State v. Brewer, 25516.
| Decision Date | 19 August 2002 |
| Docket Number | No. 25516.,25516. |
| Citation | 351 S.C. 226,569 S.E.2d 340 |
| Court | South Carolina Supreme Court |
| Parties | The STATE, Respondent, v. Margaret BREWER, Appellant. |
Richard A. Harpootlian, of Richard A. Harpootlian P.A., of Columbia, for appellant.
Attorney General Charles M. Condon, Chief Deputy Attorney General John W. McIntosh, Assistant Attorney Generals Tracey C. Green and Jennifer D. Evans, of Columbia, for respondents.
Appellant was convicted of one count of misconduct in public office and nine counts of embezzlement. In this appeal, we are asked to determine whether the trial court erred by finding appellant is not entitled to immunity from prosecution. We affirm.
Appellant worked for the City of Manning as a billing clerk. Her duties included the collection of money received to pay water bills, the bank deposits of those payments, and the making of adjustments to water bills, for instance, where a customer had a large water bill solely because a leak had occurred. Bill payments were accepted by one of four methods: mail, night deposit box, in person, or bank draft. All payments received were to be posted to the customers' accounts immediately upon receipt. After appellant reviewed the payments, she would post them into the computer system or give them to an employee for posting. The posting would automatically record the amount and form of payments onto the Daily Register Report. Appellant generated this report unless she was on leave.
In February 1997, a city employee discovered appellant was failing to post deposits. Thereafter, in March, appellant was placed on administrative leave with pay while an internal investigation took place.
After the financial problems arose, the City retained an attorney, who in turn retained an accountant, Marty Ouzts, to conduct a review of the water billing system. The review began on April 17, 1997. Ouzts spoke to the other water department employees and reviewed the Daily Reports and the water and sewer billing. During his review between April 17 and April 24, Ouzts found discrepancies in the deposits between the amount of cash collected and the amount of cash deposited for each and every day he looked at in sporadic periods. He further found that appellant printed the Daily Reports and made the bank deposits. Before speaking to appellant, Ouzts determined cash was missing from the deposits. Further, he knew there was a problem because there was no explanation as to why thousands of dollars in cash would be received in a given day and only several hundred dollars of that cash would be deposited the next day.1
As a result of Ouzts' initial investigation, appellant, appearing with her attorney, was compelled to attend a meeting on April 24, 1997. She was informed if she did not attend the meeting, her employment would be terminated. She met with the Mayor of Manning, the city administrator, a town councilman, Ouzts, and the City's retained attorney. Ouzts testified the meeting was to determine why there were discrepancies in the deposits and Daily Register Reports. At the meeting, Ouzts and appellant discussed what would cause differences in the amounts recorded for the deposit and the Daily Register Report. Appellant made the following statements: (1) she did not know what would cause the differences between the Daily Reports and the actual deposits made; (2) she had never used the Daily Report to ensure that it matched the deposits; (3) she never noticed there was a discrepancy in the amounts; (4) she never noticed the Daily Report listed the amount of checks received and the amount of cash received; (5) when asked why her reports balanced exactly to the penny (which is extremely unusual), she said she did not think that was unusual and that she had made sure her deposit and the Daily Report balanced to the penny every day; (6) she made the deposits; (7) she never had an overage or a shortage when making deposits; (8) she said other employees must be juggling the amounts for checks and cash received; (9) she never noticed that cash being deposited was less than the amount of cash being received; (10) when asked about adjustments to individual accounts, she said other employees could have made adjustments to the accounts while she was in her office doing other things; (11) that she was not aware of other employees making adjustments to individual accounts; and (12) that she was the one who should have made all adjustments to the customers' accounts.2 Ouzts stated his final report after his investigation would have been the same even if he had not spoken to appellant at the April 24th meeting.
Following the meeting, Ouzts attempted to determine whether there was information that would corroborate or contradict what appellant had stated. Ouzts related his findings to the SLED agent, who became involved after the April 24th meeting on request of the Mayor,3 and to the state grand jury. The City's retained attorney, Charles Boykin, who was also at the April 24th meeting, testified at the pre-trial hearing. He testified the City was initially conducting an internal investigation and law enforcement had not been contacted prior to the meeting. He stated there was no discussion of immunity or of a criminal investigation during the meeting. Boykin testified that appellant could have refused to speak with the officials but they did not inform her she did not have to speak with them. Boykin contended appellant was compelled to attend the meeting for the purpose of satisfying an employment law requirement that before the employee can be terminated, she must be allowed to respond to the allegations against her. He stated the meeting was also for appellant to have the opportunity to respond to any questions posed by Ouzts. Boykin testified appellant was never told that if she did not answer questions she would be fired. She was told, however, that she would be fired if she did not attend the meeting because she had an obligation to cooperate with the City. He further testified that, prior to the meeting, he knew funds were missing; that Ouzts had already completed an analysis of the financial documents for 1996; and Ouzts had explained to him how the embezzlement scheme operated. Before the meeting, Boykin said he would have advised the City to dismiss appellant from employment and refer the matter to SLED whether the meeting took place or not. Within days of the meeting, appellant's employment was terminated.
Following appellant's termination, the State brought criminal charges against her for embezzlement and misconduct in public office. Prior to trial, appellant moved that she be granted immunity from prosecution because she was allegedly coerced into making incriminating statements at the April 24th meeting between her and city officials. The motion was denied.
The trial court ruled the federal and state laws of immunity did not extend to appellant and that there was no basis to quash or dismiss the indictment against her. However, the court found appellant's statements were coerced and not voluntarily made. In making this determination, the court indicated it was analyzing the statements, as it normally would do in a Jackson v. Denno4 hearing. Consequently, the court ruled appellant's statements during the April 24th meeting should be suppressed and could not be used at trial.
Whether appellant is entitled to immunity from prosecution?
Appellant argues she is entitled to transactional immunity because her April 24th...
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