State v. Bridgham

• Decision Date: 10 November 1908
• Citation: 97 P. 1096,51 Wash. 18
• Parties: STATE v. BRIDGHAM.
• Court: Washington Supreme Court

97 P. 1096

51 Wash. 18

STATE v. BRIDGHAM.

Supreme Court of Washington

November 10, 1908

Appeal from Superior Court, Lewis County; A. E. Rice, Judge.

Frank O. Bridgham was convicted of murder, and he appeals. Affirmed.

Pruyn &amp Felkner, for appellant.

M. E Harmon, for the State.

HADLEY C.J.

The defendant was charged with having committed the crime of murder in the first degree by shooting and mortally wounding Lula Bridgham, who was his wife. The defense of not guilty including a claim of insanity at the time of the shotting, was interposed. The jury returned a verdict of guilty of murder in the first degree. The court entered judgment and sentence that the defendant shall suffer the penalty of death, and he has appealed to this court.

The first error assigned is that the court admitted a written statement as the dying declaration of the deceased. It is argued that the statement should not have been admitted, for the reason that there was nothing upon its face showing that the deceased realized at the time that she was about to die, or that her death was imminent and impending. The further argument is made that the evidence introduced in connection with the statement did not show that the deceased said she was about to die, or that her death was imminent and impending. The standard required for the admissibility of the declaration is that the declaration should have believed that she was about to die, that she made the declaration under the belief that she would not recover, and that she did die of the illness from which she was suffering as the direct and proximate result of the original injury which the declaration tended to illustrate. State v. Power, 24 Wash. 34, 63 P. 1112, 63 L. R. A. 902. It was not necessary that the written statement should contain the express declaration that the declarant believed she was about to die, and it was not necessary to show by other testimony that she actually used the words. It was sufficient to show, either by the statement itself or by other credible testimony, such statements or circumstances as would convince a reasonable mind that the declarant believed at the time that she was in extremis. The testimony showed that the deceased was informed by a physician that her wound was mortal and that she could not live; that she was rational, and realized she could not live; that she said she did not think the could get well, and she expressed the wish that her son would look out for her three babies; that she said her daughter's ashes were in a jar in her trunk, and she wanted them buried with her. We think it was clearly shown that the declarant made the statement under the belief that she was about to die; and her death soon followed. The declaration contained a statement of prior threats, and appellant contends that he was prejudiced thereby. He cites State v. Moody, 18 Wash. 165, 51 P. 356, to sustain this contention. In that case the dying declaration contained a statement of previous threats, and it was contended that these should have been excluded. The court, however, admitted the whole statement, and gave no instruction with respect to disregarding the subject of prior threats as based upon the statement. This court said: 'We think the court erred in not instructing the jury that this part or portion of the dying declaration should be disregarded.' In the case at bar the court directly covered that point in closing its instruction upon the subject of the dying declaration, as follows: 'Furthermore, such declarations are only admitted to prove the actual killing and the manner of the killing, so that, if you consider this statement at all, you will not in any manner consider any statements therein in reference to previous threats made by the defendant, nor will you consider any other statements therein except that which relates to the actual killing at the time and the manner in which the killing was done.' We do not find that the court erred in admitting the dying declaration in view of its instruction upon that subject.

It is insisted that the court erred in admitting in evidence the record of the inquest before the coroner's jury. We find nothing in this record showing that the coroner's record was read in evidence before the jury. Other written evidence is shown to have been read, but it does not so appear as to the coroner's record. The state's counsel asserts that it was not read, and that the record is for that reason silent upon the subject. Assuming, however, from the fact that it was formally admitted by the court, that it was also read to the jury, we find no sufficient objection to it. The objection made by the counsel who tried the cause was as follows: 'We object because is shows on the face of it that it is not a complete record.' There was no objection to its relevancy or materiality. We think it appeared that the record was sufficiently complete to meet appellant's objection. Counsel who conducted this appeal, but who did not try the cause below, insist that there was an agreement at the trial, sanctioned by the court, to the effect that a general objection should be understood as lodged against all the evidence. The stipulation to which counsel refer appears in the record as follows: 'Mr. Harmon: Note an exception. In order to save time in taking exceptions, at all times whenever there is an adverse ruling of the court, the counsel might have an understanding between themselves that in that case that an exception be noted. We think that is usually the rule. Court: Very good.' In will be seen that the above related exclusively to the matter of avoiding the announcement of an exception each time there was an adverse ruling upon an objection; but it did not relieve counsel from making the necessary objections at proper times. Otherwise there could have been no adverse rulings as the basis for the understood objections. The court committed no error in the matter of the coroner's record. Other objections cannot be raised for the first time on appeal. State v. Craemer, 12 Wash. 217, 40 P. 944; Same v. Owens, 15 Wash. 468, 46 P. 1039; Same v. Yourex, 30 Wash. 611, 71 P. 203.

Objection is made to the following...