State v. Brown

• Decision Date: 07 July 1911
• Docket Number: 17,388
• Citation: 116 P. 508,85 Kan. 418
• Parties: THE STATE OF KANSAS, Appellee, v. JEFFERSON D. BROWN, Appellant
• Court: Kansas Supreme Court

116 P. 508

85 Kan. 418

THE STATE OF KANSAS, Appellee, v. JEFFERSON D. BROWN, Appellant

No. 17,388

Supreme Court of Kansas

July 7, 1911

Decided July, 1911.

Appeal from Ellis district court.

Judgment affirmed.

SYLLABUS

SYLLABUS BY THE COURT.

1. STATUTORY CRIME--Evidence--Other Acts of Defendant and Prosecutrix Competent. In a prosecution for carnal knowledge of a female under the age of eighteen years evidence of anterior and subsequent acts of sexual intercourse between the prosecutrix and the defendant may be received in evidence to show the relations existing between the parties as well as their disposition toward each other.

2. STATUTORY CRIME--Same. Evidence of such other acts are not admitted to show other offenses but as tending to show the offense on which a conviction is sought, and the testimony is not rendered inadmissible because it may tend to prove the commission of other offenses.

3. STATUTORY CRIME--Uncorroborated Evidence of Prosecutrix Sufficient. In a prosecution of this kind there may be a conviction on the uncorroborated evidence of the prosecutrix if it is believed by the jury.

Joseph G. Waters, John C. Waters, and A. D. Gilkeson, for the appellant.

John S Dawson, attorney-general, S. N. Hawkes, assistant attorney-general, and J. A. Simminger, county attorney, for the appellee; J. P. Shutts, of counsel.

OPINION

JOHNSTON, C. J.:

The appellant was convicted of the offense of statutory rape committed on the person of Clara Nemechek, a female child under the age of eighteen. In the information it was alleged that the offense was committed on August 13, 1909, and at the trial testimony was given of three acts of sexual intercourse, the first in April, 1909, the second in August, 1909, and the third about September 1, 1909. The appellant objected to evidence of more than one act, but the objection was overruled. After the evidence was in, and upon motion of appellant, the state elected to rely on the act of August 13, and the court informed the jury that they could not find appellant guilty upon evidence of any other transaction than the one upon which the state had elected to stand but that "you may consider her testimony as to each and all alleged doings and relations between her and the defendant for the purpose of determining the relations existing between the parties." It is insisted that the acts were unrelated and that as only one offense was charged the admission of evidence of more than one was erroneous and prejudicial. Numerous authorities are cited to support the general rule that proof of an offense unconnected with that charged against the defendant is inadmissible. It is well settled, however, that in prosecutions for what are designated as sexual offenses proof of prior and subsequent acts are admissible although such acts in and of themselves constitute offenses. In The State v. Borchert, 68 Kan. 360, 74 P. 1108, evidence of prior acts was admitted, not to show another offense, but to show the previous relations and as tending to establish the one for which the defendant was prosecuted. In The State v. Stone, 74 Kan. 189, 85 P. 808, a prosecution for carnally knowing a female under the age of eighteen years, it was held that the admission of evidence of subsequent acts of intercourse which occurred as late as fifteen months after the acts charged in the information was not error. While in that case the subsequent acts were somewhat remote there were circumstances tending to show continuousness of illicit relations. In the opinion it was said:

"Subsequent intimacy does illustrate the...