State v. Brown
| Decision Date | 04 September 2015 |
| Docket Number | 111,771. |
| Citation | 357 P.3d 296,51 Kan.App.2d 876 |
| Parties | STATE of Kansas, Appellee, v. Curtis A. BROWN, Appellant. |
| Court | Kansas Court of Appeals |
Carl F.A. Maughan, of Maughan Law Group LC, of Wichita, for appellant.
Lesley A. Isherwood, assistant district attorney, Marc Bennett, district attorney, and Derek Schmidt, attorney general, for appellee.
Before LEBEN, P.J., SCHROEDER and GARDNER, JJ.
Curtis Brown appeals the district court's decision to revoke his probation after he admitted committing a new felony while on probation. He argues that his admission to the offense wasn't voluntary and that the district court abused its discretion when it revoked his probation.
But the district court had told him that he had a right to an evidentiary hearing at which the State would have to prove any violations, and the defendant acknowledged that he had discussed admitting to the violation with his attorney before the hearing. We find no error in the district court's conclusion that the defendant's admission was voluntary, and we find no abuse of discretion in revoking his probation for committing a new felony while on probation. We therefore affirm the district court's judgment.
Brown was convicted in 2013 of one count each of aggravated indecent solicitation, aggravated indecent liberties with a child, and criminal sodomy. Under Kansas sentencing guidelines, Brown's presumptive sentence for each offense was prison, not probation. But he pled guilty under a plea agreement in which the State agreed to join Brown in recommending a dispositional departure to probation, with both sides recommending the maximum sentences under the guidelines for each offense for someone with Brown's criminal-history score; the parties also recommended, though, that the three sentences be made concurrent to one another for a total sentence of 71 months.
Between the time of Brown's plea in May and his July sentencing, he violated the terms under which he had been released by testing positive for methamphetamine. Based on this, the court concluded for sentencing purposes that the State was no longer bound by the plea agreement and could recommend any lawful sentence. The State still recommended that the court follow the plea agreement, citing Brown's youth, his lack of criminal history, his plea (which spared the victim from testifying), and the circumstances of the offenses.
The court granted Brown's requested dispositional departure to probation rather than prison but made Brown's sentences consecutive, which resulted in a total sentence of 122 months in prison if Brown didn't successfully complete his probation. The court placed Brown on probation for 36 months with a number of conditions, which included drug-and-alcohol treatment, sex-offender treatment, and obeying the law.
Less than 6 months later, in November, the State alleged that Brown had violated his probation in six ways: failing to provide proof of payment of court costs, using methamphetamine, failing to obtain employment, failing to report to his probation officer, failing to enter and complete drug-and-alcohol treatment, and failing to enter and complete a sex-offender-treatment program. Brown appeared in court with his attorney in December on these charges. The court advised Brown he had a right to an evidentiary hearing in which the State would have to prove each allegation; Brown's attorney asked for an evidentiary hearing.
The parties appeared for that hearing in January 2014. At the start of the hearing, Brown's attorney told the court that a new case had been filed against Brown alleging felony theft, with a preliminary hearing set for the following week. The attorney then said that Brown was prepared to admit to the six violations previously made but wanted to set a later date for disposition (a date that would be coordinated based on developments in the newly filed case), at which the court would decide whether to revoke Brown's probation or give him another opportunity to complete it. The court then asked Brown whether he wanted, as his attorney suggested, to admit to the six violations already alleged by the State and to continue the probation-violation hearing “to see if ... you can cut a deal on this [case] and your new case?” Brown said he did. The court found that Brown had violated his probation in the six ways already alleged. The court also set the matter over for disposition on February 7.
The day after the January hearing, the State formally filed an allegation in this case that Brown had violated his probation by committing a felony theft in December 2013. When our case came back before the court in February 2014 for disposition, Brown's attorney told the court that he had “spoke[n] at length” with Brown and that Brown “would admit” to the theft charge for the purposes of the probation-violation hearing but not for purposes of the underlying criminal case for felony theft. The court then found that Brown had violated the probation based on the theft and confirmed that Brown understood that he was waiving his hearing right:
Later in the hearing, the defendant asked to address the court personally. Brown said that he “would just like to say on behalf of myself that I'm taking full responsibility of everything I've done here.”
Brown's attorney asked that the court continue Brown on probation with whatever sanction the court deemed appropriate, such as sending Brown to jail for some period of time as a condition of probation. The State asked that the court require that Brown serve his underlying prison sentence and not reinstate the probation.
The district court found that Brown had demonstrated that he was “not amenable to further probation” based on his failure to comply and ordered that he serve the underlying prison sentence. Brown's attorney asked for the court to modify the sentence downward from 122 months to the 71 months the parties had initially recommended, but the court denied that request.
Brown has now appealed to this court.
Traditionally, once a defendant on probation violated that probation, the district court had the discretion to revoke the probation and order that the defendant serve the underlying prison or jail sentence. State v. Skolaut, 286 Kan. 219, 227–28, 182 P.3d 1231 (2008) ; State v. Graham, 272 Kan. 2, 4, 30 P.3d 310 (2001). In this situation, where the district court's decision is a discretionary one, we may reverse only when the district court has based its decision on a factual or legal error or when no reasonable person would agree with its decision. State v. McCullough, 293 Kan. 970, 980–81, 270 P.3d 1142 (2012) ; State v. Gumfory, 281 Kan. 1168, Syl. ¶ 1, 135 P.3d 1191 (2006).
The district court's discretion was limited by a 2013 statutory change. The new statute, found now at K.S.A. 2014 Supp. 22–3716(b) and (c), requires, with certain exceptions, that the district court impose intermediate sanctions before ordering the defendant to serve the underlying sentence. See State v. Huckey, 51 Kan.App.2d 451, Syl. ¶¶ 3–4, 348 P.3d 997 (2015). One of these exceptions ties in to a longstanding distinction that probation officers, lawyers, and judges have made between technical and substantive probation violations: An act that violates probation conditions but isn't otherwise unlawful is a technical violation, while an act that violates probation conditions but is otherwise unlawful is a substantive violation. See State v. Meeks, 789 So.2d 982, 985 (Fla.2001) ; Cook, Mediation as an Alternative to Probation Revocation Proceedings, Fed. Probation 48 (Dec. 1995).
Our statute now tracks this distinction through K.S.A. 2014 Supp. 22–3716(c)(8), which provides that the district court need not first impose an intermediate sanction when the offender commits a new felony or misdemeanor while on probation. In that circumstance, the substantive probation violation is serious enough standing alone to give the court discretion to revoke the probation and send the defendant to serve his or her underlying prison sentence.
We should note that just because a probation violation is labeled as only a “technical” one does not mean it is unimportant. Some can be quite significant—such as when a person convicted for indecent liberties with a minor violates a probation requirement not to be alone with minors. In such a case, another exception to the intermediate-sanction requirement might apply, i.e., that public safety or the defendant's own welfare would not be served by an intermediate sanction. See K.S.A. 2014 Supp. 22–3716(c)(9). But the traditional distinction between technical and substantive probation violations is now reflected in the exception applicable when an offender on probation commits a new felony or misdemeanor offense, and that's the exception at issue here.
The district court in Brown's case noted that the original six violations were “technical” ones but that the new felony theft allowed the court to require that Brown serve his sentence without first serving an intermediate sanction. On appeal, Brown seeks to set aside the finding that he had committed the new felony theft. If successful on that argument, then only the technical violations would remain, and the district court would have been required to give Brown an intermediate sanction before sending him to serve the prison sentence.
Brown's argument rests on a claim that his admission to the new theft should be thrown out because the admission wasn't truly voluntary. Citing caselaw related to the...
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