State v. Bruin

• Decision Date: 31 March 1864
• Citation: 34 Mo. 537
• Parties: STATE OF MISSOURI, Respondent, v. LAWRENCE B. BRUIN, Appellant.
• Court: Missouri Supreme Court

34 Mo. 537

STATE OF MISSOURI, Respondent,

v.LAWRENCE B. BRUIN, Appellant.

Supreme Court of Missouri.

March Term, 1864.

Appeal from St. Charles Circuit Court.

E. A. Lewis, for appellant.

I. The court erred in giving the second instruction asked for by the State; that instruction treats the presumption arising from the possession of stolen property, not satisfactorily accounted for, as a presumption of law, conclusive of guilt, and not as a mere natural presumption of fact, which, like all others of its class, may be repelled by any other facts whatsoever that are naturally inconsistent with the fact to be presumed. It may be effectually destroyed by proof of an alibi, or by any other means which would show that it was naturally or physically impossible for the defendant to have committed the offence charged; and yet the instruction rejects each and all of these, except the solitary method of proving the precise way in which the possession originated. This is transforming the evidence of crime into the crime itself. Multitudes of cases arise in which it is impossible for an innocent party to explain how he came to be in possession of a stolen article. The real thief may have surreptitiously conveyed it into the pocket or dwelling of the person accused, and yet, according to this instruction, the latter must suffer the penalty, although he may succeed in proving that the theft was perpetrated by another individual, and that he, himself, was so distant from the scene of action as to render his participation impossible. The authorities all agree that the presumption in question may be rebutted in a variety of ways besides the one singled out by the instruction. Proof of good character, alone, has been held sufficient to destroy it. It is, in fact, considered of slight value when standing alone, and requires to be supported by corroborating circumstances. If any such corroborating circumstances may be found in this case, the instruction denies to them any office whatever, and deprives the jury of all opportunity to weigh their sufficiency or insufficiency to establish guilt. (Burrill's Circum. Ev. 560, 562, 566; 3 Greenleaf Ev. § 31; Sharswood's Starkie Ev. n. 666, 671; 2 Starkie Ev. 450; 1 Greenleaf Ev. § 11; 1 Cow. & Hill, Notes to Phil. Ev. 427, n. 325-169; Roscoe Crim. Ev. 15; State v. Merrick, 19 Maine, 1 App. 398; Engleman v. The State, 2 Ind. 96, 97.)

II. The instruction is a commentary on the weight of the evidence, and usurps the province of the jury. It informs them, not that one fact may reasonably be inferred from another, but that it is absolutely proven thereby, thus substituting for the scrutation of the jury the conclusions of the court.

III. The testimony develops four distinct elements of defence, viz: 1. That the defendant's acquisition of the stolen property was by an innocent purchase from the supposed owner. 2. That the defendant first obtained possession of the property in Lincoln county, and, therefore, could not be convicted of having stolen it in St. Charles. 3. That the larceny was, in fact, perpetrated by another person. 4. An alibi. The instruction directs the jury to discard from their consideration all these defences, whether proven or not, except the first.

IV. The mischief of the objectionable instruction is not cured by any other given in the case. The defendant's first instruction merely informs the jury what facts are necessary to be shown before they can find the defendant guilty. The instruction tells them that all those facts are fully proven, unless the defendant has satisfactorily accounted for his possession of the property.John C. Orrick, for respondent.

The court below did not err.

I. Recent possession of stolen property is presumptive evidence of guilt, unless such possession is satisfactorily accounted for. (1 Phil. Ev. 637, 638, 634; Roscoe's Crim. Ev. 15; Burrill on Circum. Ev. 445, § 18; 1 Hayw. 463; 2 Const. Rep. 692; N. Y. Gen. Sess. Sept. Term, 1822.)

II. The instructions of the court below should be taken together, and if they state the law applicable to the facts, the refusal of other instructions asked is not error. (Bay v. Sullivan, 30 Mo. 191; Beal v. Cullum, 31 Mo. 258.)

BAY, Judge, delivered the opinion of the court.

At a special term of the St. Charles Circuit Court, held in January, 1864, the defendant was indicted, tried, and convicted for grand larceny, and sentenced to two years' imprisonment in the penitentiary. The indictment charged him with feloniously stealing, taking, and carrying away, at the county of St. Charles, on the night of the 23d of November, 1863, a buggy, of the value of $250, the property of one Martin Ehrhardt. The evidence, on the trial, tended to show that a buggy belonging to Ehrhard, of the value of $250, was stolen from the depot of the North Missouri Railroad Company, in St. Charles, at the time alleged in the indictment, and on the 9th...