State v. Brown
Decision Date | 26 January 1993 |
Docket Number | No. 91-570-C,91-570-C |
Parties | STATE v. Edmond J. BROWN. A. |
Court | Rhode Island Supreme Court |
This case comes before us on the defendant's appeal from a judgment of conviction on multiple counts charging him with first-degree sexual abuse in respect to his stepdaughter to whom we shall refer as "Amy." The defendant was sentenced to an aggregate term of fifty years at the Adult Correctional Institutions with forty years to serve, ten years suspended, and ten years probation upon release. This case comes before us a second time. In State v. Brown, 574 A.2d 745 (R.I.1990) (Brown I ), we vacated a prior conviction and remanded the case to the Superior Court for a new trial. The facts of the case as disclosed by the record are substantially similar to those set forth in Brown I. However, we shall briefly summarize the facts that are pertinent to this appeal. Amy was born April 13, 1972, to her mother, Madelyn, and her first husband. In 1979 Madelyn divorced her first husband, and on October 27, 1979, Madelyn married defendant. At that time Amy was seven and one-half years old. A year and a half later defendant legally adopted Amy and her brother.
On May 18, 1988, when Amy was sixteen years of age, she attempted suicide by taking an overdose of antihistamines. She left a note in a school locker addressed to a close friend and explained the reasons for her attempted suicide. The note read in part, "I'm tired of the hate and anger eating away at the inside of me, I'm tired of him touching me, I'm tired of not being able to tell anyone." Amy recovered and, while she was in the hospital, made a complaint to the police, who investigated the complaint and ultimately arrested defendant. Amy testified that defendant had begun molesting her at the early age of seven and one-half years. He would insert his fingers into the girl's vagina. On several occasions he penetrated her with a banana. He would then peel and eat the banana in front of the child. When Amy became eight or nine years old, defendant committed acts of penile penetration at various times, ranging from three times per week to daily. This type of intercourse continued until Amy became fourteen. At that point she began successfully to resist his advances.
Amy testified that she did not divulge the fact of defendant's molestation to her mother because defendant admonished her that no one would believe her. Moreover, defendant told her that she should be grateful to him for having introduced her to sexual experience.
The defendant denied Amy's accusations and testified that he and his stepdaughter had a close father-daughter relationship. The defendant admitted that he participated in disciplining the children in order to enforce the mother's rules but completely denied any improper conduct toward her.
In support of his appeal, defendant raises four issues. These issues will be considered in the order in which they are raised in defendant's brief. Further facts will be supplied in order to deal with these issues.
Prior to the trial defendant requested a bill of particulars. The bill furnished by the state set forth three time periods for the acts of molestation. These periods were as follows: (1) June 1, 1979, to May 3, 1984, (2) May 4, 1984, to April 12, 1985, and (3) April 13, 1985, to May 18, 1985. The state identified three instruments of vaginal penetration to be (1) fingers, (2) penis, and (3) banana. During the trial Amy testified that defendant had oral-sexual contact with her. Counsel for defendant objected to this testimony and moved to strike. The trial justice sustained the objection and granted the motion to strike. The trial justice also gave an instruction to the jurors that they should disregard this testimony. However, the trial justice denied the motion to pass the case.
Our standard of review of a trial justice's determination to deny a mistrial has been stated on numerous occasions. Generally we consider that the decision to declare a mistrial or to deny a request for a mistrial is within the discretion of the trial justice. State v. Simpson, 606 A.2d 677, 679 (R.I.1992). Consequently, we review the determination for abuse of discretion. In order to abuse discretion, the trial justice must be clearly wrong. Id. We have also stated that in considering a motion for mistrial, the trial justice should determine whether the evidence was of such a nature as to cause the jurors to become so inflamed that their attention was distracted from the issues submitted to them. See, e.g., State v. Travis, 568 A.2d 316, 321 (R.I.1990); State v. Brown, 522 A.2d 208, 210-11 (R.I.1987). In this case the trial justice focused on this issue in the following manner:
Our review of the record of testimony in this case strongly supports the conclusion of the trial justice. The nature of the testimony that was within the bill of particulars was such that the jurors were very unlikely to be further inflamed by a reference to oral sex without embellishment along with a very unequivocal and emphatic instruction to disregard the testimony. This instruction was stated as follows:
The defendant argues that the instruction was not given immediately but in fact was given approximately eighteen hours after the motion to strike was granted. The defendant sets forth that the trial justice recessed the trial at 3:30 p.m. on January 9, 1991, shortly after granting the motion to strike. The trial was resumed at approximately 9:30 a.m. on January 10. The trial justice and counsel for the state and defendant engaged in an extended discussion after which the jury was brought into the courtroom. The instruction to disregard the testimony was given at approximately 10 a.m.
In light of the totality of the circumstances, we would regard this instruction as effective and timely. State v. Collazo 446 A.2d 1006, 1010 (R.I.1982). The trial justice had a front-row seat at this trial and exerted every effort to minimize the prejudice that could have been created by Amy's statement. She believed that the jurors in the circumstances were quite capable of understanding and obeying her instructions. The trial justice did not abuse her discretion in denying the motion for mistrial.
The defendant contends that the trial justice erred in admitting into evidence testimony concerning Amy's in-patient treatment at the Kent County Memorial Hospital psychiatric unit (following her attempted suicide) and her stay at Bradley Hospital for approximately nine months. The defendant argues that such evidence of hospitalization was irrelevant. Indeed, defendant had moved in limine to preclude the state from introducing such evidence. The trial justice at first granted the motion in limine but in response to an offer of proof by the state, decided to rule on the admissibility of this evidence as the questions were presented. She ultimately allowed Amy to testify that she went to these hospitals because of feeling suicidal as a result of defendant's sexual molestation. The trial justice considered such testimony to be relevant. The determination of relevance lies in the discretion of the trial...
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