State v. Bryan
| Decision Date | 28 January 1924 |
| Citation | 87 Fla. 56,99 So. 327 |
| Parties | STATE ex rel. SPENCE STATE ex rel. EYCHANER v. BRYAN, County Judge. STATE ex rel. EYCHANER v. RAMSEY, County Judge. |
| Court | Florida Supreme Court |
Original mandamus proceeding by the State, on the relation of W. C Spence, against T. F. Bryan, as County Judge of Dixie County and by the State, on the relation of Karl K. Eychancer against G. V. Ramsey, as County Judge of Hernando County.
Writs issued.
Syllabus by the Court
State may regulate killing. Under the common law of England the title to animals ferae naturae or game is in the sovereign for the use and benefit of the people, the killing or taking and use of the game being subject to governmental control and regulation for the general good. The power to control and regulate the killing and use of game was vested in the colonial governments of America, and passed with the title to game in its natural condition to the several states as they became sovereigns, for the use and benefit of all the people of the states respectively, subject to any provision of the federal Constitution that may be applicable to such control and regulation.
State may enact laws for protection of game. The Constitution of the state does not forbid the passage of special or local laws upon the subject of game, and it contains no express provision relative to game; therefore the Legislature may by a duly enacted law make any provision within its discretion for the preservation and conservation of the game in the state for the use and benefit of the people of the state, by regulating the taking or killing and the use of certain or all kinds of game in any part of the state, and during any periods, where such laws do not deny to any one having rights in the premises the due process of law or the equal protection of the laws that are guaranteed to all persons by the state and federal Constitutions.
Law regulating hunting must operate uniformly. The power and discretion of the Legislature to control and regulate the subject of hunting game is not limited by the organic law and the subject regulated may be as restricted in manner and extent as the Legislature deems advisable; but the regulations should affect alike all persons similarly situated and conditioned with reference to the particular regulations.
Discriminatory regulation of game may be denial of equal protection of laws. While there may be no absolute private property right in game in its natural conditions, and while the state may by statute regulate the use of game in any manner and to any extent desired by the lawmaking power, yet the beneficial use of the game in the state belongs to all the people of the state, and a regulation that unjustly discriminates against any of the people of the state may in effect be a denial of the equal protection of the laws to those so unjustly discriminated against.
Statute for protection of game must operate uniformly. The Legislature in protecting game may in its discretion limit a statute in the extent and purpose of its operation, but the regulation must operate upon all persons alike under practically similar conditions and circumstances.
Statutory classification of persons affected by regulation not disturbed if basis fair and practicable. The discretion of the Legislature in classifying those who are to be affected by a regulation for the protection of game will not be disturbed by the courts where the classification has some just, fair, and practical basis in real differences with reference to the subject regulated, and all doubts will be resolved in favor of the validity of a statute.
Vesting of title to game in counties ineffectual to impair individual rights and state's power of regulation. All the bona fide citizens of the state, irrespective of the counties in which they live, have a qualified beneficial property interest, subject to lawful governmental regulations for the public good, in all wild game while it is in any county of the state, and not reduced to the lawful possession of any one; and, as the state cannot lawfully deny to any of its citizens substantially equal rights with all other citizens of the state under like conditions to lawfully hunt wild game in the state, the vesting of title to such game in the several counties is ineffectual to impair individual rights in the game, or to relieve the state of the power and duty of just regulations for the good of all.
Classification imposing burdens on certain citizens that are not imposed on others held unconstitutional. Classifications by counties or otherwise for the purpose of prescribing regulations or exactions that in effect impose burdens on some of the citizens of the state that in kind or extent are not imposed upon other citizens of the state under practically similar conditions, with no conceivably just basis for the classifications or discriminations, constitute a denial to those injuriously affected of the equal protection of the laws in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment to the federal Constitution.
Hunting license law held invalid as discriminatory. The provisions of chapter 9456 and chapter 9431 of the Special or Local Laws of 1923, requiring, respectively, $10 and $50 license taxes of residents of the state who are nonresidents of the said counties, respectively, as a prerequisite to permissible hunting of wild game in such counties within the proper seasons, when residents of the county are required to pay only $1 or $1.25, are violative of the relators' organic rights to equal protection of the laws in the enjoyment of a right to lawfully hunt wild game in the state, which the relators, who are residents of the state but nonresidents of the county, have in common with all the citizens of the state.
R. E. L. Chancey, of Tampa, for petitioners.
W. P. Chavous, of Mayo, for respondent Bryan.
Hugh Hale, of Brooksville, for respondent Ramsey.
Chapter 9456 of the Special or Local Laws of 1923 requires all nonresidents of Hernando county, Fla., to pay to the county a license tax of $50 for hunting wild game in that county during the hunting season under the general law, while under the same special or local law a resident of Hernando county is required to pay $1 license tax for hunting wild game in the county outside of the voting precinct of such resident. Chapter 9431 of the Special or Local Laws of 1923 requires residents of the state who are not residents or Dixie county to pay a license tax of $10 for hunting wild game in Dixie county during the hunting season named in the act, while residents of the county are required to pay a license tax of $1.25 for hunting wild game in Dixie county during the hunting season. By the general law residents of this state are required to pay a license tax of $3.50 to hunt wild game in proper season in any other county than that of their residence, and $1.25 license tax in the county of residence. Sections 1292 and 1293, Rev. Gen. Stats., chapter 8510, Gen. Laws of 1921.
Section 1291, Revised General Statutes of 1920, provides that----
'The ownership and title to all wild birds and game in the state of Florida are hereby vested in the respective counties of the state, for the purpose of regulating the use and disposition of the same.'
In mandamus proceedings to require the issuance of licenses to residents of other counties of the state who desire to hunt wild game in proper season in Hernando and Dixie counties upon the payment of the $3.50 license tax required by the general law, the constitutional validity of the mentioned provisions of chapters 9456 and 9431 is challenged. See State ex rel. Clarkson v. Philips, 70 Fla. 340, 70 So. 367, Ann. Cas. 1918A, 138.
Under the common law of England the title to animals ferae naturae or game is in the sovereign for the use and benefit of the people, the killing or taking and use of the game being subject to governmental control and regulation for the general good. The power to control and regulate the killing and use of game was vested in the colonial governments of America, and passed with the title to game in its natural condition to the several states as they became sovereigns for the use and benefit of all the people of the states, respectively, subject to any provision of the federal Constitution that may be applicable to such control and regulation. 2 Black, Comm. 394, 410; Geer v. State of Connecticut, 161 U.S. 519, 16 S.Ct. 600, 40 L.Ed. 793; Graves v. Dunlap, 87 Wash. 648, 152 P. 532, L. R. A. 1916C, 338, Ann. Cas. 1917B, 944; State v. Ashman, 123 Tenn. 654, 135 S.W. 325; 27 C.J....
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