State v. Brooks

Decision Date25 June 2020
Docket NumberNo. 18AP1774-CR,18AP1774-CR
Citation2020 WI 60,392 Wis.2d 402,944 N.W.2d 832
Parties STATE of Wisconsin, Plaintiff-Respondent, v. Alfonso Lorenzo BROOKS, Defendant-Appellant-Petitioner.
CourtWisconsin Supreme Court

For the defendant-appellant-petitioner, there were briefs filed by Leon W. Todd, assistant state public defender. There was an oral argument by Leon W. Todd.

For the plaintiff-respondent, there was a brief filed by Abigail C.S. Potts, assistant attorney general; with whom on the brief was Joshua L. Kaul, attorney general. There was an oral argument by Abigail C.S. Potts.

KELLY, J., delivered the majority opinion for a unanimous Court.

DANIEL KELLY, J.

¶1 A lfonso Lorenzo Brooks was parked on the side of a road after having been stopped for speeding. He was alone in the vehicle, and he had been driving with a suspended operator's license. Although he told the Milwaukee Sheriff deputies who were issuing him his traffic citations that he could have a licensed driver retrieve the vehicle, the deputies told him department policy required them to take it to an impound lot. The deputies conducted an inventory search of the vehicle prior to the tow. Mr. Brooks, a convicted felon, could not lawfully possess the firearm the deputies found, and so he was arrested. We consider in this case whether the deputies were performing a bona fide community caretaker function when they seized Mr. Brooks' vehicle without a warrant. We conclude they were not, and so we reverse the decision of the court of appeals because the seizure and ensuing inventory search were both unconstitutional.1

I. BACKGROUND

¶2 Late one summer night in 2014, Mr. Brooks came to the attention of Milwaukee County Sheriff's Deputies Dean Zirzow and Travis Thompson because he was traveling the Lake Park freeway at a speed of no less than 15 miles per hour above the posted speed limit. The deputies pursued Mr. Brooks and, once he exited the freeway, pulled him over in a mixed commercial and residential neighborhood. While performing duties incident to the traffic stop, the deputies learned Mr. Brooks' driver's license was suspended and that he was a convicted felon. The deputies cited Mr. Brooks for unreasonable and imprudent speed and for operating a vehicle with a suspended driver's license.

¶3 The deputies did not arrest Mr. Brooks for the traffic citations, but neither could he drive away at the conclusion of the traffic stop because he did not have a valid license and he was alone in the vehicle. The deputies informed Mr. Brooks that, under those circumstances, department policy required them to tow the vehicle to an impound lot.2 Mr. Brooks asked if his girlfriend—to whom the car was registered and who was following shortly behind him—could retrieve the car from the scene of the traffic stop. Deputy Zirzow denied the request because department policy prohibits non-officials from coming to the scene of ongoing police action.3

¶4 During the dialogue between Mr. Brooks and Deputy Zirzow, Deputy Thompson commenced a warrantless inventory search of the vehicle's contents preparatory to the tow. After discovering a firearm in the trunk area, the deputies arrested Mr. Brooks for possession of a firearm by a felon, contrary to Wis. Stat. § 941.29(2)(a) (2013-14).4

¶5 Mr. Brooks moved to suppress the firearm, arguing the warrantless seizure of the vehicle and subsequent inventory search violated the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution, as well as Article I, Section 11 of the Wisconsin Constitution. Specifically, he argued that the "community caretaker" exception to the Fourth Amendment's warrant requirement did not justify seizure of the vehicle. The circuit court denied the motion, after which Mr. Brooks pled guilty and received his sentence in due course.

¶6 Mr. Brooks pursued postconviction relief, asserting that: (1) there had been no valid "exercise of law enforcement's community caretaker function because the vehicle was lawfully parked and not obstructing traffic[ ]"; and (2) Mr. Brooks' trial counsel was ineffective for failing to introduce evidence that Mr. Brooks' vehicle had been lawfully parked, and that the Department's written policies did not authorize the decision to tow the vehicle. The circuit court denied the motion without a hearing, and the court of appeals affirmed. We granted Mr. Brooks' petition for review and now reverse.

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

¶7 " ‘Whether evidence should be suppressed is a question of constitutional fact.’ " State v. Floyd, 2017 WI 78, ¶11, 377 Wis. 2d 394, 898 N.W.2d 560 (quoting State v. Knapp, 2005 WI 127, ¶19, 285 Wis. 2d 86, 700 N.W.2d 899 ). We will review the circuit court's findings of historical fact under the clearly erroneous standard, but the circuit court's application of historical facts to constitutional principles is a question of law we review independently. State v. Turner, 136 Wis. 2d 333, 343-44, 401 N.W.2d 827 (1987). "While we are not bound by the circuit court's or court of appeals' decisions on questions of law, we benefit from their analyses." Floyd, 377 Wis. 2d 394, ¶11, 898 N.W.2d 560 (citing State v. Kyles, 2004 WI 15, ¶7, 269 Wis. 2d 1, 675 N.W.2d 449 ).

III. ANALYSIS

¶8 In this case we decide whether the "community caretaker" doctrine authorizes law enforcement officers to seize a vehicle without a warrant when, subsequent to a traffic stop, they discover the driver and sole occupant of the vehicle does not have a valid driver's license. Our constitution does not prohibit all governmental seizures, of course, just the unreasonable ones. Wis. Const. art. I, § 11 ("The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures shall not be violated[.]").5 Warrantless seizures (as occurred here) are presumptively unreasonable, and therefore unconstitutional. State v. Asboth, 2017 WI 76, ¶12, 376 Wis. 2d 644, 898 N.W.2d 541 ("A seizure conducted without a valid warrant is presumptively unreasonable." (internal marks omitted)).6 However, "because the ultimate touchstone of the Fourth Amendment [and Article I, Section 11 of the Wisconsin Constitution ] is ‘reasonableness,’ the warrant requirement is subject to certain exceptions."

Brigham City, Utah v. Stuart, 547 U.S. 398, 403, 126 S.Ct. 1943, 164 L.Ed.2d 650 (2006). One of those exceptions allows law enforcement officials to perform a warrantless seizure when acting in their "community caretaker" role. Asboth, 376 Wis. 2d 644, ¶13, 898 N.W.2d 541.

¶9 Before evaluating this exception to the warrant requirement, we should be clear about which seizure we are addressing—there were two in this case. Although they overlapped for a short period of time while the first was ending and the second was commencing, they were conceptually distinct. It is essential that we distinguish them because the constitutionally-acceptable scope and duration of each seizure is inextricably bound up with its justifiable purpose.

¶10 The first seizure occurred when the deputies stopped Mr. Brooks for speeding. See State v. Brereton, 2013 WI 17, ¶24, 345 Wis. 2d 563, 826 N.W.2d 369 ("The stop of an automobile by law enforcement constitutes a seizure of the vehicle, as well as its occupants."). That seizure could last no longer than necessary to complete the purpose of the traffic stop. Floyd, 377 Wis. 2d 394, ¶21, 898 N.W.2d 560 ("Traffic stops are meant to be brief interactions with law enforcement officers, and they may last no longer than required to address the circumstances that make them necessary."); see also Rodriguez v. United States, 575 U.S. 348, 354, 135 S.Ct. 1609, 191 L.Ed.2d 492, (2015) ("Because addressing the infraction is the purpose of the stop, it may ‘last no longer than is necessary to effectuate th[at] purpose.’ " (citation omitted)). The duration of the seizure is, therefore, necessarily co-terminus with the purpose of the traffic stop: "Authority for the seizure thus ends when tasks tied to the traffic infraction are—or reasonably should have been—completed." Rodriguez, 575 U.S. at 354, 135 S.Ct. 1609. The scope of the seizure is similarly delimited by its purpose:

"The scope of the search must be ‘strictly tied to and justified by’ the circumstances which rendered its initiation permissible." [ Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 19, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968) (quoting Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294, 310, 87 S.Ct. 1642, 18 L.Ed.2d 782 (1967) (Fortas, J., concurring)) ]. The reasonableness requirement of the Fourth Amendment requires no less when the police action is a seizure permitted on less than probable cause because of legitimate law enforcement interests. The scope of the detention must be carefully tailored to its underlying justification.

Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 500, 103 S.Ct. 1319, 75 L.Ed.2d 229 (1983) (emphasis added). So the first seizure ended once the deputies accomplished the purpose of the traffic stop, to wit, safely issuing the two citations to Mr. Brooks.

¶11 The second seizure occurred when the deputies decided that Mr. Brooks' lack of a valid driver's license required them to impound the vehicle. Deputy Zirzow was still in the process of issuing the citations to Mr. Brooks (thereby winding down the first seizure) when Deputy Thompson began inventorying the vehicle in preparation for the tow (which commenced the second seizure). This is the seizure the State says was justified by the community caretaker doctrine, and which we now address.

A. The Community Caretaker Exception

¶12 When the State claims law enforcement's community caretaker role justifies a seizure, as it does here, we evaluate the following three criteria:

(1) whether a search or seizure within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment has occurred; (2) if so, whether the police were exercising a bona fide community caretaker function; and (3) if so, whether the public interest outweighs the intrusion upon the privacy of the
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