State v. Crook, 49415

• Decision Date: 31 March 1969
• Docket Number: No. 49415,49415
• Citation: 221 So.2d 473,253 La. 961
• Parties: STATE of Louisiana v. Edward Francis CROOK.
• Court: Louisiana Supreme Court

Page 473

221 So.2d 473

253 La. 961

STATE of Louisiana v. Edward Francis CROOK.

No. 49415.

Supreme Court of Louisiana.

March 31, 1969.

Rehearing Denied May 5, 1969.

George E. Mouledoux, New Orleans, for appellant.

Jack P. F. Gremillion, Atty. Gen., William P. Schuler, Asst. Atty. Gen., Jim Garrison, Dist. Atty., Louise Korns, Asst. Dist. Atty., for appellee.

SANDERS, Justice.

The Orleans Parish Grand Jury indicted Edward Francis Crook for aggravated rape, as defined by LSA-R.S. 14:42. The defendant pleaded not guilty and not guilty by reason of insanity. After trial, the jury returned a verdict of guilty as charged. The trial judge then sentenced the defendant to death by electrocution. The defendant appealed, relying upon eight bills of exceptions reserved in the trial court.

On the night of October 3, 1967, an 18-year-old girl was returning home from her employment in a New Orleans department store. As she walked from the bus stop, a white man in his mid-thirties pointed what appeared to be a gun at her, took her money, and forced her into his car. He then drove to a deserted location and brutally raped her. On the following night, the police apprehended Edward Francis Crook for the crime.

BILLS OF EXCEPTIONS NOS. 1 and 2

The defendant filed a motion for a bill of particulars and a prayer for oyer seeking 'a pre-trial inspection and discovery' of the exact date, time, and place of the rape, the specific paragraphs of LSA-R.S. 14:42 under which he was to be tried, written confessions, oral confessions or statements, a detailed list of all evidence to be used at the trial, a list of all witnesses, a transcript of the Grand Jury proceedings, certain information concerning the arrest, laboratory reports, photographs of the scene, and all demonstrative or tangible evidence to be used at the trial.

The State answered the bill of particulars and prayer for oyer. It specified the exact date, time, and place of the offense, advised the prosecution was under paragraphs (1) and (2) of LSA-R.S. 14:42, and it had no written confessions or statements of the defendant. The State declined to furnish the other items requested, and the trial judge sustained the State's position. The defendant then reserved Bills of Exceptions Nos. 1 and 2.

The State's answer was adequate to assure the defendant a full understanding of the charge and of the law under which he was being prosecuted.

The defendant is entitled to the production of written or video-taped confessions. State v. Hall, 253 La. 425, 218 So.2d 320; State v. Dorsey, 207 La. 928, 22 So.2d 273. In the present case, however, the State had no such confession.

The defendant had no right to require the production of other items of evidence. We have often held that a defendant in a criminal prosecution has no right of full pre-trial discovery. State v. Hunter, 250 La. 295, 195 So.2d 273; State v. Pailet, 246 La. 483, 165 So.2d 294.

In State v. Hunter, supra, we stated:

'Louisiana was in the vanguard of the states in granting a defendant the right to inspect his written confession before trial. See State v. Dorsey, supra; State v. Tune, 13 N.J. 203, 98 A.2d 881; and 74 Harv.L.Rev. 940, 1054. However, we have steadfastly refused to broaden this holding into full pre-trial discovery of the varied items of evidence in criminal cases. See State v. Johnson, 249 La. 950, 192 So.2d 135 (oral confession and statements of witnesses); State v. Dickson, 248 La. 500, 180 So.2d 403 (police motion picture of defendant in criminal act); State v. Pailet, 246 La. 483, 165 So.2d 294 (wire-tap recordings); State v. Bickham, 239 La. 1094, 121 So.2d 207 (defendant's oral statements); State v. Lea, 228 La. 724, 84 So.2d 169 (oral confession); State v. Shourds, 224 La. 955, 71 So.2d 340 (documents); State v. Simpson, 216 La. 212, 43 So.2d 585 (evidence produced at grand jury hearing); State v. Vallery, 214 La. 495, 38 So.2d 148 (statement of prosecuting witness); and State v. Mattio, 212 La. 284, 31 So.2d 801 (police report). * * *

'The holding of the Court has been dictated by vital considerations related to fair balance in criminal procedure and the protection of the public against the ravages of crime.'

The ruling of the trial judge is correct.

BILL OF EXCEPTIONS NO. 3

After the trial judge had ruled upon the motion for a bill of particulars and prayer for oyer, the defendant filed a motion to quash the indictment, primarily on two grounds: (1) that the trial court's denial of his motions to secure the enumerated items of the State's evidence prevented him from adequately preparing his defense and deprived him of the effective representation of counsel, in violation of the Fourth, Fifth, and Sixth Amendments of the United States Constitution; and (2) that the death penalty for aggravated rape under LSA-R.S. 14:42 is cruel and unusual punishment prohibited by the Eighth Amendment of the United States Constitution.

The State, as we have observed, furnished the defendant all the information required by law. This information was adequate to prepare the defense and to satisfy all constitutional requirements.

The motion to quash also attacks the constitutionality of the death sentence for aggravated rape. In this State, the mode of administering the death penalty is electrocution.

About twenty states authorize a death sentence for rape. See Rudolph v. Alabama, 375 U.S. 889, 84 S.Ct. 155, 11 L.Ed.2d 119 (Footnote 1). The Louisiana Legislature has authorized the death penalty for aggravated rape. LSA-R.S. 14:42. The jury, however, may return a qualified verdict, and if it does so, the sentence must be life imprisonment. LSA-C.Cr.P. Art. 817.

Since the Legislature is vested with the constitutional power to define crimes and fix punishments, this Court is concerned only with the constitutionality of the death penalty for aggravated rape. More specifically, we must determine whether the death penalty for such a crime is proscribed by the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments of the United States Constitution.

The Eighth Amendment provides:

'Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted.'

Cruel and unusual punishments are those that are barbarous extraordinary, or grossly disproportionate to the offense. In short, the constitutional prohibition is directed to punishments that shock the conscience of civilized men.

Electrocution is a common method of administering the death penalty. Introduced as an improvement over the older and less humane methods of execution, such as hanging, its constitutionality has been consistently upheld. In re Kemmler, 136 U.S. 436, 10 S.Ct. 930, 34 L.Ed. 519; State of Louisiana ex rel. Francis v. Resweber, 329 U.S. 459, 67 S.Ct. 374, 91 L.Ed. 422; State v. Burdette, 135 W.Va. 312, 63 S.E.2d 69.

Aggravated rape is a grave offense. The authorization of capital punishment for rape, as we have observed, is not unusual in the United States. Such punishment is neither bizarre nor extraordinary. Nor do we appraise it as grossly disproportionate to the crime. As late as 1963, in denying certiorari, the Supreme Court of the United States declined to consider whether the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments prohibited the imposition of the death sentence on a convicted rapist who had neither taken nor endangered life. See Rudolph v. Alabama, supra. Recently, in State ex rel. Barksdale v. Dees, 252 La. 434, 211 So.2d 318, we held the death penalty was not a cruel and unusual punishment for aggravated rape. We note, moreover, the high degree of brutality in the present case. The defendant injured his victim so severely as to necessitate her hospitalization.

We conclude the Bill of Exceptions is without merit.

BILL OF EXCEPTIONS NO. 4

The defendant reserved Bill of Exceptions No. 4 when his objection to the district attorney's question was overruled during the voir dire examination of certain prospective jurors. The question and objection are set forth in the Bill of Exceptions as follows:

'BY MR. MURRAY: At this time I think it's proper to ask if any of you gentlemen have any conscientious objections or scruples against the infliction of capital punishment, if the facts of the case warrant it?

'BY MR. KOCH: If your Honor please, I object to the question Mr. Murray has posed to the jury. Even though I know the law is against me, I think someday it might be overruled. It tends to let the State select a blue ribbon panel. I don't think that question should be asked. The State and defense should never be able to ask that question. I make my motion for mistrial based on the question he asked.

'BY THE COURT: The objection is overruled and the motion for mistrial is denied.

'BY MR. KOCH: To which ruling of the Court I respectfully reserve a bill of exceptions, making part thereof the pertinent article allowing the District Attorney to ask that question, the question asked by the district attorney, my objection and the ruling of the Court.'

Defendant relies on Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 510, 88 S.Ct. 1770, 20 L.Ed.2d 776, decided by the United States Supreme Court after the present trial. There, the Court held it was improper to exclude for cause prospective jurors who voiced only general objections, or scruples, against the death penalty. We find nothing in the decision that would render improper the District Attorney's question concerning the juror's objections to capital punishment. Rather, the thrust of the decision is toward requiring a more careful examination of the prospective juror's attitude toward capital punishment. The Court stated:

'The issue before us is a narrow one. It does not involve the right of the prosecution to challenge for cause those prospective jurors who state that their reservations about capital punishment would prevent them from making an impartial decision as to the defendant's guilt. Nor does it involve the State's assertion of a right to exclude from the jury in a capital...