State v. Brechon
| Decision Date | 03 August 1984 |
| Docket Number | No. C2-83-1696,C2-83-1696 |
| Citation | 352 N.W.2d 745 |
| Parties | STATE of Minnesota, Respondent, v. John BRECHON and Scott Carpenter, et al., petitioners, Appellants. |
| Court | Minnesota Supreme Court |
Syllabus by the Court
1. "Claim of right" in a criminal trespass case under Minn.Stat. § 609.605(5) (1982) is not a defense but an essential element of the state's case.
2. The jury, not the trial court, decides the sufficiency of the evidence presented to establish a claim of right to enter or remain upon the premises of another. The trial court may not require defendants to make a pretrial offer of proof on the claim of right issue.
3. The existence of criminal intent is a question of fact that must be submitted to a jury. Defendants may not be precluded from testifying about their intent.
Mark S. Wernick, Linda Gallant, Minneapolis, Kenneth E. Tilsen, St. Paul, for appellants.
Robert J. Alfton, Minneapolis City Atty., Michael T. Norton, Asst. Minneapolis City Atty., Minneapolis, for respondent.
Elliot C. Rothenberg, Minneapolis, for North Star Legal Foundation.
Heard, considered and decided by the court en banc.
Appellants were arrested at Honeywell corporate headquarters in Minneapolis and charged with trespassing. Prior to trial the state moved to prevent defendants from presenting evidence pertaining to necessity or justification defenses unless certain conditions were met. The state also sought to preclude defendants from asserting a "claim of right" defense. The trial court ruled that the state had the burden of disproving "claim of right" and that defendants could offer evidence about their reasons for committing the act, whether because of moral, political or religious beliefs, but could not testify more specifically such "as to the destruction [nuclear war] can present." The trial court did not rule on the necessity defense.
The state appealed and the defendants sought review of the order limiting their testimony to general beliefs. A three-judge panel in a 2-1 vote reversed the trial court and held that "without claim of right" is an affirmative defense, that defendant's testimony as to beliefs is irrelevant, that a necessity defense may not be raised at trial, and that a pretrial offer of proof must be made as to the claim of right or justification defense. We reverse.
This matter is before this court in a very difficult procedural posture. There has been no trial, so there are no facts before us. Nor have there been any offers of evidence which have been rejected by the trial court. The state has anticipated what the defenses will be and seeks to limit these perceived defenses. As a general rule in the field of criminal law, defendants are not required to determine in advance what evidence they will use in their cases. 1 The state is required to bear its burden of proof before the defendants determine whether or not they will offer any evidence and, if so, what evidence they will offer. The use of a motion in limine against a defendant in a criminal case, particularly one as broad in scope as in this case, is questionable considering the constitutional rights of defendants. See State v. Quick, 226 Kan. 308, 311-12, 597 P.2d 1108, 1112 (1979); Commonwealth v. Hood, 389 Mass. 581, 596, 452 N.E.2d 188, 197 (1983) (Liacos, J., concurring).
We find it necessary first to clarify the procedural effect of the "claim of right" language in the trespass statute under which these defendants were arrested. The parties frame the issue as whether the state has the burden to prove the defendants did not have a claim of right to be on Honeywell property or whether defendants have the initial burden of going forward to present a prima facie case of claim of right. Second, the court must determine whether the trial court or the jury should decide if defendants have a valid claim of right. Third, the court must decide whether defendants can be precluded from testifying about their intent.
1. The trespass statute, Minn.Stat. § 609.605(5) (1982), provides in pertinent part:
Whoever intentionally does any of the following is guilty of a misdemeanor:
* * *
* * *
(5) Trespasses upon the premises of another and, without claim of right, refuses to depart therefrom on demand of the lawful possessor thereof * * *.
(Emphasis added.)
We have discussed the "claim of right" language of the trespass statute in prior cases. In State v. Hoyt, 304 N.W.2d 884 (Minn.1981), defendant Hoyt sought to visit a brain-damaged patient at a nursing home. As a result of complaints about the patient's care made by Hoyt to nursing home personnel and outside agencies, she was forbidden by the nursing home administration to visit the patient. When Hoyt thereafter entered the nursing home and refused to leave, she was arrested for trespass.
This court posed the dispositive issue in Hoyt as whether defendant believed she had a license to enter the nursing home and whether there were reasonable grounds for her belief. 304 N.W.2d at 891. The court held that Hoyt did not know that the patient's guardians had acquiesced in the nursing home's letter refusing Hoyt permission to visit the patient. Thus, Hoyt had presented a prima facie case of claim of right; that is, a reasonable belief that she had license or permission to visit. Id. at 891-92.
In Hoyt, this court expressly did not decide whether claim of right is an element of or a defense to the offense. Id. at 886 n. 2. Defendant had waived a jury trial and did not contest on appeal to this court the trial court's requirement that she make an offer of proof to present a prima facie case of claim of right.
State v. Quinnell, 277 Minn. 63, 151 N.W.2d 598 (1967), involved the issue whether defendant's misdemeanor arrest was valid. Quinnell's arrest arose from his participation in a demonstration of livestock farmers at the St. Paul Union Stockyards Company. The court found the arrest valid on alternative grounds that Quinnell was a trespasser from the moment he entered the premises or that, even if his original entry was pursuant to an implied license, the lawful possessor had demanded that he leave. Although defendant had not raised the issue, the court found no evidence that defendant had a claim of right. Id. at 70, 151 N.W.2d at 604.
As a review of these cases reveals, the court has never had occasion to rule on the burden of proof issues surrounding "claim of right." We perceive several possible ways of handling the claim of right issue in a criminal trespass case: (1) as an element of the state's case requiring an acquittal if the state has not proven that the defendant did not have a right to be on the premises; (2) as an ordinary defense, requiring the defendant to present evidence, with the burden of persuasion on the prosecution to disprove the defense beyond a reasonable doubt; or (3) as an affirmative defense, requiring the defendant to go forward with evidence raising the defense and shoulder the persuasion burden of establishing such defense by a preponderance of the evidence. See generally, 1 Wharton's Criminal Law § 39 (C. Torcia 14th ed. 1978).
The state argues, relying primarily on State v. Paige, 256 N.W.2d 298 (Minn.1977), that "claim of right" is merely an exception to the statute that recognizes that certain conduct is not prohibited. We held in Paige that the phrase "without a permit" in a statute created an exception to the prohibition against possession of pistols in certain places. Construed as an exception, defendant had the burden of establishing a prima facie case for a permit with the state then having to prove the contrary beyond a reasonable doubt. 256 N.W.2d at 303-04.
The test for determining what constitutes a basic element of rather than an exception to a statute has been stated as "whether the exception is so incorporated with the clause defining the offense that it becomes in fact a part of the description." Williams v. United States, 138 F.2d 81, 81-82 (D.C.Cir.1943). In order to place the burden of proving the "exception" on the defendant, a court must decide that the act in itself, without the exception, is "ordinarily dangerous to society or involves moral turpitude" and that requiring the state to prove the acts would place an impossible burden on the prosecution. Id. at 82. Because we find neither factor present here, we refuse to place the burden of proving "claim of right" on these defendants.
Claim of right is a concept historically central to defining the crime of trespass. In State v. Quinnell, we noted that the legislature inserted the language to protect an innocent trespasser from criminal prosecution. 277 Minn. at 70-71, 151 N.W.2d at 604. If the defendant has a claim of right, he lacks the criminal intent which is the gravamen of the offense. There is no punishable act of trespass if the state cannot show defendant was on the premises without a claim of right. See Hayes v. State, 13 Ga.App. 647, 79 S.E. 761 (1913), where the court stated:
An act which, as related to the true owner of land, might appear to be trespass is not in fact a trespass if the act is committed in good faith by one who actually and sincerely believes that he is authorized (either because authorized by the true owner or because he believes himself to be the true owner) to do the act in question. In fact the burden rests upon the State of proving the absence of good faith on the part of one accused of trespass, because the act must generally be shown to be willfully done; and under the particular paragraph upon which the charge against the defendant in the present case was based, it was essential for the State to show that the presence of the accused upon the premises in question was "with no bona fide claim or color of title, and without the consent of the owner."
Id. at 649, 79 S.E. at 762-63 (emphasis added). We approved this language in State v. Hoyt, 304 N.W.2d at 891.
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