State v. Brown

Decision Date12 August 1997
Docket NumberNo. 15481,15481
Citation700 A.2d 1089,242 Conn. 445
PartiesSTATE of Connecticut v. Robert M. BROWN.
CourtConnecticut Supreme Court

Rita M. Shair, Assistant State's Attorney, with whom was James E. Thomas, State's Attorney, for appellant (State).

G. Douglas Nash, Public Defender, for appellee (defendant).

Before CALLAHAN, C.J., and BORDEN, BERDON, PALMER and McDONALD, JJ.

CALLAHAN, Chief Justice.

The certified issue in this appeal is whether the Appellate Court properly concluded that the trial court's denial of the defendant's midtrial motion for a continuance to allow for DNA 1 testing was an abuse of its discretion that entitled the defendant to a new trial. 2 In the interests of judicial economy, however, we also address the defendant's related claims that were not decided by the Appellate Court, namely, that: (1) the trial court improperly denied his posttrial motion for a new trial; and (2) the state's late disclosure of certain physical evidence deprived the defendant of several of his constitutional rights. We reverse the judgment of the Appellate Court as to the certified issue and affirm the judgment of the trial court as to the issues raised before, but not decided by, the Appellate Court. 3

The jury reasonably could have found the following facts. In mid-July 1983, 4 the victim placed an advertisement in a local newspaper seeking a roommate to share her condominium in Suffield. At 10:45 a.m. on July 24, the defendant, Robert M. Brown, called the victim and indicated that he was inquiring about the condominium for his sister, a legal secretary who was relocating to this area from Florida. At the end of the conversation, the defendant told the victim, "we'll be over" around noon.

At noon, the victim saw the defendant walking briskly toward her front door. By the time she was able to get to the door, he had already entered the foyer. The defendant explained that he had called earlier concerning the condominium. The victim then spent several minutes showing the defendant around the condominium. When they were on the second floor, where the bedrooms were located, the defendant appeared disinterested when the victim showed him the empty bedroom to be rented.

After briefly using the bathroom off the empty bedroom, the defendant entered the victim's bedroom and stood in the doorway. He asked if the bedroom was the victim's and whether certain of the doors were closet doors. After the victim responded that it was her bedroom and that there were walk-in closets behind the closed doors, she began to feel uncomfortable and attempted to leave the room. As she passed the defendant in the doorway, he grabbed her from behind with his left arm and cupped his left hand over her mouth. In his right hand, he held a knife with a five or six inch curved blade that he displayed to the victim. After a brief struggle, the defendant ordered the victim to remove her eyeglasses. After she had done so, the defendant dragged her approximately six feet into the nearest walk-in closet.

Once in the closet, the defendant continued to hold the victim with his left arm. With his right arm, he began rummaging through her clothes and found a tie to a tunic top. He then led her out of the closet and removed a pair of tube socks from a dresser drawer. The defendant ordered the victim to lie face down on her bed. After pressing the victim's face into the bed, he gagged her with one of the socks. 5 He also tied her hands behind her back with the tie he had taken from the closet. He then ordered her to turn onto her back. While he was binding and gagging the victim, he repeatedly ordered her not to scream.

The defendant then proceeded to lie on the victim and, after forcibly removing her jeans and underwear, had vaginal intercourse with her. After some time, the defendant abruptly separated himself from the victim and went into the bathroom. 6

In the bathroom, the defendant searched the cabinets until he located a disposable douche. After ordering the victim to squat down over the toilet he twice unsuccessfully attempted to insert the douche applicator into her vagina. On the third attempt, he succeeded and released the fluid contained therein into the victim. The defendant then removed the applicator and wiped the victim's vaginal area with a yellow hand towel. When he had finished, he ordered the victim to return to the bedroom and lie on the bed. The defendant then wiped down the toilet with the towel. He also asked the victim for a bag in which he could put the used douche applicator, and she provided him with a bag for that purpose.

The defendant then returned to the bedroom and sat down next to the victim. At that point, she told him that she suffered from hypoglycemia, that her blood sugar level was low and that she felt nauseated and dizzy. In response, the defendant told her that she was only afraid. He also remarked that they could get into a lot of trouble for what they had just done. He further told the victim that he did not want to hurt anyone, but that if he got into trouble he had "friends" who could "take care of things" for him. After some brief additional conversation, the defendant pushed the victim down onto the bed and announced that he was considering raping her again. The defendant then covered the victim's eyes with a pillowcase and penetrated her digitally. She told him that it hurt, and he stopped.

At that point, he asked the victim if she was expecting anyone. In response, she reminded him of the advertisement in the newspaper. The defendant then picked up the bag containing the douche applicator and hurriedly left the condominium. Shortly thereafter, the victim was taken by a neighbor to a nearby hospital where a rape kit was constructed. While the victim was at the hospital, hospital personnel called the police and, shortly thereafter, a member of the Suffield police arrived to take a statement from the victim. The next day the victim met with a police sketch artist who composed a picture of her attacker based on her description. The victim also looked at several hundred police photographs that day but did not select any of the photographs as being that of her assailant. 7

Approximately ten weeks later, after the defendant had responded to another classified advertisement in another town placed by a woman seeking a roommate, 8 the victim was shown an array of five photographs, including one of the defendant. At that time, the victim positively selected the defendant's photograph as a photograph of her assailant. The defendant subsequently was arrested and tried by a jury on three counts of sexual assault in the first degree in violation of General Statutes § 53a-70 (a), one count of kidnapping in the first degree in violation of General Statutes § 53a-92 (a)(2)(A) and one count of burglary in the first degree in violation of General Statutes § 53a-101 (a)(1). 9 The jury returned a verdict of guilty on each count, and the trial court subsequently sentenced the defendant to a total effective sentence of imprisonment of fifty-one years, suspended after thirty-nine years, and five years probation.

I

We first address the state's claim that the Appellate Court erred in concluding that the trial court had abused its discretion by denying the defendant's midtrial motion for a lengthy continuance so that DNA testing could be performed on a stain found in the crotch area of the jeans that the victim had been wearing before and after she was assaulted. The Appellate Court concluded that the trial court had abused its discretion by denying the continuance and allowing the jury to deliberate and to reach a verdict in this case before DNA testing of the stain had been completed. State v. Brown, 41 Conn.App. 317, 323, 675 A.2d 1369 (1996). We disagree with the Appellate Court on this issue.

" 'The determination of whether to grant a request for a continuance is within the discretion of the trial court, and will not be disturbed on appeal absent an abuse of discretion.' State v. Aillon, 202 Conn. 385, 394, 521 A.2d 555 (1987). A reviewing court is bound by the principle that '[e]very reasonable presumption in favor of the proper exercise of the trial court's discretion will be made.' Ridgeway v. Ridgeway, 180 Conn. 533, 538, 429 A.2d 801 (1980); State v. Beckenbach, [198 Conn. 43, 47, 501 A.2d 752 (1985) ]." State v. Hamilton, 228 Conn. 234, 239-40, 636 A.2d 760 (1994). When determining whether a new trial is required as the result of a trial court's denial of a request for a continuance, we first must determine whether the trial court's decision denying the request for a continuance was "arbitrary" or "unreasonabl[e]." Id., at 240-42, 636 A.2d 760. This determination must be made on a case-by-case basis, with particular reference to the circumstances presented to and known by the trial court at the time of its ruling. Id., at 240, 636 A.2d 760.

"There are no mechanical tests for deciding when a denial of a continuance is so arbitrary as to violate due process. The answer must be found in the circumstances present in every case, particularly in the reasons presented to the trial judge at the time the request is denied." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., at 240, 636 A.2d 760. Under the particular facts of this case, the trial court's action was not only reasonable, but represented a thoughtful balancing of the numerous competing interests known to the court at the time it rendered its decision.

The following additional facts are relevant. At trial, the presentation of the state's witnesses took from Tuesday, July 13, until Thursday, July 15, 1993. At the end of the day on July 15, after the state had presented its final witness, the defendant was allowed to place on the record information regarding the whereabouts of the jeans that the victim had worn before and after the sexual assaults. The defendant informed the court, through counsel, that: (1) the...

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  • State v. Breton
    • United States
    • Connecticut Supreme Court
    • June 24, 2003
    ...before it at the time that the defendant moved for a continuance, abused its discretion in ruling as it did. See State v. Brown, 242 Conn. 445, 458, 700 A.2d 1089 (1997) ("an appellate court should limit its assessment of the reasonableness of the trial court's exercise of its discretion to......
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    ...is outside the scope of the certified question, but we review the claim in the interest of judicial efficiency. State v. Brown, 242 Conn. 445, 447, 700 A.2d 1089 (1997) (court may address related claims not certified for review in interest of judicial economy). 38. Although the Appellate Co......
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