State v. Breen

• Decision Date: 26 February 2001
• Docket Number: No. 98-41-C.A.,98-41-C.A.
• Citation: 767 A.2d 50
• Parties: STATE v. Cornelius BREEN.
• Court: Rhode Island Supreme Court

767 A.2d 50

STATE v. Cornelius BREEN.

No. 98-41-C.A.

Supreme Court of Rhode Island.

February 26, 2001.

Present WEISBERGER, C.J., LEDERBERG, BOURCIER, FLANDERS, and GOLDBERG, JJ.

Aaron L. Weisman, Providence, for Plaintiff.

Paula Lynch Hardiman, Paula Rosin, Providence, for defendant.

OPINION

LEDERBERG, Justice.

The decisive issues in this case are whether the defendant, Cornelius Breen, should have been acquitted of stalking because the evidence was insufficient to trigger Rhode Island's stalking statute, and whether the fact and details of the defendant's prior conviction of stalking the same person were admissible to establish an element of the offense charged.

Facts

At trial, the complainant in this case (complainant) testified that she met defendant in August 1986 at an Al-Anon¹ meeting that she attended for support in her marriage to an alcoholic husband, whom she later divorced. Initially, complainant and defendant were friends, but by 1990 they started a dating relationship that lasted approximately eighteen months. The complainant testified that the relationship ended because she was becoming fearful of defendant's displays of anger, describing his behavior as "very possessive and controlling." When in November 1991, complainant disclosed that she no longer wished to see him, defendant continued to call her, leave items in her mailbox, write her letters, and make unannounced visits to her home. Although complainant had requested that defendant no longer contact her, her parents, or her children, defendant in 1992 persisted by engaging in such conduct as attending complainant's divorce modification proceedings in Family Court, visiting her parents in Massachusetts, making phone calls to complainant, threatening to "make trouble" for her at her place of employment, and following complainant and her children on vacation at her parents' house. Upon his conviction of stalking, defendant was sentenced to one year probation starting December 23, 1992, and was ordered to have no contact with complainant.

On December 23, 1993, exactly one year after the probation was imposed, complainant attended an Al-Anon meeting with another friend, Raymond Riccio (Riccio). One of the eight or ten people present was defendant. After the meeting, complainant and Riccio went nearby for coffee, as did defendant and other Al-Anon members. Upon leaving the restaurant, complainant discovered two letters of poetry on the windshield of Riccio's car, written in what she recognized as defendant's handwriting. The complainant recounted that she was "terrified" to discover the letters "[b]ecause it was one year to the day of the end of his probation," and she felt that "he was waiting until the year was up, and then he was going to start again, which he did." In the months that followed, she received three more communications by mail from defendant, an unsigned Valentine's card in February 1994, an unsigned birthday card in the same month, addressed in defendant's handwriting, and a condolence card in March for the death of her grandmother, who had died several months earlier. The complainant described the effect of receiving these letters: "I've been so upset about it, I run my lights all night, I'm afraid for my children, I'm afraid for my parents, I'm afraid for my friends even." The defendant subsequently was arrested and charged with stalking pursuant to G.L.1956 § 11-59-2.

During the trial before a jury in May 1997, complainant was permitted to testify extensively about specific instances of defendant's conduct that had resulted in his previous conviction of stalking her. This testimony was the subject of defendant's motion in limine to exclude any evidence of his previous conviction and of his behavior towards complainant which led to his first conviction. The trial justice initially granted the motion in part, but the record is unclear on whether the fact of defendant's conviction or the specific instances of conduct would not be admissible. When the state's opening statement informed the jury of both the prior conviction and the conduct, defendant moved for a mistrial. The trial justice denied the motion and ruled that evidence of the earlier conviction and the conduct that led to it were "admissible to show what her mental state of mind was when she received the new contacts, * * * after expiration of the probation * * * [and] relevant on her state of mind why she was so terribly concerned." During direct examination of complainant, the trial justice cautioned the jury that "the prior contacts are being admitted solely for you to appraise what the state of mind, what effect did these new contacts, a year after the probation was imposed, have upon this witness." He gave a limiting instruction after admitting into evidence several documents that referred to defendant's previous conviction, for the purpose of authenticating defendant's handwriting on the four most recent communications to complainant: "[T]hese documents * * * are relevant on the issue of the known signature of the defendant. That's the sole reason they have some relevance in this case."

Two of these documents now at issue on appeal also indicated that defendant had been charged with resisting arrest and violating a protective order. After initially objecting to the evidence, defendant agreed to the introduction of the documents because they also disclosed that he was found not guilty of the first charge and that the second charge was dismissed. After the state presented its case, defendant moved for judgment of acquittal and renewed the motion without presenting testimony. The motion was denied, and the jury found defendant guilty of stalking complainant. Additional facts will be discussed as required in the legal analysis of the issues raised.

Procedural History

After the same Superior Court trial justice as in the present case dismissed a different stalking case, ruling that § 11-59-2 was "facially ambiguous" and "constitutionally vague," State v. Fonseca, bench decision P3/94-2319A, a different Superior Court motion judge granted defendant's motion to dismiss this case in May 1995. The state appealed the dismissal of the instant case, and its motion to hold in abeyance its appeal of the dismissal in this case was granted, pending our review of the previous Superior Court dismissal in Fonseca.

This Court held in State v. Fonseca, 670 A.2d 1237 (R.I.1996), that the version of § 11-59-2 then in effect "was not so ambiguously worded as to render it unconstitutional," and we sustained the state's appeal and remanded that case to the Superior Court "with directions to reinstate the complaint against [Fonseca] and for further proceedings in accordance with the statute as amended."² Fonseca, 670 A.2d at 1238 (citing State v. Babbitt, 457 A.2d 1049, 1054-55 (R.I.1983); State v. Souza, 456 A.2d 775, 781 (R.I.1983)).

In accordance with our holding in Fonseca, we sustained the state's appeal in the instant case and granted its motion for "reinstatement of the `stalking' charge against this defendant and for remand of the matter to the Superior Court for further proceedings in light of that opinion." The defendant was charged under the then newly amended statute, and after a three-day jury trial in May 1997, defendant was found guilty of stalking, pursuant to § 11-59-2, as amended. The defendant filed a motion for a new trial that was denied, and the trial justice imposed sentence on defendant, after reviewing a presentence report and after affording defendant an opportunity to address the court. The defendant was sentenced to one year of incarceration, four months to serve, eight months suspended, and a probationary period of eight months to commence on release, with instruction to have no contact with complainant and to receive counseling in prison or after his release. Subsequently, defendant filed motions to reduce his sentence and to set bail pending the instant appeal, both of which were denied. The defendant has served his entire sentence.

The defendant has argued several issues on appeal: (1) the trial justice erred by denying defendant's motion for judgment of acquittal because his conduct did not amount to harassment as defined by the statute; (2) § 11-59-2 is void for vagueness and overbreadth; (3) evidence of specific acts by defendant that resulted in a previous conviction for stalking the same victim was erroneously admitted into evidence; and (4) certain documents introduced by the state for handwriting analysis were unduly prejudicial. Having considered defendant's arguments, we deny his appeal and affirm the judgment of the Superior Court.

Motion for Judgment of Acquittal

On July 21, 1992, the Legislature defined the criminal offense of stalking as specific kinds of repeated behavior directed at a particular person, such as following, harassing, or threatening.³ While the first constitutional challenge of the statute in Fonseca was pending, the Legislature amended the statute. The defendant was charged under the then-existing version of the statute.

Section 11-59-1, as amended by P.L.1995, ch. 7, § 1 provides:

"Definitions. — As used in this chapter:

(1) `Course of conduct' means a pattern of conduct composed of a series of acts over a period of time, evidencing a continuity of purpose. Constitutionally protected activity is not included within the meaning of `course of conduct.'

(2) `Harasses' means a knowing and willful course of conduct directed at a specific person which seriously alarms, annoys, or harasses the person, and which serves no legitimate purpose. The course of conduct must be such as would cause a reasonable person to suffer substantial emotional distress, or be in fear of bodily injury."

Section 11-59-2(a), as amended by P.L.1995, ch. 7, § 1 provides:

"Stalking Prohibited. — (a) Any person who: (i) harasses another person; or (ii) willfully, maliciously, and repeatedly follows another person with the...