should not construe indictments narrowly to escape their obligation to review evidence in the light most favorable [to] the State." The State asserts that the Court of Appeals assumed the State was pursuing a conviction on a non-pleaded theory about omissions, rather than viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the State to assess whether defendant made false statements. The State also emphasizes that the meaning of testimony bears on the evidence's weight, not sufficiency, as reiterated in State v. Tucker , 380 N.C. 234, 2022-NCSC-15, ¶ 22, 867 S.E.2d 924. The State further notes that an answer's falsehood may depend on the statement's context.
¶ 9 Defendant contends that the State relied on an omission by defendant, rather than a false or fabricated statement, for the felony obstruction of justice conviction. According to defendant, there was no evidence that Agent Whitley asked defendant if Cindy Blitzer was currently working on conflict cases. Defendant also argues that Agent Whitley never testified that any false or fabricated statement made by defendant on 6 September 2016 obstructed, impeded, or hindered his investigation.
¶ 10 From our review of the transcript and exhibits admitted at trial, we conclude that when viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the State and giving the State the benefit of all reasonable inferences, a reasonable inference of defendant's guilt for felony obstruction of justice can be drawn from the circumstances. See Barnes , 334 N.C. at 75, 430 S.E.2d 914.
¶ 11 The State's evidence at trial showed the following: In mid-January 2015, defendant, the elected district attorney for Caswell County and Person County (District 9A), commenced employment of Cindy Blitzer. Also at that time, Craig Blitzer, the elected district attorney for Rockingham County (District 17A), commenced employment of Pam Bradsher. Pam Bradsher was defendant's wife; Cindy Blitzer was Craig Blitzer's wife. However, defendant and Craig Blitzer wanted to employ their own wives.
¶ 12 Initially, Cindy Blitzer, employed by defendant, worked from the Caswell County District Attorney's Office (District 9A) on Caswell County District Court matters with John Stultz, who was an assistant district attorney in that district. Pam Bradsher, employed by Craig Blitzer, initially worked from the Rockingham County District Attorney's Office (District 17A). Yet, by March or April 2015, Pam Bradsher worked from the Person County District Attorney's Office (District 9A) on Person County matters. Around the same time, defendant authorized Cindy Blitzer to work from either the Rockingham County District Attorney's Office (District 17A) or from her home.
¶ 13 After this transition, Stultz assigned Cindy Blitzer to work on a case from Rockingham County that the district attorney's office in District 9A was handling (the Shockley case). Given this context, the Shockley case was classified as a conflict case. Cindy Blitzer reviewed and organized the file. She also worked on two or three other matters for Stultz "but nothing significant."
¶ 14 In May 2015, the State Ethics Commission informed defendant and Craig Blitzer that the prohibition against employing relatives under the State Government Ethics Act, N.C.G.S. § 138A-40, could not be waived. As a result, they could not hire their own wives as desired. Roughly three months later in August 2015, Pam Bradsher resigned from her employment with District 17A.
¶ 15 In light of Pam Bradsher's resignation, defendant asked Craig Blitzer to hire ...
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