State v. Brooks

• Decision Date: 28 February 1934
• Docket Number: 541.
• Citation: 172 S.E. 879,206 N.C. 113
• Parties: STATE v. BROOKS.
• Court: North Carolina Supreme Court

172 S.E. 879

206 N.C. 113

STATE v. BROOKS.

No. 541.

Supreme Court of North Carolina

February 28, 1934

Appeal from Superior Court, Durham County; Devin, Judge.

Jesse Brooks, alias Pete Brooks, was convicted of murder in the first degree, and he appeals.

Affirmed.

At the trial of this action, the defendant was convicted of murder in the first degree C. S. § 4200.

From judgment that he suffer death by means of electrocution as prescribed by statute (C. S. § 4658), the defendant appealed to the Supreme Court.

E. C Brooks, Jr., of Durham, for appellant.

Dennis G. Brummitt, Atty. Gen., and A. A. F. Seawell, Asst. Atty Gen., for the State.

CONNOR Justice.

The Attorney General has waived consideration by this court of his motion in behalf of the state that this appeal be dismissed because of manifest defects and irregularities in the record, to the end that defendant's contention that there was no evidence at the trial of the action tending to show that he is guilty of murder in the first degree may be considered and determined by this court. This contention is presented by defendant's assignments of error based on his exception (1) to the refusal of the trial court to allow his motion for judgment as of nonsuit at the close of all the evidence; and (2) to the instruction of the court to the jury that, if the jury should find from the evidence, beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant, on or about June 10 1933, intentionally shot and killed the deceased, Ronald A. Gill, and that his act in so doing was willful, deliberate, and premeditated, under the definition and rules given in the charge, it would be the duty of the jury to return a verdict of guilty of murder in the first degree.

There was manifestly no error in the refusal of the court to allow the motion for judgment of nonsuit. It is conceded that there was evidence tending to show that defendant is guilty of murder in the second degree. For this reason, the evidence was properly submitted to the jury under instructions as to the verdict, which are free from error unless, as contended by the defendant, there was no evidence sufficient to support a verdict of guilty of murder in the first degree.

There was evidence tending to show that the defendant was discovered by the deceased and other police officers of the city of Durham in a store in said city, at about 1 o'clock a. m., on June 10, 1933, that defendant had broken and...