State v. Brown
| Decision Date | 04 February 1980 |
| Citation | 410 A.2d 1033 |
| Parties | STATE of Maine v. Michael BROWN. |
| Court | Maine Supreme Court |
Henry N. Berry, III, Dist. Atty., Peter G. Ballou, Deputy Dist. Atty., Portland, Mary Gay Russell (orally), Law Student Intern, for plaintiff.
Ricky L. Brunette, Portland (orally), for defendant.
Before McKUSICK, C. J., WERNICK, GODFREY and NICHOLS, JJ., and DUFRESNE, A. R. J.
Defendant Michael Brown has appealed from a judgment of conviction entered in the Superior Court (Cumberland County) on the verdict of a jury finding him guilty of the attempted murder of Kimberly McGowan. The appeal presents two issues: (1) whether the evidence was legally sufficient to support the conviction; (2) whether defendant was subjected to irreparably improper prejudice depriving him of a fair trial because the prosecutor asked Kimberly McGowan, when she was testifying, the characterizing question whether it was an "accident" that she was shot, and she answered: "Hell no."
The issue of the legal sufficiency of the evidence was saved for appellate review when the presiding Justice denied defendant's motion for judgment of acquittal made at the close of the evidence.
We must decide whether, as contended by defendant, the evidence is legally insufficient because, viewing the evidence most favorably to the prosecution, a juror, to be rational, would have to entertain a reasonable doubt regarding the existence of one, or more, of the essential elements constituting the crime charged against defendant. 1
More particularly, defendant asserts that a juror, to be rational, could not avoid having a reasonable doubt that the discharge of the handgun which caused bodily injury to Kimberly McGowan may have been Accidental, having been caused by the crash.
This being so, since the instant indictment charged the crime of murder sought to be completed as defendant's "intentionally or knowingly" causing the death of Kimberly McGowan (17-A M.R.S.A. § 201(1)(A)), and since the crime of "attempt" requires that defendant shall have acted with
"the kind of culpability required for the commission of the crime (to be completed), and with the intent to complete the commission of . . . (it) . . . ," (17-A M.R.S.A. § 152)
defendant argues that the evidence was legally inadequate because it would not prevent a rational juror from having a reasonable doubt that defendant "intentionally or knowingly" fired the gun "intentionally or knowingly" to cause Kimberly McGowan's death.
We reject defendant's contention.
Taking the evidence most favorably to the prosecution, the jury had warrant to find the following facts.
For a long time prior to the critical events here at issue, which occurred on November 25, 1978, defendant and Kimberly McGowan had maintained an intimate relationship, in the course of which they became the parents of a son. Several days prior to November 25th, after she had had an argument with defendant, Kimberly took their son, who was three years of age, and went to stay at the home of her aunt and uncle in Harrison, Maine. At about 8:00 p. m. on November 25th the defendant and his brother, Jon Brown, appeared unannounced at the house in Harrison. Defendant came into the house holding a .22 caliber handgun. He insisted that Kimberly dress and leave with him. Believing that the gun was unloaded, Kimberly's mother, who happened to be present, lunged at the defendant three times, once with a fireplace poker. Defendant pushed her away each time, using his free hand.
During the next hour, during which defendant gave the gun to his brother, who put it in his back pocket, there was general discussion about whether Kimberly should go with defendant. Kimberly at last decided to accompany defendant and his brother and to bring the child with her. As defendant left the house, he apologized to Kimberly's uncle for having made a disturbance, explaining that he was only trying to save his relationship with Kimberly.
The foursome left Harrison in an automobile, headed for Portland. Defendant's brother, seated alone in the front seat, was driving. The other three were sitting in the back, with Kimberly in the center and the defendant sitting at her right. Soon after they started for Portland, defendant took back the gun from his brother. At times he twirled it in his hand; for a short while, he allowed his child to play with it; ultimately, he took it back and kept it, for the most part, in his lap.
During most of the trip to Portland defendant and Kimberly talked about reuniting. Among other things defendant told Kimberly, as he had on prior occasions, that if he couldn't have her, he wanted no one else to have her. He also said that he would shoot her "if . . . (her) mother had called the police."
On the trip to Portland defendant's brother drove over the Maine Turnpike, and from the Turnpike, took the approach to Portland over Route 295 which passes through South Portland. A South Portland police officer spotted the vehicle as a possible stolen vehicle. He began to pursue it, and the pursuit developed into a high-speed chase in which several Portland police units also became involved. During the chase, Kimberly slouched down upon the back seat, and she braced herself by holding her legs firmly against the front seat. The chase ended when the car operated by defendant's brother collided at an intersection with a Blazer truck, skidded into two parked vehicles and came to rest.
At some time, either between the collision with the Blazer truck and the automobile's coming to a stop, or just after it stopped, the handgun was discharged, wounding Kimberly in the lower part of the back of her head. Either just before, or just after, the gun was discharged, Kimberly felt one or two fingers of defendant's hand on the back of her head.
Almost immediately after the automobile came to a stop defendant and his brother rushed out and fled. Later, still holding the handgun, defendant appeared at the house of a friend, where he stayed for approximately two or three hours until he was arrested. Defendant's friend noticed that he was "shaken" and that his "eyes were quite blurry as if he had been crying." At least twice, defendant told his friend: "I shot her" (referring to Kimberly). One time, he said he shot Kimberly in the head; another time, he said he shot her in the neck. Defendant also told his friend, speaking somewhat hysterically, that he thought he had killed Kimberly.
From these warranted findings of fact the jury could rationally conclude beyond a reasonable...
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