State v. Brauch

Decision Date22 July 1999
Docket NumberNo. 24122.,24122.
Citation984 P.2d 703,133 Idaho 215
PartiesSTATE of Idaho, Plaintiff-Respondent, v. Eric Anthony BRAUCH, Defendant-Appellant.
CourtIdaho Supreme Court

Rude, Jackson & Daugharty, Coeur d'Alene, for appellant. Dan J. Rude argued.

Hon. Alan G. Lance, Attorney General; Kenneth K. Jorgensen, Deputy Attorney General, Boise, for respondent. Kenneth K. Jorgensen argued. KIDWELL, Justice.

Defendant Eric Brauch appeals from the district court's denial of a motion to suppress evidence resulting from a police search of his rental house where the landlord gave police permission to search after Brauch apparently abandoned the premises. We affirm.

I.

BACKGROUND AND PRIOR PROCEEDINGS

Eric Anthony Brauch and Catherine Gnechi (tenants) rented a house in Coeur d'Alene from Paula Victoria Johnson. Johnson rented the house (the Johnson house) through Anchor Property Management (Anchor). Johnson's management agreement with Anchor provided a mutual thirty-day cancellation clause. In July 1996, the tenants signed a one-year rental agreement with Anchor and paid a $400 security deposit. The rental agreement specified that if the tenants vacated or abandoned the premises, Johnson or Anchor could dispose of any property left on the premises. Although rent was due on the first day of the month, the tenants paid the rent on the fifth.

On January 7, 1997, Johnson informed Karen DeHoog, Anchor's property manager, that she intended to sell the house. She told DeHoog that the tenants could either move before the lease was up, or stay and agree to have the house shown to potential buyers. DeHoog left a message on the tenants' answering machine conveying this information.

The tenants found another house to rent on Gilbert Street in Coeur d'Alene. They did not give Anchor one month's written notice as required by the lease. They moved into the Gilbert Street house the first week of February, moving most of their belongings over the weekend of February 8 and 9.

By February 10, the Johnson house was vacant, although several items were left inside the garage. Brauch said the items consisted of painting tools, gardening tools, fiberglass canisters for a water purification system, a fish tank stand, and $150 worth of lacquer, thinner, and latex paints. Johnson characterized these items as trash, leftover paint cans, ammunition, and a face mask. In addition, a dog house and lawn mower remained outside. The tenants did not return the keys to either Anchor or Johnson, and they testified that they intended to return to the house to retrieve the rest of their belongings and make repairs. The utilities remained in the tenants' names through February. However, the tenants did not pay the February rent.

On February 9, DeHoog told Johnson that the tenants had moved out of the house. On February 10, DeHoog and Johnson inspected the vacant house. While in the basement, Johnson noticed that the wiring had been changed, black plastic covered the walls, and dirt covered part of the floor. She returned to clean the house the following day. Johnson testified that after she discovered a receipt for halogen bulbs she suspected that marijuana had been grown in the basement. She went to the police station and informed Detectives Hildebrandt and Moyer of her observations. Johnson told them that she owned the rental house which had been vacated by the tenants. She stated that she was selling the property, that Anchor had managed the rental, that she had taken the property over from Anchor, and that she and DeHoog had inspected the house the previous day. She requested that the detectives inspect the house with her.

The detectives accompanied Johnson to the house. At the suppression hearing, Hildebrandt testified that the house appeared vacant to them. Hildebrandt said that before entering the house, he saw some objects outside the garage that to him looked like "abandoned junk." Hildebrandt testified that he believed Johnson had authority to consent to a search of the house. The detectives, accompanied by Johnson, inspected the house and the items remaining in the garage. In the basement they found dried and green marijuana clippings, black plastic sheeting, and numerous electrical outlets consistent with lighting used for growing marijuana.

After searching the Johnson house, the detectives obtained a copy of the lease from Anchor. DeHoog also informed them where Gnecchi worked. When the detectives contacted Gnecchi, she told them that she and Brauch had moved to the Gilbert Street house where there was possibly one marijuana plant. Based on this information, the detectives obtained a search warrant for the Gilbert Street house, where they found seven marijuana plants, loose marijuana, and paraphernalia.

Brauch was arrested for manufacturing a controlled substance in violation of I.C. § 37-2732(a)(1)(B). He filed a motion to suppress the evidence seized pursuant to the search warrant as the product of an unlawful search of the Johnson house. After a hearing, the district court found that "[a]s of February 11, 1997, the Johnson-Brauch and Gnecchi rental agreement had not been terminated." The district court concluded that "Johnson did not have the actual authority to consent to the search of the Johnson house by Moyer and Hildebrandt" but that "Moyer and Hildebrandt reasonably believed that Johnson could consent to the search of the Johnson house." Holding that the Johnson house search came under the apparent authority exception to the warrant requirement, the district court denied the motion to suppress.

Brauch entered a conditional guilty plea pursuant to Idaho Criminal Rule 11(a)(2) on June 19, 1997, reserving his right to appeal the denial of the motion to suppress. The district court suspended execution of Brauch's two-year sentence and placed Brauch on three years' probation. The district court stayed execution of most terms of the judgment pending appeal.

II.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

When reviewing an order denying a motion to suppress evidence, this Court overturns a trial court's factual findings only if they are clearly erroneous. Doe v. State, 131 Idaho 851, 853, 965 P.2d 816, 818 (1998). In addition, this Court gives due deference to any implicit findings of the trial court supported by substantial evidence. State v. Du-Valt, 131 Idaho 550, 553, 961 P.2d 641, 644 (1998). The credibility and weight to be given evidence is in the province of the trial court. Sun Valley Shamrock Resources, Inc. v. Travelers Leasing Corp., 118 Idaho 116, 118, 794 P.2d 1389, 1391 (1990). However, this Court exercises free review over questions of law, including whether "constitutional requirements have been satisfied in light of facts found." State v. Harvill, 131 Idaho 720, 721, 963 P.2d 1157, 1158 (1998) (quoting State v. Weber, 116 Idaho 449, 452, 776 P.2d 458, 461 (1989)).

III.

ANALYSIS

A. A Landlord Has Apparent Authority to Consent to a Search of Rented Premises Where the Tenants' Lease Has Not Actually Ended but a Reasonable Person Could Conclude that the Tenants Had Abandoned the Premises.

The district court concluded that the warrantless search of the Johnson house did not violate Brauch's rights against unreasonable searches and seizures because it came under the apparent authority exception to the warrant requirement. Brauch contends that, as a matter of law, landlords cannot have apparent authority over their tenants' premises.

Individuals have a reasonable expectation of privacy within their homes which is protected by the Fourth Amendment. Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170, 177-78, 104 S.Ct. 1735, 1740-41, 80 L.Ed.2d 214, 223-24 (1984); State v. Vasquez, 129 Idaho 129, 131, 922 P.2d 426, 428 (Ct.App.1996). Warrantless searches and seizures inside an individual's home are presumptively unreasonable. Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 586, 100 S.Ct. 1371, 1380, 63 L.Ed.2d 639, 650-51 (1980); State v. Curl, 125 Idaho 224, 225, 869 P.2d 224, 225 (1993). Warrants are not required, however, if a search falls under "a few specifically established and well-delineated exceptions." Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 455, 91 S.Ct. 2022, 2032, 29 L.Ed.2d 564, 576 (1971) (quoting Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 357, 88 S.Ct. 507, 514, 19 L.Ed.2d 576, 585 (1967)); see also State v. Ham, 113 Idaho 405, 406, 744 P.2d 133, 134 (Ct.App.1987). The burden is on the government to show that a situation falls within one of the exceptions to the warrant requirement. Coolidge, 403 U.S. at 455,91 S.Ct. at 2032,29 L.Ed.2d at 576; see also State v. Johnson, 110 Idaho 516, 522, 716 P.2d 1288, 1294 (1986). If the government fails to meet its burden, the evidence obtained as a result of the illegal search, including later-discovered evidence derived from the original illegal search, is inadmissible in court. Segura v. United States, 468 U.S. 796, 804, 104 S.Ct. 3380, 3385, 82 L.Ed.2d 599, 608 (1984); State v. Bainbridge, 117 Idaho 245, 249, 787 P.2d 231, 235 (1990).

A warrant is not required when police obtain consent for the search from a person who has actual authority to consent. United States v. Matlock, 415 U.S. 164, 170, 94 S.Ct. 988, 993, 39 L.Ed.2d 242, 249 (1974); Johnson, 110 Idaho at 522, 716 P.2d at 1294; Ham, 113 Idaho at 406, 744 P.2d at 134. Actual authority can result from common authority over the premises, resulting from "mutual use of the property by persons generally having joint access or control for most purposes," as in the case of married couples or joint tenants. Matlock, 415 U.S. at 171 n. 7, 94 S.Ct. at 993 n. 7, 39 L.Ed.2d at 249-50 n. 7; see also State v. Huskey, 106 Idaho 91, 93, 675 P.2d 351, 353 (Ct.App.1984).

If a person consenting to a search does not have actual authority, but government agents reasonably believe that the person has authority, a warrantless search is valid. Illinois v. Rodriguez, 497 U.S. 177, 188-89, 110 S.Ct. 2793, 2801-02, 111...

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  • State Of Idaho v. Hansen
    • United States
    • Idaho Court of Appeals
    • July 15, 2010
    ...have apparent authority merely because the landlord has legitimate access to the premises for limited purposes." State v. Brauch, 133 Idaho 215, 221, 984 P.2d 703, 709 (1999). In State v. McGovern, 252 N.W.2d 365 (Wis. 1977), it was held that a person who answered the door to a residence wh......
  • State v. Holbert
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    ...was incarcerated, and arrangements were made with defendant's sister to remove possessions); see generally State v. Brauch, 133 Idaho 215, 220, 984 P.2d 703, 708 (1999) (noting indicators of abandonment to include nonpayment of rent; removal of furniture, clothes, etc.; nonpayment or discon......
  • Lint v. State
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    ...does not have actual authority to consent to a search of a tenant's home when the tenant is in actual possession. State v. Brauch, 133 Idaho 215, 219, 984 P.2d 703, 707 (1999). If police reasonably believed, however, that the consenting person possessed sufficient authority to consent to th......
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    ...a warrantless search may still be valid. Rodriguez, 497 U.S. at 186, 110 S.Ct. at 2800, 111 L.Ed.2d at 159–60 ; State v. Brauch, 133 Idaho 215, 219, 984 P.2d 703, 707 (1999) ; State v. Fancher, 145 Idaho 832, 838–39, 186 P.3d 688, 694–95 (Ct.App.2008). This "apparent authority" doctrine was......
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