State v. Brownlee

• Decision Date: 01 February 1892
• Parties: STATE v. BROWNLEE.
• Court: Iowa Supreme Court

84 Iowa 473

51 N.W. 25

STATE

v.BROWNLEE.

Supreme Court of Iowa.

Feb. 1, 1892.

Appeal from district court, Warren county; J. H. HENDERSON, Judge.

Defendant was indicted for maliciously threatening to shoot and kill one O. P. Wright, with the intent thereby to procure the signature of said Wright, against his will, to certain promissory notes aggregating $17,000. He was convicted, and sentenced to be confined in the state penitentiary for the term of 18 months. From this judgment, he appeals.

*26L. Kinkead, for appellant.

John Y. Stone, Atty. Gen., Thomas A. Cheshire, and G. W. Crozier, Co. Atty., for the State.

KINNE, J.

1. The material and undisputed facts in this case, as disclosed in testimony, are as follows: That the defendant, believing that he had a grievance of a financial nature against one O. P. Wright, conceived the plan of obtaining remuneration and satisfaction for the wrongs he claimed to have suffered by compelling Wright to sign promissory notes which he (Brownlee) had prepared, aggregating the sum of $17,000, and payable to himself. To accomplish this purpose, he sought the aid of one Frank Duncan, and had several interviews with him. Duncan appeared to enter into the plans of defendant, and to encourage him, although, after the first interview between him and the defendant, he (Duncan) informed Wright of defendant's plans and purposes, as described to him, and thereafter acted with Wright's knowledge and consent. Defendant and Duncan had meetings at night in a barn, and in the hearing of several persons who were there concealed in a haymow. These listeners came there at the instance of Duncan and Wright to hear what passed between defendant and Duncan. Defendant was not aware of the presence of these persons, and supposed that he was alone with Duncan. In the conversation had at the place and under the circumstances above stated, it was agreed that Duncan should take Wright to a certain place on the next Monday evening, and that defendant should there meet them, and attempt to secure the signature of Wright to the notes. In reply to the question, “Suppose Mr. Wright goes out there, and refuses to sign these notes, then what will you do?” defendant answered: “It is just this way: If he don't sign the notes, I will kill him, any way.” One witness testifies that the defendant said to Duncan that “he would make the God damned puppy sign them notes, or else he would kill him.” On the next morning defendant was at the place agreed upon, armed with a revolver, the notes ready for signature, and pen and ink. Duncan did not have Wright at the place appointed, but went there, and represented to defendant that Wright would be there. Defendant then proposed to conceal himself, and, when Wright came, to step out and make him sign the notes, saying: “I will kill him, if he don't sign the notes. It is life or death with me.” Wright did not come, but the sheriff appeared, by previous arrangement, and arrested defendant; and when so arrested the notes, ready for signature, pen and ink, and revolver, were found on his person,--also, another loaded revolver in his buggy. It appears that defendant admonished Duncan to keep all that was said a profound secret. Duncan was to receive $500 for his share in the transaction.

2. A juror was challenged for cause, on the ground that he showed on his voir dire that he had formed an opinion as to the defendant's guilt, and was related by marriage to the person threatened. Appellant claims that the court erred in overruling the challenge. As it is not shown that the juror sat in the case, or that defendant had exhausted his peremptory challenges, it is unnecessary for us to pass upon the question presented. If the juror did not sit, and defendant had not exhausted his peremptory challenges, the ruling of the court was, at most, error without prejudice. State v. Davis, 41 Iowa, 311;State v. Elliott, 45 Iowa, 486. In support of the ruling of the lower court, we are required to presume that the juror did not sit on the case, and that the defendant did not exhaust his peremptory challenges.

3. Appellant contends that the parties who were secreted in the barn, and who testified in this case, corroborating Duncan, were accomplices, and that the court erred in not so instructing the jury. The court instructed the jury that Duncan was an accomplice, and properly told them that he must be corroborated. If it were true that these witnesses were accomplices, then their testimony could not be regarded as corroborating the accomplice Duncan. But they were not accomplices. They were merely parties to a plan, and assisted in its execution, to secure evidence against the defendant, by entrapping him before he had met Wright as he had intended to do.

4. That part of the indictment charging the offense is in the following language: “The said John Brownlee, on the 18th day of May, in the year of our Lord one thousand eight hundred and ninety, in the county of Warren, aforesaid, did, unlawfully, willfully, maliciously, and feloniously, for the purpose of procuring the signature of one O. P. Wright to certain promissory notes...