State v. Brownfield

• Decision Date: 04 June 1901
• Citation: 39 S.E. 2,60 S.C. 509
• Parties: STATE v. BROWNFIELD.
• Court: South Carolina Supreme Court

39 S.E. 2

60 S.C. 509

STATE v. BROWNFIELD.

Supreme Court of South Carolina

June 4, 1901

Appeal from common pleas circuit court of Georgetown county; Ernest Gary, Judge.

John Brownfield was convicted of murder, and he appeals. Affirmed.

J. L Mitchell and W. J. Whipper, for appellant.

John S Wilson, for the State.

GARY A. J.

The defendant was indicted, tried, and convicted of murder at the November, 1900, term of the court of general sessions for Georgetown county, in said state, and sentenced to be hanged on the 28th day of December, 1900. Upon his arraignment, the defendant's attorneys made a motion to quash the indictment on the following grounds "[Caption.] And now comes the defendant, John Brownfield, in his own proper person, and moves the court to set aside and quash the indictment herein against him because the jury commissioners appointed to select the grand jury which found and presented said indictment selected no person or persons of color, or of African descent, known as 'negroes,' to serve on said grand jury, but, on the contrary, did exclude from the list of persons to serve as such grand jurors all colored persons, or persons of African descent, known as 'negroes,' because of their race and color, and that said grand jury was composed exclusively of persons of the white race, while all persons of the colored race, or persons of African descent, known as 'negroes,' although consisting of and constituting about four-fifths of the population and of the registered voters in said city and county of George town, and although otherwise qualified to serve as such grand jurors, were excluded therefrom, on account of their race and color, and have been so excluded from serving on any jury in said court of general sessions for Georgetown county for a considerable time back, which is a discrimination against the defendant, since he is a person of color, and of African descent, known as a 'negro'; and that such discrimination is a denial to him or the equal protection of the laws, and of his civil rights guarantied by the constitution and laws of the United States; all of which the defendant is ready to verify. John Brownfield. [L. S.] Sworn to before me this 15th day of Nov., A. D. 1900. J. B. Edwards, Notary Public, S. C." This motion was overruled, and thereupon the defendant's attorneys excepted.

The defendant's attorneys then challenged the array of grand and petit jurors upon the same grounds as were submitted on the motion to quash the indictment. This motion was also overruled, and to this ruling the defendant's attorneys likewise excepted. The defendant thereupon pleaded not guilty.

The testimony is not set out in the agreed "case" upon which the appeal was heard by this court, but under the word "testimony" are the words, "(Insert testimony)." This, however, did not make the testimony a part of the agreed case. In re Estate of Perry, 42 S.C. 183, 20 S.E. 84; Moore v. Perry, 42 S.C. 369, 20 S.E. 200.

In the agreed case are also the words: "The judge's charge was as follows: (Insert judge's charge.)" The charge was not inserted, and, under the authorities just cited, was not a part of the agreed case.

The defendant appealed upon five exceptions, the fifth of which was withdrawn. The first exception is as follows: (1) "Because his honor, Judge Gary, the presiding judge, erred in refusing defendant's motion to quash the indictment, on the ground that there was no member of the race to which the defendant belongs on the grand jury that found the said bill of indictment." The only question raised by this exception is whether his honor, the presiding judge, erred in refusing to quash the indictment simply because no member of the race to which the defendant belongs was on the grand jury that found the bill of indictment. In the first place, there is no provision of the constitution of South Carolina, nor any of its statutes or laws, to the effect that a person on trial can move to quash an indictment on the ground that there was no member of the race to which he belongs on the grand jury that found the bill of indictment against him. The constitution, statutes, and laws of South Carolina apply alike to the white and colored races, as to the qualifications of jurors, without any discrimination whatever on account of race, color, or previous condition of servitude. The provisions of the constitution relative to the qualifications of jurors were construed in Mew v. Railway Co., 55 S.C. 90, 32 S.E. 828, affirmed in State v. Rafe, 56 S.C. 379, 34 S.E. 660, and other cases thereafter decided. In the second place, the fact that there was no member of the race to which the defendant belongs on the grand jury that found the bill of indictment against him was not violative of the constitution, statutes, or laws of the United States, unless there was a discrimination against his race by the constitution, statutes, or laws of South Carolina, or in the administration thereof, on account of race, color, or previous condition of servitude. In the case of Gibson v. Mississippi, 162 U.S. 565, 16 S.Ct. 904, 40 L.Ed. 1075, Mr. Justice Harlan, voicing the opinion of the court, after quoting the provision of the statute that "no citizen possessing all other qualifications which are or may be prescribed by law shall be disqualified from service, as grand or petit juror, in any court of the United States, or of any state, on account of race, color, or previous conditions of servitude," says: "While a state, consistently with the purposes for which the amendment was adopted, may confine the selection of jurors to males, to freeholders, to citizens, to persons within certain ages, or to persons having educational qualifications, and while a mixed jury is not, within the meaning of the constitution, always or absolutely necessary to the enjoyment of equal protection of the laws, and therefore an accused, being of the colored race, cannot claim as matter of right that his race shall be represented on the jury, yet a denial to citizens of the African race, because of their color, of the right or privilege, accorded to white citizens, of participating, as jurors, in the administration of justice, would be a discrimination against the former, inconsistent with the amendment, and within the power of congress, by appropriate legislation, to prevent." This exception is overruled.

The second exception is as follows: (2) "Because his honor Judge Gary, the presiding judge, erred in refusing the challenge to the array of grand and petit jurors on same ground." This exception is disposed of by what was said in considering the first exception. While the question was not...