State v. Brunson

Decision Date07 April 1989
Docket NumberNo. 61739,61739
Citation13 Kan.App.2d 384,771 P.2d 938
PartiesSTATE of Kansas, Appellee, v. Eddie BRUNSON, Jr., Appellant.
CourtKansas Court of Appeals

Syllabus by the Court

1. When a criminal defendant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to support a conviction on appeal, the standard of review is whether the evidence, viewed in the light most favorable to the prosecution, convinces the appellate court that a rational factfinder could have found the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.

2. A jury is not bound to accept the defendant's version of the incident in question and, having convicted the defendant, it is presumed to have believed the State's evidence and to have drawn from it all inferences favorable to the State.

3. The warrantless search of an automobile which has been abandoned by its owner will violate the Fourth Amendment only if the defendant manifested a subjective expectation of privacy in the automobile and its contents that society accepts as objectively reasonable.

4. One's personal right to Fourth Amendment protection of property against search and seizure is lost when that property is abandoned, absent a manifested reasonable expectation of privacy.

5. Under the facts of this case, in determining the continued existence of Fourth Amendment property rights, whether the facts reveal a complete abandonment of an automobile in the strict property rights sense is not the issue. The issue is whether, by any good, sound, ordinary sense standard, the defendant abandoned any reasonable expectation to a continuation of his personal right against having his car searched.

6. In an appeal from defendant's convictions of aggravated burglary and theft, the record is examined and it is held: (1) The record contains substantial evidence from which a jury could have found the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. (2) When defendant abandoned his automobile on a golf course with the police in pursuit, leaving the lights on and the keys in the ignition, he abandoned any reasonable expectation of privacy in the contents of that automobile, and is in no position to object to a search of the automobile as unreasonable since society does not acknowledge a right to privacy in an automobile so abandoned as being objectively reasonable.

Thomas Jacquinot, Asst. Appellate Defender, and Jessica R. Kunen, Chief Appellate Defender, for appellant.

M. Bradley Watson, Asst. Dist. Atty., Dennis W. Moore, Dist. Atty., and Robert T. Stephan, Atty. Gen., for appellee.

Before ELLIOTT, P.J., LEWIS, J., and JAMES P. BUCHELE, District Judge, Assigned.

LEWIS, Judge:

This is an appeal by the defendant from his convictions of three counts of aggravated burglary, two counts of felony theft, and one count of misdemeanor theft. The defendant argues that his convictions should be overturned because the evidence was insufficient to support his convictions and because certain evidence was illegally seized from his car and should not have been admitted against him.

We first turn to the question of the sufficiency of the evidence. The standard of review and legal principles which apply to cases of this nature are well known. When a criminal defendant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to support a conviction on appeal, the standard of review is whether the evidence, viewed in the light most favorable to the prosecution, convinces the appellate court that a rational factfinder could have found the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. State v. Dunn, 243 Kan. 414, 429, 758 P.2d 718 (1988). A verdict of guilty in a criminal case will not be disturbed on appeal if there is any substantial evidence from which a jury could have found guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. State v. Bird, 240 Kan. 288, 299, 729 P.2d 1136 (1986), cert. denied 481 U.S. 1055, 107 S.Ct. 2194, 95 L.Ed.2d 849 (1987).

We have reviewed the record in this matter. The evidence is conflicting and there is evidence in the record which, if believed by the jury, would have supported a judgment of acquittal. However, upon review of the record, we reach the conclusion that the defendant's claim concerning the sufficiency of the evidence is without merit.

The defendant was first observed by the authorities in an area where recent burglaries had taken place, and where a burglary had taken place a very short time prior to defendant being seen in the area. Although the evidence is conflicting, the record supports a conclusion that the defendant was observed driving an automobile in this area. When the automobile, which defendant admits he owned and which he was observed driving on the evening in question, was searched, the authorities found a television set which had been taken from a home in the area sometime either very late the night before or very early on the morning the defendant was arrested. The search of the automobile also revealed a number of other items, including Panasonic and Quasar remote control devices, which were identified as having been taken in home burglaries in that same area several days before. The authorities also found a pry bar, a screwdriver, and a flashlight in defendant's automobile. There was evidence indicating that a pry bar may have been used to obtain access to the homes where the burglaries had taken place. The evidence indicates that when the defendant became aware that he was being observed by police officers he immediately started his car and attempted to exit the area, later abandoning his vehicle on a golf course.

The defendant testified at the trial, offering his version of why he was in the area and his explanation of how the stolen items came to be located in the trunk of his automobile. The jury chose not to believe the explanations offered by the defendant and was not required to do so. In State v. Ridge, 216 Kan. 73, 530 P.2d 1213 (1975), the Kansas Supreme Court said:

"The jury, of course, was not bound to accept [defendant's] version of the incident; it having convicted the defendant it is presumed to have believed the state's evidence and to have drawn from it all inferences favorable to the state."

See State v. Satterfield, 202 Kan. 391, 449 P.2d 564 (1969); State v. Childs, 198 Kan. 4, 422 P.2d 898 (1967).

In essence, the jury chose to believe the version of events offered by the State and chose to reject the version of events offered by the defendant. It was perfectly free to do so and substantial evidence exists to support its decision.

The defendant insists that the evidence offered to the jury was such that it failed to prove anyone was in the homes at the times they were burglarized and, as a result, the verdict of aggravated burglary cannot stand. We disagree. It is true that while there was no one who testified as an eyewitness to the burglaries committed by the defendant, and no one could testify to having observed the defendant gaining entrance to the homes burglarized, the State introduced evidence to prove the charges of aggravated burglary. One of the homeowners involved testified that she discovered things missing from her home on the morning of June 16 when she awoke. She also testified that she had been at home the night before and the early morning hours when the burglary occurred, and she had given no one permission to enter her home during that time frame. In the second burglary, the homeowner testified that she discovered her home burglarized on the morning of June 8. She testified she had been home the night before and had locked her home before she went to bed. Upon awakening the next morning, she discovered the one door had been jimmied and a number of items were missing. While neither witness was able to testify with 100% certainty exactly when the burglaries occurred, a jury could infer that these burglaries took place while the homes in question were occupied. We must presume that the jury believed the evidence of the State and drew from it all favorable inferences. In applying that standard, we conclude the evidence in this case was such that a reasonable factfinder could have found, beyond a reasonable doubt, that these burglaries were committed at a time when the homes were occupied.

The defendant argues that the evidence was insufficient to show that the items found in his car were positively identified as the items which came from the homes burglarized. This argument is made regarding identification of the television remote control devices found in the defendant's automobile. The parties stipulated at the time of trial that the purloined television set found in the trunk of the defendant's automobile did, in fact, come from a home that had been burglarized. We have reviewed the entire record in this case and, while it is true that none of the witnesses could positively state that the remote control devices in question came from their homes, they did testify that they had once owned remote control devices of similar brand and description as those found in the defendant's automobile, and that their remote control devices had disappeared on the night the burglaries were committed. It was up to the jury to weigh the evidence in this case and determine whether the State had sustained its burden of proof. The jury concluded that the State had done so. There is substantial competent evidence to support this conclusion and we will not substitute our judgment for that of the jury on appeal. After reviewing all of the evidence, we are convinced that a rational factfinder could have found defendant guilty of the crimes charged.

The defendant next argues that the search of his automobile by police was illegal and that, as a result, evidence seized from such illegal search should not have been admitted against him at the trial. The issues presented in this appeal are issues of first impression in Kansas.

The evidence indicates that the defendant, on the morning of his arrest, was sitting in his parked automobile on a public...

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  • State v. Grissom
    • United States
    • Kansas Supreme Court
    • November 10, 1992
    ...of privacy' of the property abandoned. See Annot., 40 A.L.R. 4th 381; 68 Am.Jur.2d, Searches and Seizures § 9." State v. Brunson, 13 Kan.App.2d 384, 389, 771 P.2d 938, rev. denied 245 Kan. 786 In California v. Greenwood, 486 U.S. 35, 51, 108 S.Ct. 1625, 1634, 100 L.Ed.2d 30 (1988), the Unit......
  • State v. Aikins
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    ...the jury is presumed to have believed the State's evidence and to have drawn from it all inferences favorable to the State." State v. Brunson, 13 Kan.App.2d 384, Syl. p 2, 771 P.2d 938, rev. denied 245 Kan. 786 Looking at McGlory's testimony in the manner we are required to view it, it beco......
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    ...property is not permitted to contest the legality of the search and seizure of the property. The Grissom court, quoting State v. Brunson, 13 Kan.App.2d 384, 771 P.2d 938, rev. denied 245 Kan. 786 (1989) " 'The warrantless search of an automobile which has been abandoned by its owner will vi......
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