State v. Brocuglio

• Decision Date: 22 July 2003
• Docket Number: (SC 16590)
• Citation: 826 A.2d 145,264 Conn. 778
• Court: Connecticut Supreme Court
• Parties: STATE OF CONNECTICUT v. ANTHONY J. BROCUGLIO

264 Conn. 778

826 A.2d 145

STATE OF CONNECTICUT v. ANTHONY J. BROCUGLIO

(SC 16590)

Supreme Court of Connecticut.

Argued April 16, 2003.

Officially released July 22, 2003.

Borden, Norcott, Katz, Palmer and Zarella, Js. Mitchell S. Brody, senior assistant state's attorney, with whom, on the brief, were James E. Thomas, state's attorney, and Adam Scott, assistant state's attorney, for the appellant (state).

Jon L. Schoenhorn, special public defender, for the appellee (defendant).

Opinion

KATZ, J.

The defendant, Anthony J. Brocuglio, was convicted, after a jury trial, of two counts of interfering with an officer in violation of General Statutes § 53a-167a.¹ The sole issue in this certified appeal² is whether the defendant's conduct in response to the police officers' illegal entry³ into the backyard of his residence dissipated the taint of the unlawful entry, thereby precluding the defendant from invoking the exclusionary rule to suppress evidence derived from the unlawful entry. The state appeals from the judgment of the Appellate Court, which concluded that the trial court improperly had denied the defendant's motion to suppress on the ground that the defendant's conduct constituted a new crime that broke the chain of causation, dissipating the taint of the unlawful entry. State v. Brocuglio, 64 Conn. App. 93, 106-108, 779 A.2d 793 (2001). We conclude that, under the exception to the exclusionary rule that we herein adopt, the commission of a new crime dissipates the taint from evidence of that crime obtained as the result of an illegal entry into one's home. We also conclude, however, that because, at the time of the relevant events, the defendant in the present case had a limited common-law right to resist an unlawful, warrantless entry into the backyard of his residence, we cannot apply retroactively the new crime exception to the defendant. We therefore affirm the judgment of the Appellate Court.

The Appellate Court's opinion sets forth the relevant facts and procedural history. "On September 27, 1996, two officers of the East Hartford police department went to the defendant's house at 59 Church Street [in the town of East Hartford (town)], at the request of the East Hartford mayor's office, to ticket abandoned and unregistered vehicles.⁴ While they were issuing citations, the officers went to areas contiguous to the defendant's residence. The areas consisted of the rear yard, which was protected by a fence, and an unprotected area near the front of the defendant's residence. The ticketing was done pursuant to East Hartford's Code of Ordinances, § 21-1 et seq.⁵ The officers had no search warrant, either administrative or otherwise.

"The officers first began to ticket vehicles located in the driveway of the defendant's front yard. While the police were in the front of the house, the defendant's wife came outside and ordered the officers off her property. The officers responded that they had been sent by the town and were acting pursuant to one of [the town] ordinances. The defendant's wife went back inside to call the officers' watch commander, and the defendant came outside. The defendant also ordered the officers off the property. The officers repeated that they were sent by the town and instructed the defendant to call the watch commander.

"In response to the officers' comments, the defendant cursed about the mayor and threatened to bring his dog outside if the officers did not leave. The defendant also claimed that his dog would eat one of the police dogs present at the scene. One officer responded that he would shoot the defendant's dog if he let it come outside. The defendant went inside and returned to the front of the house holding his dog by the collar. One of the officers drew his gun, upon seeing the dog, and ordered the defendant to keep his dog away. The defendant and his dog went back inside the house.

"The officers finished ticketing the vehicles in the front of the house and proceeded to the backyard of 59 Church Street to continue ticketing. To get to the backyard and driveway of the house, the officers had to bypass a six foot tall stockade fence that displayed `no trespassing' and `keep out' signs. That fence ran on both sides of the defendant's house. It blocked the back driveway and yard from sight from the street in front of the house. The officers entered through the portion of the fence that extended from the side of the house across the driveway to another home.

"The officers then began ticketing vehicles in the backyard. The defendant and his dog again came outside, this time onto the back porch near where the officers were ticketing. He again threatened to release his dog if the officers did not leave. At that point, according to one of the officers, the defendant took his dog down the back steps and moved toward the two officers, as he yelled profanities and threatened to let his dog go.⁶ In response, one officer informed the defendant that he was under arrest. An altercation then ensued between the officers and the defendant." Id., 95-97.

The defendant subsequently was charged in a substitute information with two counts of assault of a peace officer in violation of General Statutes § 53a-167c (a) (1)⁷ and three counts of interfering with an officer⁸ in violation of § 53a-167a. See footnote 1 of this opinion. The defendant filed a motion to suppress the evidence of "the condition of the vehicles in the backyard, their vehicle identification numbers, the officers' description of the backyard, and the verbal utterances the defendant directed at the officers, in the backyard, including the defendant's alleged threats"; State v. Brocuglio, supra, 64 Conn. App. 105; claiming that the police officers' entry onto his property violated his rights under the state and federal constitutions. Id., 98. The trial court denied the motion, concluding that the defendant's statements and actions had been voluntary and had not been gathered by any exploitation of any illegality on the part of the police. Therefore, the trial court concluded that the "defendant's independent and intervening actions [had] broke[n] the chain of causation and dissipated the taint of any alleged prior illegality."

Thereafter, following a jury trial, the defendant was convicted of two counts of interfering with an officer. The jury acquitted him of one count of interfering with an officer and one count of assault of a peace officer, and the court granted the defendant's motion for a judgment of acquittal, made at the conclusion of the state's case-in-chief, on the second count of assault of a peace officer. The defendant was sentenced to one year incarceration and fined $1500 on one count of interfering with an officer, and sentenced to one year of incarceration, execution suspended, and two consecutive years of probation, on the second count of interfering with an officer. State v. Brocuglio, supra, 64 Conn. App. 98.

On appeal, the Appellate Court reversed the judgment of the trial court, holding that the trial court improperly had denied the defendant's motion to suppress evidence gathered during the warrantless search and seizure. Id., 95. The Appellate Court recognized that, under federal case law, "[i]f a suspect's response to an illegal search is itself a new, distinct crime ... the police constitutionally may arrest the [suspect] for that crime ... [because] that ... new and distinct crime ... is a sufficient intervening event to provide independent grounds for arrest." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., 106. The Appellate Court concluded, however, that the defendant's statements requesting that the police leave his property and warning that he would let his dog loose if they did not do so did not constitute a new, distinct crime. Id. The Appellate Court further concluded that the defendant's resistance to the unlawful entry was "ongoing"; id., 108; such that it did not break the chain of causation. Id., 107. Accordingly, the Appellate Court concluded that "the evidence obtained from the time the officers bypassed the fence and entered the back driveway and yard until the time of the defendant's arrest should have been suppressed." Id. As a result, the court remanded the case for a new trial. Id., 108. This certified appeal followed.

The state contends that the Appellate Court improperly concluded that the defendant's conduct was not attenuated sufficiently from the unlawful police conduct to break the chain of causation and to dissipate the taint of the unlawful search. Specifically, the state contends that the defendant's conduct constituted a new crime subsequent to the unlawful police entry and that this court should apply the new crime exception to the exclusionary rule adopted by many other jurisdictions. Moreover, to the extent that the defendant had any right under the common law to resist an unlawful entry into his home, as set forth in State v. Gallagher, 191 Conn. 433, 443, 465 A.2d 323 (1983), the state urges this court to overrule that decision. We agree with the state that we should adopt the new crime exception to the exclusionary rule. We further agree that, in accordance with our adoption of that exception, we must overrule Gallagher, but only to the extent that it conflicts with our adoption of the new crime exception.

We first set forth the standard of review and legal principles that guide our analysis. "Our standard of review of a trial court's findings and conclusions in connection with a motion to suppress is well defined. A finding of fact will not be disturbed unless it is clearly erroneous in view of the evidence and pleadings in the whole record.... [W]here the legal conclusions of the court are challenged, we must determine whether they are legally and logically correct and whether they find support in the facts set out in the memorandum of decision...." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Luurtsema, 262 Conn. 179, 184, 811 A.2d 223 (2002). The...