State v. Brown, 80-1790
| Decision Date | 14 April 1982 |
| Docket Number | No. 80-1790,80-1790 |
| Parties | STATE of Florida, Appellant, v. Leonard K. BROWN, Appellee. |
| Court | Florida District Court of Appeals |
Steve Gomberg and Gay Broome, Asst. State Attys., West Palm Beach, for appellant.
Fred H. Gelston of Adams, Coogler, Watson & Smith, West Palm Beach, for appellee.
The State appeals from an order of the County Court of Palm Beach County dismissing an information against appellee on the grounds that the statute giving rise to the charge is unconstitutional. This court has jurisdiction. Art. V, § 4(b)(1), Fla.Const.; Art. V, § 5(b), Fla.Const.; § 26.012(1), Fla.Stat. (Supp.1980).
It appears appellant was in charge of the transportation department of the Palm Beach County School Board. Maintenance of the county school buses was included in the duties of that department. During the fiscal year 1979-80 appellant allegedly disposed of tire carcasses or casings (which had been removed from school buses) without competitive bidding, in violation of Section 274.06, Florida Statutes (1979). More specifically, the information the State Attorney filed against appellee charged, in pertinent part, that between June 1, 1979, and January 11, 1980, appellee disposed of tire carcasses and casings, being property of the Palm Beach County School Board having a value in excess of $200 (which property was obsolete or uneconomical or inefficient or had no useful function) without soliciting bids therefor or selling said property at public auction as required by Section 274.06, Florida Statutes. Appellee moved to dismiss the information on the ground the statute was vague and indefinite as to what specific property is subject to its terms, thereby violating appellee's due process rights. The trial court agreed, declared the statute unconstitutional, and dismissed the information. Section 274.06, Florida Statutes (1979), provides:
Alternative procedure.-Having consideration for the best interests of the county or district, a governmental unit's property that is obsolete or the continued use of which is uneconomical or inefficient, or which serves no useful function, which property is not otherwise lawfully disposed of, may be disposed of for value without bids to the state, to any governmental unit, or to any political subdivision as defined in s. 1.01, or if the property is without commercial value it may be donated, destroyed, or abandoned. The determination of property to be disposed of by a governmental unit pursuant to this section instead of pursuant to other provisions of law shall be at the election of such governmental unit in the reasonable exercise of its discretion. Property, the value of which the governmental unit estimates to be between $100 and $200, shall be sold only to the highest responsible bidder after a request for at least three bids, or by public auction. Any sale of property the value of which the governmental unit estimates to be $200 or more shall be sold only to the highest responsible bidder, or by public auction, after publication of notice not less than 1 week nor more than 2 weeks prior to sale in a newspaper having a general circulation in the county or district in which is located the official office of the governmental unit, and in additional newspapers if in the judgment of the governmental unit the best interests of the county or district will better be served by the additional notices; provided that nothing herein contained shall be construed to require the sheriff of a county to advertise the sale of miscellaneous contraband of an estimated value of less than $200.
For purposes of this case the key word in the statute is "property." That word is defined in Section 274.01(3), as follows:
"Property" means all tangible personal property, owned by a governmental unit, of a nonconsumable nature.
Appellee attacks Section 274.06 by characterizing as vague the phrase "of a nonconsumable nature" in Section 274.01(3). In his written order declaring Section 274.06 unconstitutional the trial judge stated:
Whether a statute is unconstitutionally vague depends upon whether the language conveys sufficient warnings of the proscribed...
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