State v. Broussard
| Decision Date | 01 February 2012 |
| Docket Number | 11-849 |
| Parties | STATE OF LOUISIANA v. MARTIN P. BROUSSARD |
| Court | Court of Appeal of Louisiana — District of US |
NOT DESIGNATED FOR PUBLICATION
APPEAL FROM THE
TWENTY-SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
PARISH OF ST. LANDRY, NO. 07-K-1481-C
Court composed of Sylvia R. Cooks, Elizabeth A. Pickett, and Phyllis M. Keaty, Judges.
CONVICTIONS AFFIRMED. SENTENCES VACATED AND REMANDED FOR RESENTENCING.
27th JDC District Attorney
Jennifer Ardoin
Assistant District Attorney
COUNSEL FOR APPELLEE:
State of Louisiana
Peggy J. Sullivan
Louisiana Appellate Project
COUNSEL FOR DEFENDANT-APPELLANT:
Martin P. Broussard
Martin P. Broussard
South Louisiana Correctional Center
Because the defendant pled guilty to the charges, there is little in the record to indicate the facts of the case. Pursuant to the bill of information, on March 22, 2007, the defendant unlawfully entered the victim's home with the intent to commit a felony within. According to a pleading filed by the defendant, the victim's purse was taken and later he was seen using her Sam's Club credit card. While inside the home, he attempted to force the victim to have sexual intercourse.
The defendant was charged with aggravated burglary of an inhabited dwelling, a violation La.R.S. 14:60, and attempted forcible rape, violations of La.R.S. 14:27 and 14:42.1. The defendant filed a motion to suppress videotaped statements he gave to the police. A hearing was held on March 31, 2010, following which the motion was denied. The defendant pled guilty as charged on May 25, 2010, but reserved his right to appeal the trial court's denial of the motion to suppress the statements. On the same date, the defendant was sentenced to twenty years on each count, to be served concurrently, and concurrently with any other sentence he was presently serving, with credit for time served. He did not file a motion to reconsider the sentence.
The defendant has perfected a timely appeal. He raises six assignments of error, five of which are pro se assignments.
In accordance with La.Code Crim.P. art. 920, all appeals are reviewed by this court for errors patent on the face of the record. After reviewing the record, we find there are no errors patent.
The defendant argues that the trial court erred when it denied the Motion to Suppress the videotaped confession to the crimes charged. He asserts that the confession was a product of an unduly coercive atmosphere.
Before the state may introduce a confession into evidence, it must demonstrate that the statement was free and voluntary and not the product of fear, duress, intimidation, menace, threats, inducements or promises. La. R.S. 15:451; La.C.Cr.P. art. 703(D); State v. Simmons, 443 So.2d 512, 515 (La.1983). If a statement is a product of custodial interrogation, the state additionally must show that the person was advised before questioning of his right to remain silent; that any statement he makes may be used against him; and, that he has a right to counsel, either retained or appointed. Miranda v. Arizona, [384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602 (1966)]. When claims of police misconduct are raised, the state must specifically rebut the allegations. State v. Vessell, 450 So.2d 938, 942-943 (La.1984). A trial court's finding as to the free and voluntary nature of a statement carries great weight and will not be disturbed unless not supported by the evidence. State v. Benoit, 440 So.2d 129, 131 (La.1983); State v. English, 582 So.2d 1358, 1364 (La.App. 2nd Cir.1991), writ denied, 584 So.2d 1172 (La.1991). Credibility determinations lie within the sound discretion of the trial court and its rulings will not be disturbed unless clearly contrary to the evidence. Vessell, supra at 943. When deciding whether a statement is knowing and voluntary, a court considers the totality of circumstances under which it is made, and any inducement is merely one factor in the analysis. State v. Lavalais, 95-0320, p. 6 (La.11/25/96), 685 So.2d 1048, 1053; State v. Lewis, 539 So.2d 1199, 1205 (La.1989); State v. Thomas, 461 So.2d 1253 (La.App. 1st Cir.1984), writ denied, 464 So.2d 1375 (La.1985).
State v. Blank, 04-204, pp. 9-10 (La. 4/11/07), 955 So.2d 90, 103, cert. denied, 552 U.S. 994, 128 S.Ct. 494 (2007).
Three officers were involved with the defendant's interrogation: Dustin Abshire, a detective with the Calcasieu Parish Sheriff's Office, Buford Clay Knight, a captain with the St. Landry Parish Sheriff's Office, and Richard Ortego, the lead investigator with the St. Landry Parish Sheriff's Office. All three officers testified at the suppression hearing. There was little factual testimony given by the officers. Detective Abshire was present because of some other unrelated charge outside of Calcasieu Parish. At the hearing, the three officers primarily identifiedtheir voices on the taped interview. The videotape was reviewed by the participants and the trial court.
The defendant argues that during the interrogation, he was He also claims that he was threatened that his wife would be arrested and his son placed in foster care if he did not cooperate.
After viewing the videotape, the trial court ruled:
I would think the tape was about an [sic] hour - I think it started around 9:20, so the tape is about an [sic] hour and a half, and the Court listened to it and looked at it overall, the expressions in the tape, and the Court finds that there were no threats made in this case. The confession was free and voluntary. Accordingly, the Motion to Suppress is hereby denied. Of course the tape will have to be redacted if this matter, if this case goes to trial on those issues involving the other parishes. All right.
After reviewing the videotape, we agree with the trial court. The interview initiated at 11:09 in the morning. Captain Knight read the defendant his Miranda rights and asked the defendant if he would talk with them without an attorney present. The defendant signed a form acknowledging he had been given his Miranda rights and that he voluntarily agreed to talk with the officers. He was questioned primarily by Captain Knight and Deputy Ortego. They began the questioning by establishing how the defendant knew the victim. The defendant explained that in March of 2007, he and his wife had spoken with the victim at her house about a rental property she owned that they were interested in. The wife had dogs, however, and the victim did not want dogs in the house. The officers asked the defendant about the Sam's Club credit card which belonged to the victim. They advised him they had surveillance tapes showing that he used the card on several occasions in different parishes. They urged him to cooperate and to tell the truth.The officers spoke in calm, soft voices and were respectful. They continuously told him that it would go easier on him if he cooperated. The defendant indicated his reluctance to speak because he could get forty or fifty years. Detective Absire told the defendant he would not get forty or fifty years, particularly if he cooperated and helped out the officers with the facts. They said that if he told the truth, they would tell the district attorney's office that he cooperated with them and it could possibly go easier on him. The officers asked him if his wife, Donna, was involved with the theft of the credit card. They reminded him that he should tell the truth because it would be a shame if they had to arrest her and she would be taken away from their young son. The possibility of the wife being arrested came up only twice during the interview. The officers kept reminding the defendant that he should tell the truth and get the matter over with so that he could start anew and watch his son grow up. Eventually, the defendant admitted he went to the victim's house with the intent to rob her and that while in the house, he attempted to have sexual intercourse with her. We find there was no undue coercion or intimidation. The officers' approach simply coaxed the defendant to tell them what occurred at the victim's house.
In State v. Reynolds, 45,674, pp. 3-4 (La.App. 2 Cir 11/3/10), 55 So.3d 136, 139, the second circuit stated:
Although promises or inducements will void a defendant's confession, a mild exhortation to tell the truth, or an indication that if the defendant cooperates the officer will "do what he can" or "things will go easier," will not negate the voluntary nature of a confession. State v. Thomas, 30,490 (La.App.2d Cir.4/8/98), 711 So.2d 808, writ denied, 1999-0331 (La.7/2/99), 747 So.2d 8. Appeals to a defendant's emotions and/or religious beliefs typically do not render an ensuing confession involuntary. State v. Blank, 2004-0204 (La.4/11/07), 955 So.2d 90, cert. denied, 552 U.S. 994, 128 S.Ct. 494, 169 L.Ed.2d 346 (2007). See also State v. Murray, 546 So.2d 944 (La.App. 3d Cir.1989); State v. Welch, 448 So.2d 705 (La.App. 1st Cir.1984), writ denied, 450 So.2d 952 (La.1984).
In Reynolds, the defendant had committed two murders. The defendant was thoroughly Mirandized and twice invoked his right to silence, which the officers honored, but then the defendant initiated further conversations with the interviewing officers. During interrogation, the officers, who knew the defendant had admitted to his father that he had killed two people, reminded defendant that he was putting his father in the awful position of having to testify against his own son at trial. The officers further asked him if he preferred the electric chair or life in prison. The officers also mentioned that the defendant was suspected of being involved in another murder of a child and that he possibly would not make it out of Angola. Before the defendant finally...
To continue reading
Request your trial