State v. Brown
| Decision Date | 02 December 2015 |
| Citation | 479 S.W.3d 200 |
| Parties | State of Tennessee v. Adrian R. Brown |
| Court | Tennessee Supreme Court |
479 S.W.3d 200
State of Tennessee
v.
Adrian R. Brown
Supreme Court of Tennessee, AT KNOXVILLE.
September 10, 2015 Session
Filed December 2, 2015
Mark A. Fulks and R. Andrew Hutchinson, Johnson City, Tennessee, for the appellant, Adrian R. Brown.
Herbert H. Slatery, III, Attorney General and Reporter; Andrée S. Blumstein, Solicitor General; Rachel E. Willis, Senior Counsel; Stephen Crump, District Attorney General; and Krista Oswalt, Assistant District Attorney General, for the appellee, State of Tennessee.
Cornelia A. Clark, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Sharon G. Lee, C.J., and Jeffrey S. Bivins and Holly Kirby, JJ., joined.
OPINION
Cornelia A. Clark, J.
We granted this appeal to determine whether Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 36.1 (" Rule 36.1") permits parties to seek correction of expired illegal sentences. We hold that Rule 36.1 does not expand the scope of relief available for illegal sentence claims and therefore does not authorize the correction of expired illegal sentences. We also conclude that a Rule 36.1 motion alleging that a trial court failed to award pretrial jail credit is insufficient to state a colorable claim for relief from an illegal sentence. Applying these holdings, we affirm the judgment of the Court of Criminal Appeals upholding the trial court's dismissal of the defendant's Rule 36.1 motion.
I. Factual Background
On November 7, 2013, Adrian Brown filed pro se a motion under Rule 36.1, seeking correction of the allegedly illegal sentences the Criminal Court for McMinn County imposed after he pleaded guilty, on November 6, 1995, to three counts of selling less than .5 grams of cocaine, a Class C felony,1 and to one count of selling more than .5 grams of cocaine, a Class B felony.2 Mr. Brown attached several exhibits to his motion, including a transcript of his plea submission hearing and copies of the judgments reflecting the sentences he challenged as illegal.3 Mr. Brown argued that his sentences are illegal because: (1) the
trial court failed to award him pretrial jail credit, as mandated by Tennessee Code Annotated section 40–23–101(c) (2012) ;4 (2) the trial court imposed six-year sentences on his Class C felony convictions when his plea agreement called for three-year sentences; and (3) the trial court imposed sentences above the presumptive statutory minimum for his offense (Class C felony) and offender (Range I) classifications without finding enhancement factors.
The transcript of Mr. Brown's plea submission hearing reflects that the assistant district attorney and defense counsel announced they had reached an agreement by which Mr. Brown would plead guilty to the indicted offenses, with a recommended three-year concurrent sentence for each Class C felony and a recommended eight-year concurrent sentence, with a referral to Community Corrections for service of the sentence, for the Class B felony. See Tenn. R. Crim. P. 11(c)(1)(C).5 At the conclusion of the plea colloquy, the trial court "accept[ed] the pleas" and "adopt[ed] the agreements" as announced. See Tenn. R. Crim. P. 11(c)(3)(A), (c)(4).6 However, despite the trial court's statements indicating his acceptance of the agreement, the judgments the trial court signed on November 9, 1995, listed Mr. Brown's sentence on each Class C felony as six years instead of the agreed upon three years.7
On January 21, 2014, about two months after he filed his Rule 36.1 motion, Mr. Brown moved to compel the trial court to hold a hearing on it. The trial court did not act upon the motion to compel, and on March 11, 2014, Mr. Brown filed a second Rule 36.1 motion and attached several of the same exhibits he had attached to his initial motion, including the transcript of his plea submission hearing and copies of the judgments.8 Mr. Brown reiterated the arguments he had initially made regarding the illegality of his sentences.
On March 25, 2014, the State filed a response, arguing that Mr. Brown's Rule 36.1 motions should be dismissed because Mr. Brown's sentences had expired. The trial court dismissed Mr. Brown's motions on March 26, 2014, without explanation, stating only that the motions were without merit.
Mr. Brown appealed, arguing that: (1) his sentences are contrary to statute because he was not awarded pretrial jail credit; (2) his six-year sentences fall outside the statutory range because the trial court's failure to award pretrial jail credits resulted in a de facto sentence above the six-year statutory maximum for a Range I offender convicted of a Class C felony; (3) his sentences are illegal because the trial court violated Rule 11(c) of the Tennessee Rules of Criminal Procedure when it failed to give him an opportunity to withdraw his pleas before sentencing him to six years on each Class C felony offense instead of the agreed upon three-year concurrent sentence; and (4) the six-year sentences the trial court imposed are void because the trial court failed to find enhancement factors on the record to justify increasing his sentences above the presumptive statutory minimum. State v. Brown, No. E2014–00673–CCA–R3–CD, 2014 WL 5483011, at *2 (Tenn. Crim. App. Oct. 29, 2014). Mr. Brown also asserted that the allegations of his Rule 36.1 motion are sufficient to state a colorable claim and that the trial court erred by refusing to appoint counsel and hold a hearing. Id.
In the Court of Criminal Appeals, the State changed its position and conceded that Mr. Brown's allegation that the trial court failed to award pretrial jail credits states a colorable claim for relief under Rule 36.1. The State recommended remanding the case to the trial court for appointment of counsel and a hearing under Rule 36.1. Id.
The Court of Criminal Appeals declined to accept the State's concession and held instead that the expiration of Mr. Brown's sentences had rendered his Rule 36.1 motion moot. Id. at *6. The Court of Criminal Appeals also noted that Mr. Brown's allegations, other than his claim involving the trial court's failure to award pretrial jail credits, were insufficient to state a colorable claim for relief from an illegal sentence under Rule 36.1. Id. at *6 n.6. The Court of Criminal Appeals, therefore, affirmed the trial court's dismissal of Mr. Brown's Rule 36.1 motions.
Mr. Brown filed pro se in this Court an application for permission to appeal. See Tenn. R. App. P. 11. We granted the application and appointed counsel to represent him before this Court.9 State v. Brown, No. (Tenn. May 15, 2015) (order granting the pro se application, appointing counsel, and providing instructions for the scheduling of oral arguments).
II. Standard of Review
The primary issue in this appeal is whether Rule 36.1 expands the scope of relief available on illegal sentence claims from that available in habeas corpus proceedings by permitting the correction of expired illegal sentences. This appeal also presents the question of whether an allegation that the trial court failed to award pretrial jail credits is sufficient to state a colorable claim for relief from an illegal sentence under Rule 36.1. These issues are questions of law concerning the scope of relief and the proper interpretation of Rule 36.1. State v. Johnson, 342 S.W.3d 468, 471 (Tenn. 2011). Therefore, we review the lower courts' constructions of Rule 36.1 de novo without a presumption of correctness. Id. (citing State v. Ferrante, 269 S.W.3d 908, 911 (Tenn. 2008) ). In construing rules of procedure, such as Rule 36.1, we apply generally the same rules of construction that are used to construe statutes. Id. (citing State v. Crowe, 168 S.W.3d 731, 744 (Tenn. 2005) ). As is true of statutory construction, our primary objective is to effectuate the intent of the rule "without broadening or restricting the intended scope of the rule." Fair v. Cochran, 418 S.W.3d 542, 544 (Tenn. 2013) (citing Owens v. State, 908 S.W.2d 923, 926 (Tenn. 1995) ). When the text is clear and unambiguous, we need not look beyond the plain language to ascertain the meaning of the rule. Lee Med., Inc. v. Beecher, 312 S.W.3d 515, 527 (Tenn. 2010) (citing Green v. Green, 293 S.W.3d 493, 507 (Tenn. 2009) ). We do not base our interpretation of a procedural rule on a single sentence, phrase, or word of text, however, but instead endeavor to give effect to every clause, phrase, or word used. Id. (citing Cohen v. Cohen, 937 S.W.2d 823, 828 (Tenn. 1996)). We presume that every word was used deliberately, that each word has a specific meaning and purpose, and that the intent was not to enact a useless or absurd procedural rule. Id. (citing Fletcher v. State, 951 S.W.2d 378, 382 (Tenn. 1997) ). We also interpret a procedural rule in light of the law existing at the time the procedural rule was adopted. Id. (citing Murfreesboro Med. Clinic, P.A. v. Udom, 166 S.W.3d 674, 683 (Tenn. 2005) ). Additionally, when construing procedural rules, we may consider matters beyond the text that are relevant to the rule's construction, such as public policy, historical facts preceding or contemporaneous with the enactment of the procedural rule, and the background and purpose of the procedural rule, although these sources cannot provide a basis...
To continue reading
Request your trial
-
United States v. Braswell
...he is no longer in custody and has already served his sentence. See State v. Wooden, 478 S.W.3d 585, 591 (Tenn. 2015); State v. Brown, 479 S.W.3d 200, 211-12 (Tenn. 2015). Indeed, Braswell applied for state post-conviction relief but was denied relief for just that reason. State v. Braswell......
-
State v. Pompa
...The Defendant cites State v. Brown as support for his claim that his right to present a defense was violated. 29 S.W.3d 427 (Tenn. 2000). Brown outlined factors toconsider in determining "whether the constitutional right to present a defense has been violated by the exclusion of evidence." ......
-
Lanier v. State
...the original sentence is fully served, the attachment of jeopardy ... preclude[s] the court from resentencing."). Cf., State v. Brown, 479 S.W.3d 200, 211 (Tenn. 2015) (interpreting a rule of procedure to prohibit correction of an illegal sentence after the sentence has expired in order to ......
-
Collier v. State
...a defendant or the State to seek the correction of an unexpired illegal sentence. See Tenn. R. Crim. P. 36.1(a)(1); State v. Brown, 479 S.W.3d 200, 211 (Tenn. 2015). For the purposes of Rule 36.1, "an illegal sentence is one that is not authorized by the applicable statutes or that directly......