State v. Brown

Decision Date19 February 2002
Docket NumberNo. COA00-1527.,COA00-1527.
Citation560 S.E.2d 170,148 NC App. 683
CourtNorth Carolina Court of Appeals
PartiesSTATE of North Carolina v. Reshaud Amondo BROWN.

Attorney General Roy A. Cooper, III, by Assistant Attorney General M.A. Kelly Chambers, for the State.

Mark E. Hayes, Greensboro, for defendant-appellant.

HUNTER, Judge.

Reshaud Amondo Brown ("defendant") appeals from a judgment entered against him on the charge of robbery with a dangerous weapon. On appeal, defendant argues that the trial court erred in sustaining the State's objections to questions asked by defendant during his cross-examination of one of the eyewitnesses to the robbery. Defendant also argues that the trial court erred in permitting an assistant district attorney to testify at trial. We find no prejudicial error in defendant's trial.

The evidence at trial tended to show that on 29 September 1999, defendant was driving a car containing four other individuals, including Ibn Hasan ("Hasan") and Michael Jarrell ("Jarrell"). Defendant followed a car with a "Pizza Hut" delivery sign into an apartment complex. Jarrell left the car intending to rob the Pizza Hut delivery employee, Everett Alston ("Alston"), but stopped and returned to the car when he realized he knew Alston. Defendant then proceeded to exit the car and rob Alston using a gun and wearing a ski mask and gloves. All five individuals were arrested and charged with robbery with a dangerous weapon. Jarrell agreed to testify as to the events of the robbery in exchange for not being tried as an adult, and the other three individuals who had been in the car, including Hasan, each agreed to testify as to the events of the robbery in exchange for having the charges against them dropped. At defendant's trial, Jarrell, Hasan, and the other two eyewitnesses each testified that defendant committed the robbery. Alston testified as to the approximate size and weight of the person who had robbed him. Also, Frank Chut ("Chut"), an assistant district attorney, testified as to the concessions that Jarrell and Hasan had received in exchange for agreeing to testify about the robbery.

We first note that defendant contends on appeal that the two evidentiary rulings by the trial court, to which defendant has assigned error, violated various constitutional rights of defendant. However, defendant's objections and arguments at trial were not based upon constitutional grounds, and the trial court's rulings on defendant's objections were, likewise, not made on constitutional grounds. It is well-established that constitutional issues not raised or passed upon at trial will not be considered for the first time on appeal. See, e.g., State v. Anthony, 354 N.C. 372, 388, 555 S.E.2d 557, 571 (2001)

. Therefore, we decline to review the constitutional components of defendant's arguments, and we limit our review to a consideration of the grounds upon which the objections, and the trial court's rulings, were actually based.

Defendant first argues that the trial court erred in sustaining the State's objections to certain questions asked by defendant during his cross-examination of Hasan. A review of the record indicates that, on direct examination, Hasan testified that defendant committed the robbery of Alston, and he further testified that he has no reason to lie about who committed the robbery. On cross-examination, defendant asked Hasan whether he had lied to a particular detective about a separate robbery incident involving a business called "the Sonic." Before the State was able to object to this question, Hasan stated, "[o]h, yeah. I remember lying to him." The State then objected on the grounds of relevancy.

The trial court removed the jury and conducted a hearing, during which defendant specifically argued that he wished to question Hasan regarding lies he told to a detective about "the Sonic robbery" for the purpose of impeaching Hasan's credibility. The trial court sustained the State's objection, stating:

The Sonic robbery is wholly collateral to the present case and is not intermingled or inextricably intertwined in this case.
The investigative details of the so-called Sonic robbery being wholly collateral to the case at bar are not relevant to the present prosecution.
Even if there be some marginal relevance on the issue of impeachment, the probative value of such evidence is substantially outweighed by the very distinct and present danger of confusion of the issues by the jury and by the danger of misleading the jury and should be thus excluded under Rule 403.

On appeal, defendant argues that he should have been permitted to question Hasan about the details of the Sonic robbery itself because such questioning would have revealed a reason for Hasan to be biased against defendant. As with defendant's constitutional arguments, defendant did not, in fact, argue the issue of bias to the court at trial. Thus, we address only the issue of whether defendant should have been permitted to question Hasan regarding his lying to a detective about a separate robbery for purposes of establishing Hasan's character for truthfulness.

Rule 608(b) of the North Carolina Rules of Evidence provides:

Specific instances of the conduct of a witness, for the purpose of attacking or supporting his credibility, other than conviction of crime as provided in Rule 609, may not be proved by extrinsic evidence. They may, however, in the discretion of the court, if probative of truthfulness or untruthfulness, be inquired into on cross-examination of the witness (1) concerning his character for truthfulness or untruthfulness, or (2) concerning the character for truthfulness or untruthfulness of another witness as to which character the witness being cross-examined has
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4 cases
  • State Of North Carolina v. Lewis
    • United States
    • North Carolina Court of Appeals
    • August 17, 2010
    ...did not result in a conviction; and (4) the inquiry into the conduct must take place during crossexamination. State v. Brown, 148 N.C. App. 683, 686, 560 S.E.2d 170, 173 (2002). Nevertheless, the trial court may exclude such evidence under Rule 403 if it determines that "'its probative valu......
  • REYNOLDS TOBACCO v. ENV. & NAT. RES.
    • United States
    • North Carolina Court of Appeals
    • February 19, 2002
    ... ... Gen.Stat. § 130A-290(35). Because the state" definition is broader than the federal definition, we will not rely on federal case law in our interpretation ...         II ...      \xC2" ... ...
  • State v. Richardson
    • United States
    • North Carolina Court of Appeals
    • May 1, 2012
    ...the trial court. This Court will not address constitutional arguments raised for the first time on appeal. State v. Brown, 148 N.C.App. 683, 684, 560 S.E.2d 170, 172 (2002). Further, after the trial court sustained each of the State's challenged objections, Defendant never made an offer of ......
  • State v. Brown
    • United States
    • North Carolina Supreme Court
    • May 9, 2002
    ...for Brown. M.A. Kelly Chambers, Assistant Attorney General, R. Stuart Albright, District Attorney, for State. Prior report: 148 N.C.App. 683, 560 S.E.2d 170. Upon consideration of the notice of appeal from the North Carolina Court of Appeals, filed by the Defendant in this matter pursuant t......

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