State v. Brewton, 2016-UP-222

• Decision Date: 25 May 2016
• Docket Number: 2016-UP-222
• Parties: The State, Respondent, v. Lashad Demond Brewton, Appellant. Appellate Case No. 2014-000880
• Court: South Carolina Court of Appeals

The State, Respondent, v. Lashad Demond Brewton, Appellant.

Appellate Case No. 2014-000880

No. 2016-UP-222

Court of Appeals of South Carolina

May 25, 2016

UNPUBLISHED OPINION

Submitted April 1, 2016

Appeal From Union County John C. Hayes, III, Circuit Court Judge

Appellate Defender Tiffany Lorraine Butler, of Columbia, for Appellant.

Attorney General Alan McCrory Wilson and Assistant Attorney General Mark Reynolds Farthing, both of Columbia; and Solicitor Kevin Scott Brackett, of York, for Respondent.

PER CURIAM

Lashad Demond Brewton appeals his conviction of possession with intent to distribute (PWID) crack cocaine, arguing the trial court erred in (1) refusing to suppress evidence seized during a search of a vehicle and subsequent searches of Brewton and his co-defendants when law enforcement did not have reasonable suspicion to justify the traffic stop; (2) refusing to suppress evidence seized during the search of the vehicle and subsequent searches of Brewton and his co-defendants when law enforcement did not have probable cause to believe the vehicle contained evidence of criminal activity and there were no exigent circumstances to justify the warrantless search; (3) finding a sufficient chain of custody existed to admit evidence found in a law enforcement vehicle that transported Brewton and one of his co-defendants to jail; and (4) denying Brewton's motion for a directed verdict of acquittal. We affirm pursuant to Rule 220(b) SCACR, and the following authorities:

1. As to issues 1 through 3: State v. Pope, 410 S.C. 214 225-29, 763 S.E.2d 814, 820-22 (Ct. App. 2014) (holding in the appeal of Brewton's co-defendant, the trial court did not err in: (1) denying his motion to suppress the evidence seized during the search of the vehicle because law enforcement had reasonable suspicion to justify the traffic stop; (2) denying his motion to suppress the evidence seized during the search of the vehicle because law enforcement had probable cause to believe the vehicle contained evidence of criminal activity; and (3) admitting the drugs found in the police car into evidence because a complete chain of custody was established), cert. denied (Feb. 20, 2015).

2. As to issue 4: We find the issue of whether the trial court erred in denying Brewton's motion for a directed verdict on the charge of trafficking in crack cocaine is moot because Brewton was acquitted of that charge. See Bozeman v State, 307 S.C. 172, 174, 414 S.E.2d 144, 145 (1992) (stating that by convicting the defendant of the lesser-included offense of voluntary manslaughter, the jury, in essence, acquitted the defendant of the murder charge for which he was indicted); State v. Green, 337 S.C. 67, 71, 522 S.E.2d 602, 604 (Ct. App. 1999) ("When judgment on an issue can have no practical effect upon an existing case or controversy, the issue is moot."). We find the trial court did not err in denying Brewton's motion for a directed verdict on the lesser-included charge of PWID crack cocaine. See State v. Gibson, 390 S.C. 347, 353, 701 S.E.2d 766, 769 (Ct. App. 2010) ("When ruling on a motion for a directed verdict, the trial court is concerned only with the existence of evidence, not the weight."); id. ("When reviewing the denial of a motion for a directed verdict, an appellate court must review the evidence, and all inferences therefrom, in the light most favorable to the State."); id. at 353-54, 701 S.E.2d at 769 ("The trial court's denial of a directed verdict will not be reversed if supported by any direct evidence or substantial circumstantial evidence of the defendant's guilt."); S.C. Code Ann. § 44-53-375(B) (Supp. 2015) (providing it is a felony to possess cocaine base with intent...