State v. Briggs

Decision Date25 February 2020
Docket NumberNo. A-19-300.,A-19-300.
Citation28 Neb.App. 65,940 N.W.2d 582
Parties STATE of Nebraska, appellee, v. Maurice L. BRIGGS, appellant.
CourtNebraska Court of Appeals

Thomas C. Riley, Douglas County Public Defender, and Bethany R. Stensrud, for appellant.

Douglas J. Peterson, Attorney General, and Austin N. Relph, Lincoln, for appellee.

Pirtle, Riedmann, and Welch, Judges.

Welch, Judge.

INTRODUCTION

Following an investigation of an alleged altercation leading to Maurice L. Briggs’ arrest, officers searched his vehicle before impounding it and found drug paraphernalia. The record does not contain an inventory sheet, but it does contain an impound sheet listing only Briggs’ wallet, identification card, Social Security card, and drug paraphernalia. Briggs unsuccessfully sought to suppress the evidence because the district court determined the search was a proper inventory search. For the reasons set forth herein, we affirm.

STATEMENT OF FACTS

In December 2017, a police officer responded to a call concerning an assault in progress involving pepper spray at an Omaha, Nebraska, discount store. Upon arriving at the scene, the initial responding officer (initial officer) learned the people involved in the alleged assault left in a black Jeep, which vehicle he then encountered in a parking lot of an automobile parts supply store located across the street from the discount store. Video from the officer’s cruiser camera depicted that the initial officer parked his cruiser behind the vehicle with the cruiser’s emergency lights activated. The driver, Briggs, and the passenger, Jessica Hakl, were outside the vehicle when the initial officer made contact with them. Both Briggs and Hakl denied using pepper spray, and the initial officer did not observe any evidence that an assault had occurred.

While other officers arrived at the scene, the initial officer asked Briggs and Hakl for identification. Briggs stated he did not have any identification with him and identified himself as "Anthony Anderson" born "December 18, 1975," while Hakl likewise stated she did not have any identification but gave her name and birth date. The initial officer then returned to his police cruiser to run a records check and found Hakl’s information. Hakl’s record indicated she had a history of drugrelated convictions. As a result, the initial officer asked Hakl if he could search her purse and told Hakl, "The reason I'm asking, besides wanting to know where the mace is, you do have a history of drugs on your record." Hakl declined. During the encounter, the initial officer continued to ask Hakl for permission to search her purse, which Hakl refused. The initial officer then asked Briggs for permission to search the vehicle, but Briggs refused. After that, the initial officer requested that a "K-9 unit" be dispatched to the scene; however, none were available.

Following this exchange, the initial officer ran a records check on "Anthony Anderson," but was unable to locate any information on that name. He then asked Briggs a second time for his information, and Briggs responded with the same name but gave a different birth date. One of the responding officers ran the license plate number of the vehicle, which revealed the vehicle was registered to Briggs. The initial officer then viewed a driver’s license photograph of Briggs in a law enforcement database and identified the driver as Briggs. After performing a records check on Briggs, the initial officer learned that there was a misdemeanor arrest warrant for Briggs and that Briggs’ driver’s license was suspended. As a result, the initial officer arrested Briggs for supplying false information to a police officer, driving on a suspended license, and the misdemeanor arrest warrant. The initial officer told the additional responding officers at the scene, "Now we can search it." Once Briggs was secured in a police cruiser, the initial officer asked, "I think we can search that car now, can't we? Search incident to arrest?" One of the responding officers then clarified, "No, it’s an inventory search." The initial officer replied, "Inventory search, yeah."

Two responding officers proceeded to search the vehicle, which they described as "packed to the brim" with various items. During the search, officers found a cell phone box in the front seat passenger area. They also discovered a canvas bag on the center console. This canvas bag contained Briggs’ wallet, identification card, and Social Security card, as well as drug paraphernalia that included several baggies suspected of containing methamphetamine and one baggie suspected of containing cocaine. Briggs claimed ownership of the cell phone box but not the canvas bag. Based on the testimony of the officers and video from the initial officer’s body camera, other items located in the vehicle appeared to include credit and debit cards, a tablet, a set of house keys, a walkie-talkie-type device, a Visa gift card, several cell phone chargers, and bags of clothing and hair products. There was no separate written document which captured the items identified by the officers during their search.

Following the discovery of the contraband, the initial officer’s body camera video included the following exchange in which the initial officer told the other responding officers: "Well, yeah, there’s that felony," to which another officer responded, "Well, there you go, there’s that felony you were waiting on, there it is." As the search drew to a close, the body camera video also recorded the initial officer’s comment that they needed to tow the vehicle because they "inventoried it." Finally, the body camera video captured an officer’s inquiry governing what reason to list on the form in relation to impounding the vehicle. Specifically, an officer asked: "Impound tow? Safekeeping?" The initial officer replied, "For drug arrest." The impounded vehicle report listed the reason for towing as a drug arrest and noted in the details section of the report: "Ve[h]icle towed for safekeeping."

The contraband tested positive for cocaine and methamphetamine. Briggs was charged with two counts of felony possession of a controlled substance. See Neb. Rev. Stat. § 28-416 (Cum. Supp. 2018).

MOTION TO SUPPRESS

Prior to trial, Briggs filed a motion to suppress alleging the vehicle search was unconstitutional. At the suppression hearing, the State did not offer a written policy of the Omaha Police Department (OPD) governing inventory searches or impoundments, but did adduce evidence including testimony from the initial officer and one of the responding officers and video recordings of the incident from the initial officer’s body camera and police cruiser camera.

The responding officer testified that an inventory search must be conducted according to OPD policy and that the reasons to conduct an inventory search include the following: (1) to catalog property prior to the vehicle’s being taken into police possession, (2) to protect OPD from allegations of mishandling property, and (3) to accurately track property in possession of OPD. However, he acknowledged that OPD may not inventory a vehicle to look for evidence of a crime. The responding officer further testified that an inventory search requires a thorough inventory of all property in the vehicle, that all property is to be documented, and that the purpose of an inventory log is to protect OPD from a lawsuit if the items are misplaced, while a property report is used to itemize the evidence collected for trial. The responding officer also testified that he did not fill out an inventory log and was unsure if any of the other officers completed an inventory log. The record does not contain an inventory log. When asked about the search of the vehicle, the responding officer testified that he subsequently created an item submission form to document the evidence found. On the impounded vehicle supplemental report, the officers listed only the contraband and Briggs’ wallet, identification card, and Social Security card, but they did not include other items discovered in connection with their investigation.

Concerning OPD’s vehicle towing policy, the responding officer testified that towing is allowed only when necessary due to a parking violation, due to an accident, for public safety, or for evidentiary purposes. He further testified that towing a vehicle is unnecessary when the vehicle can be locked and left on the street. The responding officer testified that Briggs’ vehicle was legally parked in a parking stall at the automobile supply store parking lot, but that he called for a tow truck after determining Briggs was going to jail. The initial officer testified that the purpose of towing the vehicle was for "safekeeping."

The district court overruled Briggs’ motion to suppress, finding that the inventory search by the officers was proper, reasonable, and not unconstitutional. Specifically, among other things, the district court found that, after officers arrested Briggs for providing false information, for driving on a suspended license, and for the active warrant, "the officers decided to impound [Briggs’] vehicle as [Briggs] was under arrest and the vehicle was on private property. [One of the responding officers] called for a tow to have the vehicle towed to the police impound lot. An inventory search was then done." The court further found that "[o]nce the decision was made to impound the vehicle, the police had a right to do an inventory search for protection of the property of [Briggs] and also to protect the police from false accusations of disposition of the property."

TRIAL AND SENTENCING

A stipulated bench trial was held in December 2018, with Briggs preserving the issues raised in his motion to suppress. At the trial, the State offered video recordings of the incident, various police reports, the property report listing the contraband found in the vehicle, and the laboratory report for the controlled substances discovered during the vehicle...

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3 cases
  • State v. Briggs
    • United States
    • Nebraska Supreme Court
    • January 8, 2021
    ...923 N.W.2d 725 (2019) (recognizing inventory search is exception to Fourth Amendment's warrant requirement).2 State v. Briggs , 28 Neb. App. 65, 81, 940 N.W.2d 582, 594 (2020).3 Id. at 78, 940 N.W.2d at 592.4 Id. at 82, 940 N.W.2d at 594.5 Id.6 State v. Nunez , 299 Neb. 340, 907 N.W.2d 913 ......
  • State v. Stabler
    • United States
    • Nebraska Supreme Court
    • March 27, 2020
  • Reveiz v. El-Kasaby
    • United States
    • Nebraska Supreme Court
    • April 3, 2020

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