State v. Bryson
| Decision Date | 30 June 1879 |
| Citation | 81 N.C. 595 |
| Court | North Carolina Supreme Court |
| Parties | STATE v. JOHN F. BRYSON. |
INDICTMENT for a Misdemeanor under Bat. Rev., ch. 32, § 116, tried at Spring Term, 1879, of JACKSON Superior Court, before Gudger, J.
The bill charged the defendant with entering upon the land of E. C. Chastain, after being forbidden to do so. The evidence was that the defendant in the summer of 1877, was cultivating the land of Nathan Coward, which adjoined the lands of Chastain, the prosecuting witness, and that he was in the habit of going through a part of witness' farm to get to Coward's land, and continued doing so after being forbidden by Chastian. On cross-examination the witness stated that he formerly owned the land which the defendant was cultivating, and had sold it to Coward. He also stated that he had notified defendant that he did not allow Coward or any of his tenants to pass through his field, and that about fifty yards distant was a cart-way on Coward's land which his tenants traveled, and leading from a public road to defendant's field. Coward testified that he had usually passed over Chastain's land to get to the tract purchased of him, about three years ago, and rented to defendant; that Chastain's land cut him off from the public road for a distance of seventy-five yards, and that to go through Chastain's field the defendant would have to travel about two hundred yards, but to get out otherwise he would have to go through two other farms and at a distance of about two miles, except by a ford which was said to be impassable. It was also in evidence that the defendant hauled his corn through the prosecutor's field after being forbidden to do so, to obviate the necessity of building a bridge over said ford.
The defendant asked the court to charge the jury upon the authority of State v. Hause, 71 N. C., 518,“that if defendant believed he had the right to enter or travel over the prosecutor's land because he and the former owners and tenants of the land had done so for some ten or eighteen years, he would not be guilty.” The court declined to give the instruction on the ground it was not applicable to the facts of this case, but told the jury if they found that Coward's land joined the public road, the defendant should have entered the field through Coward's land, and if defendant entered the same through the prosecutor's land after being forbidden, he would be guilty. Defendant excepted. Verdict of guilty, judgment, appeal by the defendant.
Attorney General, for the State .
No counsel in this court for the defendant.
This was an indictment against the defendant under chapter 32, section 116, of Battle's Revisal, for entering and passing through a field of one Chastain, the prosecutor, after being forbidden to do so.
To constitute the offence intended to be punished by the statute under which the bill of indictment was framed, there must be an entry on land after being forbidden; and such entry must be wilful, and not from ignorance, accident, or under a bona fide claim of right or, license. State v. Hanks, 66 N. C., 612; State v. Ellen, 68 N. C., 281; State v. Hause, 71 N. C., 518.
The constituents of the offence we find in this case, on examination of the testimony set out in the case of appeal, to be as follows: Defendant entered upon and passed through the field of the prosecutor after being forbidden, and he did so wilfully and without a claim to the land on which the trespass was committed, or a claim of a right of way, or license therein by grant or prescription. And so, the defendant had nothing to excuse him or screen him from conviction, unless his belief that he had the right or license of way under the circumstances specified in the terms of the instruction refused took away guilt and authorized his acquittal.
The charge requested was that if the jury should find that defendant believed he had a right to enter or travel over the prosecutor's land, because he and the former owner and tenants had done so for some ten or eighteen years, he would not be guilty; and...
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...to prove that he had reasonable ground for such belief, and the jury should so find under proper instructions from the court. State v. Bryson, 81 N.C. 595. ' This Court said in State v. Wells, 142 N.C. 590, 55 S.E. 210, 212: 'True we have held in several well-considered decisions, that when......
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...v. Crawley, 103 N.C. 353, 9 S.E. 409; State v. Lawson, 101 N.C. 717, 7 S.E. 905, 9 Am.St.Rep. 42; State v. Winslow, 95 N.C. 649; State v. Bryson, 81 N.C. 595; State Crosset, 81 N.C. 579; State v. Hause, 71 N.C. 518; State v. Whitehurst, 70 N.C. 85; State v. Ellen, 68 N.C. 281; State v. Hank......
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...103 N.C. 353, 9 S.E. 409; State v. Lawson, 101 N.C. 717, 7 S.E. 905, 9 Am.St.Rep. 42; State v. Winslow, 95 N.C. 649; State v. Bryson, 81 N.C. 595; State v. Crosset, 81 N.C. 579; State v. Hause, 71 N.C. 518; State v. Whitehurst, 70 N.C. 85; State v. Ellen, 68 N.C. 281; State v. Hanks, 66 N.C......
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