State v. Brandon
Decision Date | 29 May 2008 |
Docket Number | No. 07-1206.,07-1206. |
Citation | 755 N.W.2d 548 |
Parties | STATE of Iowa, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Jackie Lynn BRANDON, Defendant-Appellee. |
Court | Iowa Court of Appeals |
Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, Richard Bennett, Assistant Attorney General, and Jeffrey Millhollin, County Attorney, for appellant.
Mark C. Smith, State Appellate Defender, and Robert Ranschau, Assistant Appellate Defender, for appellee.
Considered by HUITINK, P.J., and ZIMMER and MILLER, JJ.
Jackie Brandon (Brandon) and his wife, Terri, are the co-owners of a home in rural Adams County. After receiving permission to search the Brandons' marital residence from Terri, law officers conducted a search of the couple's home. They discovered evidence of criminal activity in the basement. Based on that evidence, the State charged Brandon with two criminal offenses. Brandon moved to suppress the evidence. Following a hearing, the district court determined the search was invalid because Brandon was present at the residence and did not consent to the search. Therefore, the court granted Brandon's motion to suppress. Following the granting of discretionary review, the State seeks reversal of the district court's ruling. Upon our review, we affirm the court's decision.
Brandon and Terri were involved in a domestic altercation on January 11, 2007, which led Terri to leave the family residence. On January 15 Terri executed a written permission to search form, which gave the Adams County Sheriff's Office consent to search the Brandon family residence.1 After receiving this consent, several deputy sheriffs proceeded to the Brandons' home. The deputies had an arrest warrant for Brandon on charges arising out of the domestic altercation.
The deputies entered the Brandons' residence and found Brandon in the living room. Brandon asked if the deputies had a search warrant. One of the deputies replied that they had an arrest warrant, and another said that because of that, they did not need a search warrant. The deputies then arrested Brandon and removed him from the residence.
A search of the Brandon residence ensued. In the basement, deputies found drug paraphernalia, small plastic bags, and some white residue. After discovering those items, the deputies left the residence and obtained a search warrant. The deputies then returned to the scene, executed the search warrant, and conducted a more extensive search.
Based on the evidence recovered from the Brandons' home, the State filed a trial information charging Brandon with possession of methamphetamine and child endangerment. Brandon filed a motion to suppress the evidence seized from his residence. He argued that the initial search pursuant his wife's consent was invalid because he had not consented to a search, the officers did not request his consent despite his presence in the home, and the officers allegedly "removed" him to avoid a possible objection. The motion also asserted that any later search pursuant to the search warrant the deputies obtained was invalid.
Following an evidentiary hearing, the district court granted the defendant's motion to suppress the evidence found in the Brandons' home. The court concluded that Brandon did not consent to a search of his residence, and that the consent of his wife was insufficient support for the initial warrantless search, in light of the decision in Georgia v. Randolph, 547 U.S. 103, 126 S.Ct. 1515, 164 L.Ed.2d 208 (2006).
The State filed an application for discretionary review of the district court's ruling contending the district court erroneously concluded that Georgia v. Randolph controlled the result in this case. Our supreme court granted discretionary review, stayed further district court proceedings, and transferred the case to this court.
We review a district court's ruling on a motion to suppress evidence allegedly seized in violation of constitutional guarantees de novo. State v. Turner, 630 N.W.2d 601, 606 (Iowa 2001). We independently evaluate the totality of the circumstances as shown by the entire record. State v. Howard, 509 N.W.2d 764, 767 (Iowa 1993). We defer to the district court's fact findings due to its opportunity to assess the credibility of witnesses, but we are not bound by those findings. Turner, 630 N.W.2d at 606.
The State contends the district court's suppression ruling should be reversed because the Supreme Court's decision in Georgia v. Randolph has no application to this case. The State argues that because the defendant did not expressly object to the search of his home, the search was appropriately based on the consent of his wife.
Voluntary consent allows police to conduct a warrantless search of property over which the consenting person has authority. See Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 219, 222, 93 S.Ct. 2041, 2043-2045, 36 L.Ed.2d 854, 858, 860 (1973). In United States v. Matlock, 415 U.S. 164, 170, 94 S.Ct. 988, 993, 39 L.Ed.2d 242, 249 (1974), the Supreme Court held that "the consent of one who possesses common authority over premises or effects is valid as against the absent, nonconsenting person with whom that authority is shared." In Georgia v. Randolph, the Court addressed whether such consent is valid when the other occupant or owner of the premises is present and objects to the search. 547 U.S. at 106, 126 S.Ct. at 1519-1520, 164 L.Ed.2d at 217. The Court held that an officer had no authority to proceed with a search in the face of the objection of a co-tenant of the property who was present and objected to the search. Id. at 120, 126 S.Ct. at 1526, 164 L.Ed.2d at 226.
In this case, the district court found that Brandon had "objected to the search" of his residence, and so the Randolph decision controlled. The State asserts the district court erred in finding that Brandon expressly objected to a search of his residence.
Deputy Alan Johannes testified at the suppression hearing. Initially, he testified that the defendant was in jail when Terri gave her consent to search the Brandons' home. However, after being shown documents that clearly revealed the defendant was not in custody, the deputy recalled that Brandon was present in the living room of his home when deputies arrived to conduct a search.
On cross-examination Deputy Johannes testified as follows:
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