State v. Broughton

• Decision Date: 31 December 1846
• Citation: 45 Am.Dec. 507,29 N.C. 96,7 Ired. 96
• Court: North Carolina Supreme Court
• Parties: STATE v. BROUGHTON.

7 Ired. 96

29 N.C. 96

45 Am.Dec. 507

STATE

v.BROUGHTON.

Supreme Court of North Carolina.

December Term, 1846.

A grand juror, on the trial of an indictment, may be compelled to disclose what was given in evidence by a witness before the grand jury.

Although a prisoner, on his examination, shall not have his examination, if given on oath, read against him, yet where a grand jury are investigating an offence, with a view to discover the perpetrator, and the person, who was subsequently indicted, was examined before them on oath and charged another with the commission of the offence, this examination may be given in evidence against the prisoner on the trial of his indictment.

Appeal from the Superior Court of Law of New Hanover County, at the Fall Term, 1846, his Honor Judge SETTLE, presiding.

The prisoner was indicted for the murder of Frank De Silva. The homicide occurred in Wilmington, during the term of New Hanover Superior Court, and the grand jury then empannelled were engaged in an enquiry as to the circumstances, character, and perpetrator of the act. At the instance of the grand jury, Broughton was summoned and sworn in Court and sent to them as a witness. On the trial of the present indictment Mr. Savage, who was at the time the foreman of the grand jury, was called, as a witness for the State, to prove that the prisoner, on his examination before the grand-jury on that occasion, charged one Gonzales with the murder of De Silva. The counsel for the prisoner objected to the examination of Mr. Savage, as to any matter that occurred before the grand-jury. But the Court received the witness for the purpose, to which he was called; and he stated that the prisoner charged Gonzales with murder and betrayed unusual anxiety to fix it upon him.

On the part of the State further evidence was given, that De Silva kept a shop in Wilmington, and had some money on hand, and that, on the night preceding his death, the prisoner was entirely without money, but immediately afterwards had money and made an ostentatious boast of it and treated his acquaintances at several tippling shops, and, when arrested six days afterwards, he still had fourteen or fifteen dollars about him, and also had two purses, a cap, and a pencil case that belonged to the deceased at his death. And it was further given in evidence, that the deceased was in the habit of wearing a ring on one of his fingers; but that, when the dead body was found, the ring was gone, and that the prisoner, who had never worn a ring before, was seen, two or three days after the homicide, with just such a ring on as De Silva had usually worn.

After the conviction of the prisoner his counsel moved for a venire de novo, because the evidence of Savage was improperly received; and because the Court ought to have instructed the jury to place no reliance whatever in the charge on the prisoners's pecuniary condition, as that might have taken place in many ways, nor on the possession of the prisoner of the several articles before mentioned. The motion was refused, and from the judgment of death the prisoner appealed.

Attorney General, for the State .

Strange, for the defendant .

RUFFIN, C. J.

By the policy of the law, grand-juries act in secret; and, with the view of sustaining that policy, it is prescribed that a grand-juror shall, amongst other things, swear, that “the State's counsel, your fellows, and your own, you shall keep secret.” The whole sense in which those words are to be received, or the duration of the secrecy imposed, we do not find accurately stated by any ancient writer on the common law. There are some reasons for the rule, which are obvious enough; and, as far as the public interests can be subserved by it, the secrecy ought to be kept, not only while the grand-jury continues empannelled, but it ought also to be subsequently observed. The principal ground of policy is, no doubt, to inspire the jurors with a confidence of security in the discharge of their responsible duties, so that they may deliberate and decide without an apprehension of any detriment from an accused or any other person, but be free “true presentment to make.” Therefore it is clear, that at no time nor upon any occasion ought a grand-juror to make known, who concurred in or opposed the presentment; as the power to do so would or might in some degree impair that perfect freedom from external bias, which a grand-juror ought to feel. It is probable, likewise, that another ground is, that it might lead to the escape of criminals, if their friends or others on the grand-jury were at liberty to make known the institution and progress of an inquisition into their guilt. But as that reason can operate, only while the accused is at large, it would seem, that, as far as the rule depends on that, it would not be obligatory after his arrest. We think, too, that in furtherance of justice, the law may have intended to forbid a grand-juror from giving aid to one indicted, and thus found to be probably guilty, in his efforts to defeat the prosecution,...