State v. Bridges

• Decision Date: 06 August 1917
• Docket Number: 14296.
• Citation: 97 Wash. 553,166 P. 780
• Court: Washington Supreme Court
• Parties: STATE ex rel. HUGGINS et al. v. BRIDGES et al., Port Com'rs.

166 P. 780

97 Wash. 553

STATE ex rel. HUGGINS et al. v. BRIDGES et al., Port Com'rs.

No. 14296.

Supreme Court of Washington, En Banc.

August 6, 1917

Appeal from Superior Court, King County; John S. Jurey, Judge.

Action by the State of Washington, on the relation of N.W. Huggins and another, against Robert Bridges and others, as Commissioners of the Port of Seattle, a municipal corporation. From a judgment enjoining defendants from the building of a belt line railway, defendants appeal. Affirmed.

C.J. France, of Seattle, for appellants.

Carkeek & McDonald, F. M. Dudley, F. V. Brown, and Bogle, Graves Merritt & Bogle, all of Seattle, for respondents.

HOLCOMB J.

On November 3, 1915, the Seattle port commission adopted a resolution which provided for the construction and operation of a belt line railway to be known as unit No. 14, which was submitted to the voters of the Seattle port district and ratified by them on December 4, 1915. At the same time that the above-mentioned resolution was submitted, a further resolution, providing for bond issues with which to secure money to build unit No. 14, which had also been passed by the commissioners of the port district, was submitted to the voters of the district, and at the same election at which the resolution to build the belt line railway was ratified the proposition to bond was rejected. On March 7, 1917, there was again referred to the voters of the district the question of the issuance of bonds for the belt railway line, which again failed to carry. On May 23, 1917, the port commission by resolution provided for the creation of a belt line railway fund, to be made up of various revenues, for the purpose of building the belt line railway. On June 30, 1917, the port commission by resolution provided for the building of the line. This action was then brought by respondents to enjoin the construction of the proposed belt line railway, and later an intervening complaint was filed by J. W. Clise. Demurrers were filed to each of the complaints, which were overruled. The appellants declined to plead further, and judgment was rendered in accordance with the prayer of the complaint and the intervening complaint.

In 1914, 1915, and 1917 certain ordinances were enacted by the city of Seattle, granting to the port commission the right to construct a belt line railway in the city. These ordinances were all accepted by the port commission. The complaints allege that the port commission has no authority to build any belt railway line, has no authority to create a belt railway line fund, and has no authority to accept the ordinances which it has accepted from the city council of Seattle; and the complaint in intervention avers there is no need for any such belt railway line by reason of the fact that the city council of Seattle on July 2, 1917, passed on ordinance granting franchises to other railroads in the city for the construction of a belt railway line, so that there will be no necessity for the port commission to build such a railway.

It was admitted by appellants at the trial below that the franchises granted by the city to the port commission are for the purpose of authorizing the construction of railway tracks by the commission as a common carrier, with power to fix charge, and receive rates for switching, transferring, and carrying freight to and from various industrial plants werehouses, piers, docks, and terminals within the port district. It is also admitted that the franchises granted to the port commission are not only for the purpose of enabling the port commission to connect up its own units by a railway, but are intended to permit the port commission as a common carrier to run an independent switching belt railway line of its own. Respondents maintain that the port commission is without power to construct or operate railways as a common carrier. This proposition is controverted by appellants, and that is the only question for solution in this case.

The port commission, under the statute creating it, is expressly declared to be a municipal corporation of the state of Washington. Laws 1911, p. 414, § 3; Laws 1913, p. 204, § 3. The question of the power granted such ereatures of the statute must be examined critically, carefully, and strictly, and not with a disposition to strain the grant to find the power.

'It is a well-settled rule of construction that a delegation of powers will not be presumed in favor of a municipal corporation, unless they be such as are necessary to its corporate existence, but that the same must be clearly conferred by express statutory enactment.' Tacoma Gas & Elec. L. Co. v. Tacoma, 14 Wash. 288, 44 P. 655.

'It is a general and undisputed proposition of law that a municipal corporation possesses and can exercise the following powers, and no others: First, those granted in express words; second, those necessarily or fairly implied in or incident to the powers expressly granted; third, those essential to the declared objects and purposes of the corporation--not simply convenient, but indispensable. Any fair, reasonable doubt concerning the existence of the power is resolved by the courts against the corporation, and the power is denied.' Dillon, Mun. Corp. § 89.

See, also, 1 McQuillin, Mun. Corp. § 353.

The principle to be applied, therefore, is that a doubtful power is a power denied. The question to be determined then is, in exact terms: Do the legislative enactments in relation to the proposed project, in express terms or by clear implication beyond a reasonable doubt, grant to the port districts the powers to construct railways and operate the same as a common carrier and to assume and perform the obligations required by the Seattle ordinances granting these franchises, or are such powers indispensable...