State v. Brown

• Decision Date: 26 March 2012
• Docket Number: No. A11A2257.,A11A2257.
• Citation: 315 Ga.App. 154,726 S.E.2d 654,12 FCDR 1288
• Parties: The STATE v. BROWN.
• Court: Georgia Court of Appeals

315 Ga.App. 154

726 S.E.2d 654

12 FCDR 1288

The STATE

v.BROWN.

No. A11A2257.

Court of Appeals of Georgia.

March 26, 2012.

Patrick H. Head, Powell Anderson, Anna Green Cross, for The State.

John Arnold Steakley, Marietta, for Douglas Brown.

BOGGS, Judge.

The State appeals from the trial court's grant of Douglas Wayne Brown's motion to suppress evidence obtained as a result of a roadblock. For the following reasons, we reverse.

“When reviewing a ruling on a motion to suppress, if the evidence is uncontroverted and no question regarding the credibility of witnesses is presented, we do not defer to the trial court's legal analysis or its application of law to undisputed facts. Rulings involving solely legal issues are reviewed de novo.” (Citations and punctuation omitted.) State v. Dymond, 248 Ga.App. 582, 584(1), 546 S.E.2d 69 (2001). The trial court here found the following facts:

On April 9, 2010, the Defendant was arrested by officers of the Cobb County Police Department, charged with various offenses, and ultimately indicted for VGCSA, DUI, two counts of Obstruction of an Officer and attempted removal of a weapon from a Peace Officer.

....

A few days prior to that date, although no evidence of the exact date was presented, Captain Charles Cox of the Cobb County Police Department, who was precinct commander of Zone 4 in Cobb County, sent an email to all precinct 4 officers in response to a “citizens traffic complaint” he had received. The complaint referenced speeding, racing and littering on Groover Road. Captain Cox's email instructed all precinct 4 officers to handle the complaint. No further instructions were given.

....

On April 9, 2010, Sgt. Mar[ch]etta of the Cobb County Police Department made a decision in response to the e-mail sent by Captain Cox several days earlier, to set up a traffic safety check point, or roadblock. He testified that he did this acting as the supervisor implementing the checkpoint.

....

Only two officers participated in the checkpoint, Sgt. Mar[ch]etta and Officer David Smith.

....

The Officers activated their blue lights, wore vests and marked the checkpoint with cones. Every car was to be stopped for purposes of enhancing roadway safety. Both Sgt. Mar[ch]etta and Officer Smith were acting as screeners of drivers.

....

The Defendant approached the roadblock at approximately 7:05 p.m. Officer Smith, acting as a screener, made the initial contact after directing Defendant to stop his vehicle. Officer Smith smelled marijuana coming from the car, and observed a large folding knife clipped to Defendant's pants. Defendant was removed from the vehicle and immediately became combative with both officers. Considerable effort from both officers was necessary to restrain him, and put him on the ground. Defendant was arrested and charged with various offenses, including possession of marijuana, which was found following a subsequent search of the vehicle.

In granting Brown's motion to suppress, the trial court found that although Sergeant Marchetta was authorized to implement a checkpoint as a supervisor, no evidence was presented that the roadblock was planned in advance to occur at a specific time. In conjunction with this finding, the court concluded that Marchetta made the decision while acting as an officer in the field. The court found further that the roadblock was not sufficiently manned because Sergeant Marchetta “should not act as a screening officer, the investigating officer and the chase-vehicle officer.”

The State argues on appeal that the legal requirements for the roadblock set forth in LaFontaine v. State, 269 Ga. 251, 497 S.E.2d 367 (1998), were met and that therefore the trial court should have denied Brown's motion to suppress. “In examining the propriety of roadblock stops, the issue for resolution is not whether there was probable cause to stop the vehicle, but whether the roadblock stop was otherwise implemented and conducted in a manner as to demonstrate that the stop of the vehicle was ‘reasonable’ under the Fourth Amendment.” (Citations omitted.) Id. at 252(3), 497 S.E.2d 367. To justify a roadblock that serves legitimate law enforcement objectives,

the State must prove that a highway roadblock program was implemented at the programmatic level for a legitimate primary purpose, that is, that the roadblock was ordered by a supervisor, rather than by officers in the field, and was implemented to ensure roadway safety rather than as a constitutionally impermissible pretext aimed at discovering general evidence of ordinary crime.

(Citations, punctuation and footnotes omitted.) Owens v. State, 308 Ga.App. 374, 375(1), 707 S.E.2d 584 (2011). The minimum constitutional prerequisites for a roadblock are outlined by the Georgia Supreme Court in LaFontaine, supra, 269 Ga. at 253(3), 497 S.E.2d 367:

A roadblock is satisfactory where the decision to implement the roadblock was made by supervisory personnel rather than the officers in the field; all vehicles are stopped as opposed to random vehicle stops; the delay to motorists is minimal; the roadblock operation is well identified as a police checkpoint; and the “screening” officer's training and experience is sufficient to qualify him to make an initial determination as to which motorists should be given field tests for intoxication. [Cit.]

The purpose of these requirements is to ensure that individuals are not subject to arbitrary or oppressive invasions solely at the unfettered discretion of officers in the field. Id.

In this case, the trial court based its invalidation of the roadblock upon two specifically articulated bases, which allegedly violate the requirements set forth in LaFontaine. First, the court held that the State failed to prove the decision to implement the checkpoint was made by supervisory personnel rather than by officers in the field; and secondly, the trial court concluded that the roadblock was not sufficiently manned.¹ Neither of these reasons withstands scrutiny.

1. With regard to the first ground, and based upon a cursory reading of Paragraph seven of the trial court's order, the trial court clearly based its decision that Marchetta was acting as an officer in the field, only in conjunction with and reliance upon the email Marchetta received from his precinct commander a few days prior to the implementation of the roadblock. Indeed, the trial court concluded that “[t]he e-mail from the precinct commander which initiated the response simply instructed all precinct officers to handle the complaint. No checkpoint was ordered and no instructions were given.” It is clear that in reaching this decision, the trial court relied heavily upon a specific factual finding that “no evidence was presented that it was planned in advance to occur at a specific time.” This factual finding is belied by the record. The record reveals without dispute that Marchetta decided to implement the roadblock two days before and even sent another officer to survey the road before implementing it.

Moreover, while it appears that the reason for Marchetta's decision originated with his captain, the decision to implement the roadblock was made by Marchetta, a supervisor who, as even the trial court concedes, had the authority to do so. See, e.g., Jacobs v. State, 308 Ga.App. 117, 120, 706 S.E.2d 737 (2011) (officer's testimony that she was authorized to plan and implement roadblocks was sufficient to establish that fact); Gonzalez v. State, 289 Ga.App. 549, 551, 657 S.E.2d 617 (2008) (roadblock valid where uncontradicted testimony established that sergeant alone made decision to implement roadblock and evidence showed he had authority to do so; fact that sergeant participated in roadblock did not transform him from a supervisor into a field officer); Bennett v. State, 283 Ga.App. 581, 583, 642 S.E.2d 212 (2007) (pre-planned checkpoint not transformed into roving patrol because lieutenant testified that implementation of roadblock would depend upon number of officers available to support it); compare Thomas v. State, 277 Ga.App. 88, 90, 625 S.E.2d 455 (2005) (roadblock unauthorized because corporal on patrol made spur of the moment decision while meeting with other officers at convenience store, and no evidence presented that corporal had any specific authorization to implement roadblock).

It appears from the trial court's order that the court reached the conclusion that Sergeant Marchetta “made the decision while acting as an officer in the field,” focusing solely on the fact that Sergeant Marchetta's decision was prompted by the earlier email of his precinct commander. Indeed, had Sergeant Marchetta lacked the requisite authority to authorize and implement a checkpoint, it is clear that as an officer in the field, a roadblock premised solely upon the email of the precinct commander would have been wholly noncompliant with the mandate of LaFontaine. However, based upon the facts presented here, the precinct commander's email is meaningless but for the fact that it apparently prompted the authorized action by Marchetta to implement a roadblock. Because of the particular facts of this case, wherein Marchetta had the independent supervisory authority to implement roadblocks, the actions of the precinct commander and the contents of his email are irrelevant to a proper analysis of whether the roadblock authorized by Marchetta was compliant with LaFontaine.

Moreover, officers are not precluded as a matter of law from acting simultaneously as a supervisor and a field officer. See Jacobs, supra, 308 Ga.App. at 120, 706 S.E.2d 737;Gonzalez, supra, 289 Ga.App. at 551, 657 S.E.2d 617;Hobbs v. State, 260 Ga.App. 115, 117(1), 579 S.E.2d 50 (2003). The trial court therefore erred in concluding as a matter of law that Marchetta was acting as an officer in the field.

2. The trial court also granted Brown's motion to suppress on the ground that the roadblock “was not sufficiently manned as required by LaFontaine.” But whether the...