State v. Brown
| Decision Date | 06 October 1892 |
| Citation | 53 N.W. 92,86 Iowa 121 |
| Parties | STATE v. BROWN. |
| Court | Iowa Supreme Court |
OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE
Appeal from district court, Pottawattamie county; A. B. THORNELL, Judge.
The defendant was convicted of the crime of seduction, and adjudged to be imprisoned in the penitentiary for the term of 14 months. He appeals.Frank Shinn and Turner, Smith & Cullison, for appellant.
John Y. Stone, Atty.
Gen., and Thomas A. Cheshire, for the State
The defendant is accused of having seduced Miss Flora Robley, on or about the 15th day of September, 1888. Evidence was submitted, on the part of the state, which tended to show that defendant visited Miss Robley as a suitor during several months, both before and after the date specified. She testified, in substance and effect, that she was seduced under the promise of marriage; that a child, of which the defendant is the father, was begotten on the 1st day of February, 1889, and born on the 23d day of the following October. The defendant admits having visited the prosecutrix, but denies the alleged promise of marriage and sexual intercourse.
1. Miss Robley was permitted to testify, against the objections of defendant, that he commenced “keeping company” with her the 1st of July, 1888, and that he treated her “very affectionately.” The phrase “keeping company” is so commonly used, and so generally understood, that we think there was no error in permitting the witness to use it. It has a definite signification, as applied to the relations of unmarried people, and the answer which contained it was not open to the objection that it gave the conclusion of the witness as to the fact. If the witness used the phrase in any other than the ordinary sense, that could have been fully shown on cross-examination. But we think the court erred in permitting the witness to state that defendant treated her “very affectionately.” The answer was in the nature of a conclusion of the witness. The facts upon which it was based should have been stated, and the jury permitted to determine their effect.
2. A witness, who testified to having had a conversation with defendant, stated that “he never said he intended to do any particular thing with Flora Robley, and he never said that he intended to have sexual intercourse with her.” He was then asked the following: “Didn't defendant say, in conversation with you, in speaking of taking improper liberties with this girl, that he was ‘going to get there?’ ” This was objected to as incompetent, immaterial, and leading; but the objection was overruled, and the witness was permitted to answer. “That was the understanding that I took from it.” No exception to the ruling was taken, but the witness was asked, “Didn't he say that, in substance?” That question was objected to on the same ground as the former one, but, without any ruling on the objection, the witness was permitted to answer: A motion to strike the answer was sustained as to the latter part only, and an exception to the ruling was taken. The questions were leading, the answers were clearly incompetent and immaterial, and the last one was not responsive to the question. The understanding of the witness may not have been justified by the language used by the defendant, and in no view of the case was it properly received in evidence. The objections to the questions should have been sustained. Had the motion to strike not been made, the defendant would not have been in a position to complain because he failed to except to the ruling on the first objection, and there was no ruling on the second; but the motion showed that he did not waive his objections, and his exceptions to the ruling on the motion preserved his right to insist that the court erred in receiving the answer, and permitting it to stand. The motion should have been sustained as to the entire answer.
3. The defendant claims that he was engaged to be married to a Miss Preston, in the months of July, August, and September, 1888, and that he told Miss Robley of that engagement about the 1st...
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