State v. Brown
| Decision Date | 17 January 1945 |
| Docket Number | 15703. |
| Citation | 32 S.E.2d 825,205 S.C. 514 |
| Parties | STATE v. BROWN. |
| Court | South Carolina Supreme Court |
Lee & Shuler, of Kingstree, and McEachin & Townsend, of Florence, for appellant.
F A. McLeod, Sol., of Sumter, and E. L. Ard, of Hemingway, for respondent.
The defendant was tried and convicted of the crime of involuntary manslaughter. From the judgment pronounced, he has appealed.
The appellant seeks a reversal of the judgment upon two grounds namely, (1) Error of the Court in denying appellant's motion made at the close of all of the evidence for a directed verdict of acquittal; and (2) error of the Court in its charge to the jury.
Does the evidence afford a reasonable inference of guilt and warrant the verdict? If it does, the case was properly submitted to the jury.
On the night of October 2, 1942, appellant, with one companion (who did not testify in the case) was driving an automobile--a V-8 Ford Sedan--on a straight stretch of paved road between Kingstree and Hemingway. Approaching him was a Ford Pick-up truck, driven by Mr. Eaddy, who was alone. Mr. Eaddy was headed toward Kingstree, and appellant was going toward Hemingway. The two vehicles collided, resulting in the death of Eaddy.
At the time of the collision, the truck driven by Eaddy was on its right of the center of the highway; and the Ford Sedan driven by appellant was across the highway to its left, and was completely on that side, about 12 inches from the white stripe marking the center of the road.
Evidence for the State tended to show that it was a head-on collision the front wheels of the two vehicles were locked together and some of the witnesses described the collision as "tire to tire." The Eaddy car had been forced three feet backward, and its two front tires were ripped and mangled. The left front tire on appellant's car was flat, and had a hole in its side wall.
The defense interposed was accident or misadventure. The appellant testified that just as he came within a short distance of the approaching truck of Mr. Eaddy, his left front tire suddenly went flat, swerving the car to the left, across the center line of the road, and that he collided with the truck before he could get back on the right-hand side of the center of the road. His was an old car, with old tires, and he had never driven it before. He said that the car jumped to the left across the center line so quickly that there was no time to apply the brakes. When asked how far the Ford sedan traveled from the time the left front tire went flat until he hit the truck, appellant estimated the distance to be about the space of a car and a half; but later stated that he thought it was farther than that.
The Act regulating the operation of vehicles upon the highways of this State provides, among other things, that upon all roadways of sufficient width a vehicle shall be driven upon the right half of the roadway.
South Carolina Code, Vol. I, subsection 6 of Section 1616, Page 907. There are certain exceptions to this provision not applicable here. Subsection 7 of the same section of the Code provides that drivers of vehicles proceeding in opposite directions shall pass each other to the right, and that each driver shall give to the other at least one-half of the main traveled portion of the roadway, as nearly as possible. Subsection 33 declares a violation of the foregoing provisions to be a misdemeanor, and fixes the punishment therefor.
It is the established rule in this jurisdiction that one who causes the death of another by the negligent use of a deadly weapon or instrumentality may be convicted of involuntary manslaughter. And it is further declared that one who uses an automobile on the highways without due care and caution (which is but negligence), and in violation of the statutes of the State, or the ordinances of a town or city, and thereby causes the death of a person, is guilty of manslaughter. State v. Staggs, 186 S.C. 151, 195 S.E. 130; State v. Dixon, 181 S.C. 1, 186 S.E. 531; State v. Hanahan, 111 S.C. 58, 96 S.E. 667.
We think there was evidence for the State tending to show that the defendant had violated the quoted provisions of the statute. The responsibility for a death is sometimes made to depend on whether the unlawful act is malum in se or malum prohibitum. The authorities agree, however, without regard to this distinction, that if the act is a violation of a statute intended and designed to prevent injury to the person, and is in itself dangerous, and death ensues, the person violating the statute is guilty of manslaughter at least. The evident purpose of our statute is to prevent accidents and to safeguard persons from death or serious bodily injury, and the reason for it is that one driving upon the prohibited side of the road is apt at any time, and especially at night, to cause injury or death by colliding with a driver who is occupying his own proper and lawful side of the road.
The violation of a statute, if it is the proximate or contributing cause of an injury, constitutes negligence per se. So that driving on the left of the center of the road is an offense per se if injury or death results; testimony showing such violation and resulting death would ordinarily be sufficient to warrant the submission of the case to the jury. Such evidence is not necessarily conclusive, but may be rebutted not only by contradictory evidence, but also by evidence so explaining the conditions and circumstances under which the alleged offense was committed as to convince the jury that the person charged is not guilty.
It is sometimes difficult to distinguish between evidence sufficient to carry a case to the jury, and that which raises only a suspicion or possibility of the fact in issue; and it may readily be conceded that this is one of the border line cases. But, viewing the evidence, and the inferences which may reasonably be drawn therefrom, in its most favorable light for the State, which is the accepted position on a motion to direct a verdict,--State v....
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