State v. Browne
Decision Date | 06 November 2007 |
Docket Number | No. 27662.,27662. |
Citation | 104 Conn.App. 314,933 A.2d 735 |
Court | Connecticut Court of Appeals |
Parties | STATE of Connecticut v. Herbert J. BROWNE III. |
John R. Donovan, Cromwell, for the appellant (defendant).
Russell C. Zentner, senior assistant state's attorney, with whom were Susan W. Hatfield, deputy assistant state's attorney, and, on the brief, Timothy J. Liston, state's attorney, for the appellee (state).
DiPENTIMA, GRUENDEL and BERDON, Js.
The defendant, Herbert J. Browne III, following a plea of nolo contendere was convicted of possession of more than four ounces of marijuana in violation of General Statutes § 21a-279 (b). The plea of nolo contendere was conditioned on the defendant's right to challenge on appeal the validity of the search warrant. The defendant claims that the trial court improperly denied his motion to suppress evidence seized pursuant to that warrant. He argues that the warrant authorizing the search was invalid because the particularity section authorized a search for cocaine, crack cocaine and collateral items,1 not marijuana, the intended target of the search. We agree that the warrant was invalid and reverse the judgment of the trial court.
The following facts and procedural history are relevant to the defendant's claim. In December, 2003, the Middletown police department began an investigation of the defendant for the sale of marijuana. Police officers observed two controlled purchases of marijuana from the defendant by a confidential informant. As a result of this investigation, they applied for a warrant to search the defendant's person, automobile and residence. The warrant application requested permission to search for "cocaine, crack cocaine" and collateral items believed to be related to the sale of narcotics. The application also stated that these items were believed to constitute evidence of the crime of possession of marijuana. The affidavit in support of the warrant application detailed the affiants' knowledge of the defendant's involvement in the sale of marijuana, including the observation of two controlled purchases of marijuana from the defendant. The warrant itself did not name marijuana as an item to be seized or make any reference to marijuana. Instead, the particularity clause of the warrant listed "cocaine, crack cocaine" and collateral items as those for which police were authorized to search.2
The warrant was executed on December 30, 2003. Seven and one-half pounds of marijuana, two scales, proof of residence and plastic bags were seized during the search, leading to the defendant's arrest. When the warrant was executed, neither the warrant application nor the supporting affidavit accompanied the warrant because they had been placed under seal to protect the identity of a confidential informant.
The defendant filed a motion to suppress the evidence seized pursuant to the warrant. At the suppression hearing, Detective Jorge Yepes testified that cocaine, rather than marijuana, was listed as an item to be seized because he mistakenly had copied the particularity section from another warrant and failed to edit the text before submitting the affidavit and warrant to the magistrate for his determination of probable cause and signature.3
(Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Santiago, 8 Conn.App. 290, 304, 513 A.2d 710 (1986). The parties agree that the principal object of this search was marijuana, and it was not listed on the warrant. Instead, cocaine and crack cocaine were listed. This warrant, on its face, simply did not describe the property sought, and we hold that it is invalid.
The state argues that the allegations asserted by the affiants in the affidavit and warrant application reflected a consistent and continuous reference to marijuana such that the absence of marijuana from the particularity clause of both the warrant and application was merely a scrivener's error. This argument was addressed in the recent United States Supreme Court case of Groh v. Ramirez, 540 U.S. 551, 124 S.Ct. 1284, 157 L.Ed.2d 1068 (2004). In Groh, the court held: (Citations omitted; emphasis added.) Groh v. Ramirez, supra, at 557-58, 124 S.Ct. 1284. Even if the state is correct that the affidavit and allegations sufficiently describe the items to be seized so as to inform the reader that marijuana, not cocaine, is the object of the search, here, as in Groh, the affidavit did not accompany the warrant.4
The state also argues that the warrant was valid because the executing officer had personal knowledge of the crime being investigated and knew that marijuana, not cocaine, was the focus of this search. (Citation omitted; emphasis added.) Washington v. Riley, 121 Wash.2d 22, 28-29, 846 P.2d 1365 (1993). The United States Supreme Court has 5 (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Groh v. Ramirez, supra, 540 U.S. at 561, 124 S.Ct. 1284.
The state argues that because it had probable cause to believe that some of the collateral items were located in the house, the police officer could seize the marijuana under the plain view doctrine. (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Cobb, 251 Conn. 285, 347, 743 A.2d 1 (1999), cert. denied, 531 U.S. 841, 121 S.Ct. 106, 148 L.Ed.2d 64 (2000). The problem with this theory in this case is that the police were not lawfully on the premises of the defendant where the marijuana was found. See United States v. George, 975 F.2d 72, 80 (2d Cir.1992) ( ). Moreover, the collateral items, standing alone without the illegal drug, would not support probable cause to believe a crime was committed.6 Accordingly, the marijuana could...
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