State v. Brighi

• Decision Date: 15 December 1942
• Docket Number: 46071.
• Citation: 7 N.W.2d 9,232 Iowa 1087
• Parties: STATE v. BRIGHI.
• Court: Iowa Supreme Court

7 N.W.2d 9

232 Iowa 1087

STATE v. BRIGHI.

No. 46071.

Supreme Court of Iowa

December 15, 1942

John M. Rankin, Atty. Gen., Jens Grothe, Asst. Atty. Gen., and Ralph Bastian, Co. Atty., and Horace J. Melton, Asst. Co. Atty., both of Fort Dodge, for appellant.

Helsell Burnquist & Bradshaw, of Fort Dodge, for appellee.

MILLER Justice.

On November 7, 1941, an information was filed with a Justice of the Peace in Webster County, Iowa, which stated "The defendant is accused of the crime of Failing to Yield the Right of Way and Caused a Fatal Accident. For that the defendant on the 3d day of Nov., A. D. 1941, at the city of Fort Dodge, Ia., in the County and State aforesaid, did fail to yield the right of way with his automobile thereby causing a collision fatal to Mrs. Clyde Williamson, contrary to the Statutes in such cases made and provided, and against the peace and dignity of the State of Iowa." To this information the defendant entered a plea of not guilty. Trial was had, resulting in a conviction and a fine of $100 and costs.

Appeal was taken to the District Court of Webster County. The plea of not guilty was withdrawn and a demurrer to the information was filed on the following grounds: "1. That said information does not charge an offense against the laws of the State of Iowa. 2. That there is no clear statement of any affirmative act on the part of the defendant constituting an offense either of commission or omission such as is defined by any statute of the State of Iowa. 3. That there is no statute in the State of Iowa providing a penalty for the act charged in said information and that the court would be without jurisdiction to assess any penalty even admitting the defendant committed the act as charged in said information." The information was thereafter amended by inserting the words "at an intersection" after the words "right of way" as they appear in two places in the information. The cause was submitted to the court on the demurrer to the information as amended. The court sustained the demurrer. The State elected to stand on the ruling. Judgment was entered discharging the defendant setting aside the judgment of the Justice of the Peace, exonerating defendant's bond and entering judgment against the State for costs. The State of Iowa appeals therefrom.

While the grounds of the demurrer were three in number, they presented but two questions for the court's decision: First, whether the act charged in the information is made an offense by the statutes of this state and, second, whether the information states the commission of the offense. The answer to either question depends upon an interpretation of Chapter 175 of the Acts of the 49th General Assembly, which repealed Section 5026.01 of the Code 1939, and enacted in lieu thereof the following provisions: "Where two vehicles are approaching on any public street or highway so that their paths will intersect and there is danger of collision, the vehicle approaching the other from the right shall have the right of way. The foregoing rule is modified at through highways and otherwise as hereinafter stated in this chapter." This enactment is substantially the same as Section 5035, Code 1935, which has been repeatedly interpreted by this court. Accordingly, while the statute involved herein is of recent enactment, the circumstances are such that we have many interpretations thereof by this court. It is the contention of the State that Chapter 175, Acts of the 49th G.A., states a criminal offense when interpreted with Section 5036.01, which provides as follows: "It is a misdemeanor for any person to do any act forbidden or to fail to perform any act required by any of the provisions of this chapter unless any such violation is by this chapter or other law of this state declared to be a felony."

In the case of State v. Campbell, 217 Iowa 848, 853, 251 N.W. 717, 719, 92 A.L.R. 1176, this court states: "It is a settled rule in this state that criminal statutes are to be strictly construed, and not extended to include an offense not clearly within the fair scope of the language employed. State v. Bunn, 195 Iowa 9, 190 N.W. 155; State v. Niehaus, 209 Iowa 533, 228 N.W. 308. It is also settled in this state that there are no common-law offenses and that all crimes are statutory. State v. Banoch, 193 Iowa 851, 186 N.W. 436; State v. Flory, 203 Iowa 918 210 N.W. 961; State v. Lamb, 209 Iowa 132, 227 N.W. 830."

In 14 Am.Jur. 773, 774, the rule is amplified as follows: "The legislature, in the exercise of its power to declare what shall constitute a crime or punishable offense, must inform the citizen with reasonable precision what acts it intends to prohibit, so that he may have a certain understandable rule of conduct and know what acts it is his duty to avoid. * * * It is axiomatic that statutes creating and defining crimes cannot be extended by intendment. Purely statutory offenses cannot be established by implication. There can be no constructive offenses. Before a man can be punished, his case must be plainly and unmistakably within a statute."

I. The Attorney General concedes that the law is as above stated but contends that the information should be interpreted as asserting that the defendant was operating an automobile on the streets of Fort Dodge, approaching an intersection at the same time that another automobile was approaching the intersection from his right, that the vehicles approached each other in such manner that their paths would intersect and there was danger of collision and, under such circumstances, the defendant failed to yield the right of way, thereby violating Chapter 175 of the Acts of the 49th G.A. and, because of the provisions of Section 5036.01, Code 1939, defendant, having failed to perform an act required by Chapter 251.1, Code 1939, was guilty of a...