State v. Broden, 28074.

• Decision Date: 10 October 1930
• Docket Number: No. 28074.,28074.
• Citation: 232 N.W. 517,181 Minn. 341
• Parties: STATE v. BRODEN.
• Court: Minnesota Supreme Court

232 N.W. 517

181 Minn. 341

STATE v. BRODEN.

No. 28074.

Supreme Court of Minnesota.

October 10, 1930.

Appeal from District Court, St. Louis County; C. R. Magney, Judge.

Criminal prosecution by the State against A. H. Broden on an information charging him with a violation of the Basic Science Act. A demurrer to the information was overruled with a certificate that the question raised, involving the constitutionality of the statute, was important and doubtful.

Question answered in the negative.

Jenswold, Jenswold & Dahle, of Duluth, for appellant.

Henry N. Benson, Atty. Gen., James E. Markham, Deputy Atty. Gen., and Mason M. Forbes and Harry H. Boyle, Co. Attys., both of Duluth, for the State.

F. Manley Brist, of St. Paul, for Board of Examiners.

HOLT, J.

Defendant's demurrer to an information charging him with a violation of chapter 149, Laws 1927, the Basic Science Act (Sections 5705-1 to 5705-23, inclusive, Mason's Minn. St. 1927), was overruled with a certificate that the question raised, the constitutionality of the law, was important and doubtful.

No other parts of the Constitution are invoked against the statute than sections 33 and 34 of article 4. It is difficult to see in these constitutional prohibitions anything intended to touch said chapter 149. The law deals with a subject which concededly is within legislative regulation and control by virtue of the police power of the state. The statute is not special legislation, but general, for it embraces the whole state and operates upon all persons residing therein who undertake to alleviate or cure bodily ills or injuries. Therefore it does not fall within the prohibition contained in the first sentence of section 33, art. 4, and the only clause in the specific subjects withdrawn by the rest of the section from special legislation which might be claimed applicable is: "Granting to any corporation, association or individual any special or exclusive privilege, immunity or franchise whatever." Chapter 149 does not grant or give anything, it restricts or regulates a vocation. In State ex rel. v. Cooley, 56 Minn. 540, 58 N. W. 150, it was held that the specific subjects upon which section 33, art. 4, prohibited special legislation were but an enlargement of those covered by the first sentence thereof. Michigan has essentially the same constitutional prohibition as contained in the first sentence of said section 33, and it was there held, as against the same argument here advanced touching a statute similar to chapter 149, Laws 1927, that there was nothing in the Constitution of that state upon which to question the law, but the court considered whether or not the Fourteenth Amendment to the Federal Constitution was contravened and decided that it was not. People v. Lewis, 233 Mich. 240, 206 N. W. 553, 42 A. L. R. 1337. However, in as much as the ground of attack upon the constitutionality of said chapter 149 is predicated upon the exceptions contained therein, the claim being made that they are arbitrary, unreasonable, and not uniform in application to the groups classified, can be and have been made because of the alleged contravention of the Fourteenth Amendment in the Federal Constitution, which in substance is the same as the protection assured by sections 2 and 7 of article 1 of the state Constitution, we have considered whether the arguments of appellant have shown any reason for holding that this law contravenes any constitutional provision.

It may be conceded that any law, general or special, which classifies groups or individuals either brought within or excepted from its operation cannot stand where the classification is arbitrary, unreasonable, or does not operate uniformly, or is in fact what is termed class legislation. The first objection raised, and perhaps the one most relied on, is that those who were duly licensed to practice as healers of human ills on May 1, 1927, the time this law went into effect, are excepted from examination in the basic sciences enumerated in the law. It is said, if knowledge of such sciences is essential to those who were to begin practice on May 1, 1927, it was just as essential to those who on or before that date were duly licensed to practice. The law makes no distinction between those who have held the license for a day or so and those who have practiced under a license for years. There can be no doubt of the right of the Legislature to raise the standard of knowledge required of those who undertake to cure injuries or ailments of the human body. In so doing it is but reasonable that a line be drawn so that those already engaged in the practice be not arbitrarily excluded or required to enter upon the study of new subjects of learning or take examinations therein. Those who held license as physicians on May 1, 1927, under whatever school, had passed examination and had been found worthy to practice under the standards required before that date, and there is not much weight to the contention that the public health will be seriously jeopardized if they continue to practice without taking an examination in the basic sciences; but, at the same time, the right of the Legislature to raise the standard of knowledge for those who aim to practice the art of healing in the future must be fully recognized. Some legislative bodies have made the line of demarcation between the old and new standard a certain number of years of practice. And this has been held valid, although, where a fixed number of years is made the dividing line, there is room for the argument that there is an arbitrary classification in excluding the one who has practiced a day or week short of the fixed period. It would seem the fact of having taken the examination required by the law at the time the license to practice was issued is less subject to the charge of arbitrariness or unreasonableness than fixing the line of demarcation upon a certain period of practice. No one can legitimately object to laws raising the standard of knowledge which might aid in the treatment of human ills by those engaged in that calling, but every one should recognize that the method pursued to attain this...