State v. Santiago

• Decision Date: 29 July 1986
• Docket Number: Nos. 4564-4566,s. 4564-4566
• Court: Connecticut Court of Appeals
• Parties: STATE of Connecticut v. Raul SANTIAGO. STATE of Connecticut v. Benjamin CAMPFIELD et al. STATE of Connecticut v. Ollie LAWRENCE et al.

Page 710

513 A.2d 710

8 Conn.App. 290

STATE of Connecticut v. Raul SANTIAGO.

STATE of Connecticut v. Benjamin CAMPFIELD et al.

STATE of Connecticut v. Ollie LAWRENCE et al.

Nos. 4564-4566.

Appellate Court of Connecticut.

Argued March 19, 1986.

Decided July 29, 1986.

Carl Schuman, Asst. State's Atty., with whom, on briefs, were Katherine J. Lambert and James L. Radda, former Deputy Asst. State's Attys., for appellant (state).

James Kearns, Bridgeport, with whom were David Goldman and, on briefs, Earl I. Williams, New Haven, for appellees (named defendant in each case).

Before BORDEN, DALY and BIELUCH, JJ.

BORDEN, Judge.

In these combined cases, the state appeals, ¹ with the permission of the trial court, from the judgments of the court dismissing with prejudice the informations against the defendants following the suppression of evidence by the trial court. The informations charged the defendants with professional gambling in violation of General Statutes § 53-278b. The filing of the informations resulted from two searches in New Haven made pursuant to search and seizure warrants. The issues involve (1) whether the defendants established reasonable expectations of privacy in the areas searched so as to enable them to challenge the introduction of the evidence gathered by the searches, and (2) whether the facially general warrants were made sufficiently particular by reference to the applications and affidavits which accompanied them. We find error and remand for further proceedings.

There are three separate appeals. Two of the appeals, those involving the defendants Campfield and Santiago, arise out of a search pursuant to a warrant on April 1, 1982, of premises at 844 Grand Avenue, in New Haven, known as The 844 Grand Avenue Recreation Center. ² The third appeal, involving the defendant Lawrence, arises out of a search pursuant to a warrant on April 3, 1982, at 444 Legion Avenue, in New Haven, known as the Chicken Plus Luncheonette. ³

The Grand Avenue cases arose as follows: On March 31, 1982, a search and seizure warrant was issued by a Superior Court judge based on an affidavit establishing probable cause to believe that The 844 Recreation Center was being used as an after hours club and was disposing of liquor without a permit in violation of General Statutes § 30-77. The warrant was signed by the judge, but those parts of the printed warrant form describing the place and person to be searched and the property to be seized were left blank.

The parts of the form describing the place and person to be searched consisted of two boxes, which were not checked, followed by certain recitals and a blank space to be filled. The first box was followed by the following language: "enter into or upon and search the place or thing described in the foregoing Affidavit and Application, to wit...." The second box was followed by the following language: "search the person described in the foregoing Affidavit and Application, to wit...." ⁴ The part of the form describing the property to be searched for was as follows: "for the property described in the foregoing Affidavit and Application, to wit...." None of the boxes was checked, nor were the blanks filled in.

On April 1, 1982, the New Haven police department executed the warrant. The lengthy return and inventory indicated that the police "searched the person, place, or thing named [in the warrant], to wit: 844 Grand Avenue--Grand Avenue Recreation Center located on the (1st) First Floor and Basement of 844 Grand Ave. and found thereon or therein, seized and now hold in custody the following [list of items]." ⁵ The defendants involved in the Grand Avenue cases were arrested at the time of the execution of the search warrant.

The Legion Avenue cases arose as follows: On April 3, 1982, a search and seizure warrant was issued by a Superior Court judge based on an affidavit establishing probable cause to believe that the crime of keeping liquor with intent to sell, in violation of General Statutes § 30-77, was being committed at 444 Legion Avenue, in New Haven. The affidavit and application described the premises as "the first floor store front with silver metal facade with large glass windows covered with black curtain type material, and a sign with the lettering above the windows stating Chicken Plus Luncheonette." The warrant was signed by the judge, but the same boxes were unchecked and the same blanks not filled in as was the case with respect to the Grand Avenue warrant. The New Haven police department executed the warrant on the same day. The return and inventory indicated only that they had searched "444 Legion Ave. Silver Metal facade, Store Front, Large Windows, with sign above windows stating Chicken Plus Luncheonette," and that the property seized was "[a]ll pertinent property pertaining to said Search Warrant." The defendants involved in the Legion Avenue cases were arrested at the time of the execution of the search warrant.

All the defendants, in both the Grand Avenue and Legion Avenue cases, moved to suppress all the evidence seized and moved for its return, claiming that the warrants were invalid on the common ground of lack of particularity. ⁶ The defendants in all cases did not question the probable cause established by the underlying affidavits, relied solely on the facial invalidity of the warrants themselves, and presented no evidence. The state claimed that (1) none of the defendants had established a reasonable expectation of privacy in the area searched; (2) the lack of particularity in the warrants was cured by the incorporation by reference of the underlying affidavits; and (3) even if the warrants were invalid, the seizures were independently justified because the police officers executing the warrants had been invited into public places. The state offered to introduce evidence to support this last claim, which evidence the trial court rejected as irrelevant.

The trial court ruled that the warrants were facially invalid for lack of particularity, and suppressed all the evidence seized and ordered it returned. Upon the state's concession that it could not prosecute without the suppressed evidence, the court dismissed all the informations with prejudice. These appeals followed.

I

We first consider the cases involving all the defendants except Campfield. The state argues that the court erred in granting the defendants' motions to suppress, and thus in dismissing their cases, because they did not establish the requisite reasonable expectations of privacy. We agree.

The law is clear that, in order for a defendant to challenge the introduction of evidence resulting from a search and seizure, he must at the threshold establish a reasonable expectation of privacy in the area searched. "A person may not object to the introduction of evidence resulting from an illegal search unless he first proves that he was a victim of that search. Rawlings v. Kentucky, 448 U.S. 98, 104, 100 S.Ct. 2556, 2561, 65 L.Ed.2d 633 (1980). One is a victim of a search when it violates his reasonable expectation of privacy in the area searched. Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 143, 99 S.Ct. 421, 430, 58 L.Ed.2d 387 (1978), reh. denied, 439 U.S. 1122, 99 S.Ct. 1035, 59 L.Ed.2d 83 (1979). Therefore, the first question that must be answered in any suppression case is whether the individual who seeks suppression had a reasonable expectation of privacy in the area searched." State v. Daay, 5 Conn.App. 496, 498, 500 A.2d 248 (1985). "Absent such an expectation, the subsequent police action has no constitutional ramifications." State v. Brown, 198 Conn. 348, 355, 503 A.2d 566 (1986). The defendant "has the burden of proving that he had a reasonable expectation of privacy in the area searched." State v. Daay, supra, 5 Conn.App. 499, 500 A.2d 248. It is not sufficient for this purpose that a defendant seeking to challenge a search was legitimately on the premises searched. Rakas v. Illinois, supra, 439 U.S. 142-48, 99 S.Ct. 429-33.

These defendants made absolutely no effort to establish their reasonable expectations of privacy in either the Legion Avenue or Grand Avenue premises. There is nothing in these records, either in the trial court or in this court, which would permit them to challenge either search. There is nothing in these records to establish the connection of any of these defendants with the premises searched which would establish his reasonable expectation of privacy in those premises. They utterly failed to lay any foundation for this basic threshold requirement for such a challenge.

The defendants argue in their brief that their reasonable expectations of privacy derive solely from "the fact that all defendants had their persons searched and that a substantial sum of money was seized from 'various persons arrested....' " See footnote 5, supra. There is nothing in this record, however, to support their factual claim that all the defendants were searched, because the defendants made no effort to individualize their claims in the trial court. The return and inventory does not indicate that all defendants were searched. They presented no evidence as to how either warrant was executed. They presented no evidence that all the defendants were searched and they made no effort to establish what property or money was seized from whom. While it may be true that some or all defendants were searched and that some money or other evidence was seized from some or all of them, each defendant had the burden to establish that he was searched in order to establish his individual reasonable expectation of privacy. The fact that a total sum of money was seized from "Various Persons Arrested"; see footnote 5, supra; is insufficient to give every defendant arrested a reasonable expectation of privacy sufficient to challenge all the evidence seized. Under these circumstances, their blanket claim, while it purported to cover all of them, in fact covered none.

II

This...