State v. Brogden
| Decision Date | 15 November 1922 |
| Citation | 84 Fla. 520,94 So. 653 |
| Parties | STATE ex rel. RAND v. BROGDEN, Chief of Police. |
| Court | Florida Supreme Court |
Error to Circuit Court, Dade County; H. Pierre Branning, Judge.
Habeas corpus by the State, on the relation of F. H. Rand, Jr. against C. E. Brogden, Chief of Police of Miami Beach, for discharge from custody for violation of a city ordinance. From an order remanding petitioner, he brings error.
Affirmed.
Syllabus by the Court
Penal ordinances reasonably construed, and not scrutinized for purpose of rendering them void. Municipal ordinances, which are penal in character, should be reasonably construed, and their terms should not be scrutinized for the purpose of giving them meanings which will render them void.
Where ordinance capable of legal and illegal constructions, former adopted, if possible. Where a municipal ordinance is capable of two constructions, one construction rendering the ordinance legal and the other illegal, the former will be adopted, if possible.
Ordinances construed as to give reasonable effect to provisions. In construing municipal ordinances the court should strive to so construe them as to give reasonable effect to their provisions.
Ordinance regulating speed of automobiles held valid exercise of power under charter. A municipal ordinance which provides that any person who shall drive any automobile within the corporate limits of the city while in a drunken or intoxicated condition, or who shall be guilty of reckless driving, by driving any automobile or motor vehicle over or upon any sidewalk, boardwalk, or concrete walk in the corporate limits, or by driving at a rate of speed greater than 25 miles per hour, or by turning corners, or approaching other automobiles, motorcycles, or pedestrians in a reckless manner, shall be punished by a fine of not exceeding $100, or by imprisonment not exceeding 30 days, or by both such fine and imprisonment, in the discretion of the mayor, deals with two classes of persons, viz., persons who, while intoxicated drive automobiles within the corporate limits, and, secondly persons guilty of reckless driving, and is a valid exercise of power so far as it relates to the second class of persons under a charter authorizing the city to regulate the speed at which horses and vehicles of all classes, automobiles, and motorcycles may be driven through the streets of the city.
James M. Carson and W. E. Walsh, both of Miami, for plaintiff in error.
McCaskill & McCaskill, of Miami, for defendant in error.
Among the the ordinances of Miami Beach there is one which provides for the punishment of any person who drives an automobile within the corporate limits of the city limits under certain conditions.
The ordinance is as follows:
The plaintiff in error was arrested and taken into custody by an officer of the city upon the charge of violating the above-quoted ordinance. Mr. Rand applied to the circuit court for Dade county for a writ of habeas corpus and moved for his discharge upon the return of the chief of police, Mr. C. E. Brogden. The court remanded the petitioner, and he took a writ of error to that judgment.
The petition alleges that Rand was arrested in 'Miami,' Dade county, Fla., on the 1st day of February, 1922, for 'violation of section 97, c. 5, of the ordinances of the City of 'Miami Beach' for driving a certain automobile within the corporate limits of said city of 'Miami Beach' at a rate of speed greater than 25 miles per hours.'
The return of the chief of police is in substance that he held that petitioner in custody 'under and by virtue of an arrest made by a police officer of said city of Miami Beach, Fla., of F. H. Rand, Jr., for driving an automobile over and upon a public highway in said city of Miami Beach at a rate of speed greater than 25 miles per hour, in violation of the ordinance attached to the petition,' etc.
The charter of the city empowers the city council by ordinance to 'regulate the speed at which horses and vehicles of all kinds, automobiles and motorcycles may be driven through the streets,' etc. It also contains a general welfare clause empowering the council by ordinance to 'regulate any other matter or thing that may tend to promote the health, welfare, prosperity and morals of the city' and a clause vesting in the city council all powers and privileges not inconsistent with its charter, 'granted to the city council of cities and towns by the general laws of the state * * * and shall have power to do and perform all things necessary for the government of the city not inconsistent with the Constitution and laws of the United States, the Constitution of the state of Florida, and the terms and provisions of this act.' See chapter 7672, acts 1917.
It is contended by plaintiff in error that the ordinance under which he was arrested is void, because it is too board in its scope in that it undertakes not to regulate the speed of automobiles upon the 'streets, sidewalks, alleys' only, but it is broad enough in its provisions to embrace any spot, private track, playground, or private estate in the city.
Several cases are cited in support of the point that a city empowered by its charter to regulate the speed at which automobiles may be driven through its streets may not pass a valid ordinance regulating the speed at which an automobile may be driven 'within the corporate limits' of the city. It is contended that such an ordinance would be operative upon private property to which the authority of the city did not extend in the matter; that it would invade the right of citizens by including in its scope property over which it had no control.
There are two classes of persons with which the ordinance deals, viz. persons who while intoxicated drive automobiles within the corporate limits; and persons guilty of reckless driving. The latter class is declared to consist of those who may drive automobiles or motor vehicles upon any sidewalk, boardwalk, or concrete walk in the corporate limits; those who drive such vehicles at a rate of speed greater than 25 miles per hour; and those who when in turning corners or approaching other automobiles, motorcycles, or pedestrians do so in a reckless manner.
The charge against the plaintiff in error was in effect that he was guilty of reckless driving by 'driving an automobile over and upon a public highway in said city of Miami Beach at a rate of speed greater than 25 miles per hour.' The ordinance is penal in character, and should therefore receive a strict construction or a reasonable construction, and its terms should not be strictly scrutinized for the purpose of making them void. See 2 McQuillin on Municipal Corporations, § 814.
Where it is open to two constructions, one legal and the other illegal, if possible, the former will be adopted. See 2 McQuillin on Municipal Corporations, § 810.
While it is desirable that ordinances should be free from doubt, the court should strive so to construe them as to give reasonable effect to the object aimed at. Scrutiny unreasonably rigid will not be resorted to in considering the meaning of ordinances. 2 McQuillin on Municipal Corporations, supra.
The city of Miami Beach has undoubted power, granted by its charter expressly, to regulate the speed at which horses and vehicles of all kinds, automobiles, and motorcycles may be driven through the streets of the city.
In the case of State ex rel. Ellis v. Tampa Waterworks Co., 56 Fla. 858, 47 So. 358, 19 L. R. A. (N. S.) 183, the rule of construction was adopted which requires all doubts as to the propriety of means used by a city in the exercise of its powers to be resolved in favor of the municipality. If a reasonable doubt exists as to a particular power attempted to be exercised by the city, it will be resolved against the city, but, the existence of the power being established, all doubts as to the propriety of the means used in the exercise of the power will be resolved in its favor. The means adopted by the city to regulate the rate of speed at which automobiles may be driven through the streets was the adoption of an ordinance providing for the punishment of reckless driving. Reckless driving is defined by the ordinance to be driving at a greater rate of speed than 25 miles per hour.
To construe this language to mean driving at that rate of speed 'anywhere in the city' is to write words into the ordinance that were not intended to be placed there and to exercise a power which the city did not possess. It is to place a broad or liberal construction upon the words used that would defeat the attempted exercise of its power.
The language used should be construed in the light of the power conferred, so that the meaning of the ordinance would be that the rate of speed at which an automobile may be driven on the city streets shall not exceed 25 miles per hour.
We do not regard either the case of People v. Bell (Sup.) 148 N.Y.S. 753, or the case of Royal Indemnity Co. v Schwartz (Tex. Civ. App.) 172 S.W. 581,...
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