State v. Brunson

• Decision Date: 27 November 1968
• Docket Number: No. 434,434
• Citation: 435 S.W.2d 242
• Parties: The STATE of Texas, Appellant, v. J. H. BRUNSON et ux., Appellees. . Corpus Christi
• Court: Texas Court of Appeals

Page 242

435 S.W.2d 242

The STATE of Texas, Appellant, v. J. H. BRUNSON et ux., Appellees.

No. 434.

Court of Civil Appeals of Texas Corpus Christi.

Nov. 27, 1968.

Rehearing Denied Dec. 19, 1968.

Crawford C. Martin, Atty. Gen., Woodrow Curtis, Asst. Atty. Gen., Austin, for appellant.

Mahoney, Shaffer & Hatch, Richard J. Hatch, Corpus Christi, for appellees.

OPINION

GREEN, Chief Justice.

This appeal involves the recovery by appellees J. H. Brunson and wife on their cross-action of damages for loss of rental value of a house trailer allegedly converted and/or wrongfully taken by appellant without payment of just compensation. Appeal is from a judgment for appellees based on a jury verdict.

In a condemnation suit in which a trial de novo was had in county court after objections had been duly filed by the property owners to the award of the special commissioners, the State of Texas was awarded an easement for highway purposes over a tract of land belonging to appellees, and appellees recovered $14,308.00 as damages for such right of way easement. This county court judgment was not appealed from and became final. For more detailed recitation of facts, see, on former appeal of the present suit, Brunson v. State, Tex.Sup.Ct., 418 S.W.2d 504, which affirmed in part, reversed and rendered in part, and reversed and remanded in part, Brunson v. State, Tex.Civ.App., 410 S.W.2d 9.

There was located on said property certain improvements, including the house trailer here involved. The county court judgment was silent as to the disposition of these improvements. The Brunsons, after the judgment in the condemnation proceedings in the county court, removed this house trailer off the property, whereupon the State filed this suit in the district court alleging the acquisition of title to such property by virtue of the county court judgment and a wrongful conversion by the Brunsons to their use and benefit. Thereafter, the State recovered possession of the house trailer under a writ of possession and retained same from September 13, 1962, to the date of this trial in January, 1968.

Appellees filed a cross-action against the State and others who are no longer parties to the litigation (see the above cited Supreme Court opinion) alleging that title to the house trailer had not passed to the State, and claiming damages for conversion. All parties filed motions for summary judgment on the liability issues. As shown in the above cited opinions of the Court of Civil Appeals and Supreme Court, the motion of Brunson was overruled and the others were sustained in the district court. Thus, a leading issue on the former appeal was whether title to the house trailer had passed to the State by reason of the condemnation proceedings, and, subsidiary thereto, whether Brunson had wrongfully removed it after the judgment and whether the State had wrongfully taken possession.

The Supreme Court held that the State had secured only an easement over the land for highway purposes, and had not obtained any title to the house trailer; that the lower courts had erred in sustaining the State's motion for summary judgment and in overruling Brunson's motion; and on the State's suit against Brunson, rendered judgment that the State take nothing. The Court severed into a separate cause Brunson's cross-action, and remanded such cause to the trial court for further proceedings consistent with their opinion. In view of the holdings of the Supreme Court on the issues involved, it appears that such further proceedings would involve only the issue of damages which the Brunsons were legally entitled to recover for the taking by the State of the house trailer without paying adequate compensation therefor. Brunson v. State, Tex.Sup.Ct., 418 S.W.2d 504; Texas State Constitution, Art. 1, § 17, Vernon's Ann.St.

A few days before the trial of this cause in January, 1968 after the remand, the State by an amended pleading first recognized Brunsons' right to possession of the trailer house, and tendered same to them. Possession thereof was taken by appellees in January, 1968, during the trial. The only issue submitted to the jury on said trial was:

'What sum of money, if any, do you find from the preponderance of the evidence to be the reasonable monthly rental value of the subject trailer since September 13, 1962?'

The answer of the jury was: $125.00 per month.

The court rendered judgment against the State of $8,041.66, and for the return of the house trailer to appellees. This amount was monthly rental value as found by the jury multiplied by the number of months appellant retained possession of the house trailer.

Appellant's first point of error reads:

'The trial court erred in granting Brunson's motion to strike the State's cross-action and granting Brunson's motion in limine suppressing any evidence introduced before the special commissioners in the condemnation proceedings. (Germane to Assignment of Errors I, II, Amended Motion for New Trial)'

The State in their cross-action to appellees' cause alleged in substance that the Special Commissioners in making their award had included the sum of $3,000.00 as the reasonable value of the house trailer, and that when appellees had withdrawn the State's deposit of the amount of the special commissioners' award, they received payment of $3,000.00 for said trailer house, and that they were not entitled to retain said $3,000.00 and continue to assert title to said property.

The Supreme Court held contrary to this contention in Brunson v. State, supra. It was there held that the county court's judgment was clear and unambiguous in its terms, and only awarded the State the easement which it sought for right of way purposes, and fixed the amount of the damages for such easement. The Court stated that the judgment of the county court is not subject to impeachment or collateral attack by the tendered proof of the stance of the parties before the special commissioners or of other collateral matters.

Appellant's first point is overruled.

The State in oral argument before this Court withdrew its second point of error, and we shall not consider it.

Appellant in its points of error Nos. 3--8 inclusive and in the argument and discussion thereunder questions the propriety of the rule pertaining to the measure of damages applied by the trial court in the special issue and in the judgment. Appellant contends that such special issue was improper and not the ultimate issue under the evidence, that the jury's answer was not supported by evidence, and that the amount of the judgment is greatly excessive, and is without evidence to support it. Appellees in their third and fourth counterpoints and in their statements and arguments thereunder reply that the court correctly overruled appellant's objections to the special issue and correctly submitted same, and that there was abundance of evidence to support the judgment.

There was much testimony by witnesses who qualified as experts concerning the market value of the house trailer at the time possession was taken by the State in 1962, and also at the time that possession was returned to appellees in January, 1968. The top value in 1962, according to the evidence, was $4500.00, and the low value was $1725.00. The testimony as to market value in January, 1968, ranged from $700.00 to $1600.00. There was also considerable testimony of the rental value of the house trailer during the time it was in the State's possession. Such evidence ranged from a high of $200.00 per month to a net low of $50.00 monthly.

At the close of the evidence appellees, having obtained possession of the house trailer, chose to go to the jury on the issue of loss of rental value during the period of time their property was withheld from them by the State, rather than on the issue of depreciated value. We agree with appellees that where possession of one's property is unlawfully obtained by writ of possession, sequestration, or other action, and the owner subsequently recovers possession, he may recover, If the evidence supports the issue for reasonable rental value proved to have been lost during the period of the unlawful detention. Brown v. Guaranty Securities Co., Tex.Com.App., 265 S.W. 547, holding approved by Sup.Ct.; Ford Motor Co. v. Freeman, Tex.Civ.App., 168 S.W. 80; Hyway Motor Co. v. Saulsbury, Tex.Civ.App., 223 S.W. 322; Van Velzer v. Stryker, Tex.Civ.App., 233 S.W. 146; Halff Co. v. Waugh, Tex.Civ.App., 183 S.W. 839, wr. ref.; Montgomery v. Gallas, Tex.Civ.App., 225 S.W. 557; De George v. Rodgers-De Long Hotel Co., Tex.Civ.App., 126 S.W.2d 79, wr. dis.

The special issue inquired only concerning the reasonable Monthly rental value since September 13, 1962. The trial court, upon receipt of the verdict, multiplied the jury's answer of $125.00 per month by the number of months from September 1962 to the date of surrender of possession by the State in January, 1968, and reached the total of $8,041.66, for which sum it rendered judgment. But the evidence does not establish, and the jury did not find, that the house trailer could or would have been rented during each and every one of said months in this period of 64 months; in fact the testimony introduced by appellees of rental value concerned rentals of much shorter durations. Such testimony also indicated constant depreciation in the property's value. Although it may well be that the evidence would have justified an issue inquiring of the rental value of the house trailer during the period its possession was withheld from appellees, it was not proper procedure to arrive at the value of use for rentals for 64 months by securing a jury finding of its rental value by the month, and multiplying this figure by 64.

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