State v. Brown
| Decision Date | 16 December 1963 |
| Docket Number | No. 10429,10429 |
| Citation | 97 R.I. 95,196 A.2d 138 |
| Parties | STATE v. Douglas G. BROWN. Ex. |
| Court | Rhode Island Supreme Court |
J. Joseph Nugent, Atty. Gen., Corinne P. Grande, Sp. Counsel, for State.
Aram K. Berberian, Providence, for defendant.
This is a criminal complaint charging that the defendant on November 7, 1961 in the city of Warwick 'did operate a taxi cab upon a public highway of this state to wit: Post Road without first having obtained a special license from the Registry of Motor Vehicles to operate said taxi cab in violation of Title 39, Chapter 14, Section 20 of the General Laws of 1956, as amended.' After a trial to a justice of the superior court sitting without a jury, the defendant was found guilty of the offense charged and is now before this court prosecuting an exception to that decision.
General laws 1956, § 39-14-20, provides that 'No person shall operate a taxicab or limited public motor vehicle upon the public highways until such person shall have first obtained an operator's license as provided for in chapter 10 of title 31, and shall also have obtained a special license from the registry of motor vehicles to operate a taxicab or limited public motor vehicle under such rules and regulations as said registry shall require.' The defendant is here charged with a violation of this statute in that he operated a taxicab without having first obtained the 'special license' as provided therein.
The record discloses that at trial defendant stipulated orally that he had not obtained a special license to operate a taxicab at the time of his arrest and that the vehicle had been registered as a taxicab and certified for operation as such. The arresting officer testified without contradiction that the vehicle being operated by defendant was painted orange and white and bore the inscription 'Apponaug Cab Company.' He testified also that at the time there was a woman riding in the rear seat of the vehicle who informed him that she was on her way home but whose identity he did not ascertain. The defendant, upon request, gave the officer his operator's license along with the registration certificate of the vehicle and told him that he had applied for the issuance of a chauffeur's license, apparently referring to the special license required under § 39-14-20. The record discloses also that the owner of the vehicle came to the place of the arrest and drove the vehicle away with the woman referred to above remaining therein.
The trial justice in his decision summarized the evidence and discussed the significance that in his opinion could properly attach thereto. He stated, in particular, that the presence of the woman in a vehicle designed for use as a taxicab and occupying a seat in the portion thereof customarily reserved for passengers gave rise to a presumption that she was a fare-paying passenger and that this presumption, being unrebutted and coupled with the evidence as to the appearance of the vehicle and its registration and defendant's claim at the time that he had an application for a chauffeur's license pending, was sufficient to establish beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant had been operating a taxicab in violation of the statute.
The defendant, in urging error, contends that the state has failed to meet the burden of proof in that an essential element of the offense, the operation of a taxicab on a public highway, was not established beyond a reasonable doubt. In so arguing, he relies substantially upon the pertinent provision of § 39-14-1 which provides that 'The term 'taxicab' shall mean and include any motor vehicle for hire, * * * operated upon any street or highway, or on call or demand, accepting or soliciting passengers indiscriminately for transportation for hire * * *.' This is to contend, as we understand it, that there is in the record no evidence from which it reasonably could be found that at the time under consideration the vehicle was being operated for hire, conceding, as he does, that it could have been used in that capacity.
We are of the opinion that in enacting § 39-14-20 the legislature did not intend to proscribe all operation of motor vehicles that are so designed and equipped as to be used as taxicabs by persons who have not first obtained the special license referred to therein. These vehicles may of necessity be operated for purposes other than furnishing transportation for hire as, for example, in the course of maintenance and repair. If we read § 39-14-20 in the light of the definition contained in §...
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