State v. Buchanan

• Decision Date: 14 October 1971
• Docket Number: No. 41924,41924
• Citation: 79 Wn.2d 740,489 P.2d 744
• Parties: The STATE of Washington, Respondent, v. David BUCHANAN, also known as David Dupree Benton, Appellant.
• Court: Washington Supreme Court

Page 740

79 Wn.2d 740

489 P.2d 744

The STATE of Washington, Respondent, v. David BUCHANAN, also known as David Dupree Benton, Appellant.

No. 41924.

Supreme Court of Washington, Department 1.

Oct. 14, 1971.

Webster, Kroum, McCann, Granberg, Bass & Mack, Stephen A. Mack, Seattle, for appellant.

Christopher T. Bayley, King County Pros. Atty., Kenneth W. Sharaga, Deputy Pros. Atty., Seattle, for respondent.

NEILL, Associate Justice.

Defendant appeals from his conviction upon a charge of first degree perjury in violation of RCW 9.72.010. ¹

Defendant and another were arrested on suspicion of larceny. The arresting officers advised each of his rights, using the 'Miranda card.' On arrival at the police station, defendant was asked routine identification questions including name and date of birth. He answered that his name was 'Benton,' and stated a date of birth which placed his age at 17. On the basis of this information, the officer prepared and signed a juvenile court petition and placed defendant in the custody of the juvenile authorities. A preliminary hearing was held in King County Juvenile Court. At this hearing, defendant was advised of his rights and was placed under oath. In the course of this hearing, defendant was again asked whether his name and birth date as stated in the petition and in other juvenile court documents were correct. He testified that they were. At the conclusion of this hearing, the court entered a preliminary finding of delinquency. Soon thereafter, when the probation officer confronted defendant with her belief as to his true identity, he admitted his true name and adult age. He was then removed to the city jail where he was again advised of his rights and asked the routine admittance questions. Defendant said that he did not wish to make a written statement, but did give his true name and age. When defendant indicated that he wanted to think things over, all questioning ceased.

On appeal, defendant contends that the juvenile court did not have jurisdiction to administer a lawful oath, due to defendant's adult age. Therefore, defendant argues, he could not be guilty of perjury for statements made before that court. There is nothing in the record to indicate that jurisdiction was not properly invoked under Juvenile Court Rules (JuCR 2.1(a) (1)). Thus framed, the issue is whether jurisdiction sufficient to support a perjury charge exists where jurisdiction is apparent at the time the testimony is taken, but where subsequent developments show a jurisdictional defect.

In State v. Dallagiovanna, 69 Wash. 84, 88, 124 P. 209, 210 (1912), we stated the general rule:

'* * * perjury cannot be predicated of a false oath in a proceeding before a court which had no jurisdiction to inquire into the matter which was the subject of that proceeding.' (Morford v. Territory, 10 Okl. 741, 63 P. 958, 54 L.R.A. 513 (1901).)

A widely recognized distinction or exception to this general rule is recited in Annot., 82 A.L.R. 1127, 1138 (1933):

A distinction is to be observed between want of jurisdiction to take cognizance of a case and want of jurisdiction to proceed to judgment therein. It frequently happens that want of jurisdiction in the latter sense arises from some matter dehors the record, which appears only after investigation. So, while a court may not have jurisdiction to proceed to judgment, it may have jurisdiction to take cognizance of a case in the first instance and until the facts showing lack of jurisdiction appear; and testimony given on a record showing jurisdiction is none the less perjury because facts later appear defeating jurisdiction.

See, e.g., Bennett v. District Court of Tulsa County, 81 Okl.Cr. 351, 162 P.2d 561 (1945); People v. Rogers, 348 Ill. 322, 180 N.E. 856, 82 A.L.R. 1124 (1932).

The necessity and good sense of this exception in well illustrated by the case at bar. Here, the subject matter of the case was clearly within the juvenile court's jurisdiction under our rules. Jurisdiction to take cognizance of the case was properly invoked under JuCR 2.1(a)(1), on the basis of information given and testified to by defendant. It would be incongruous to hold that one may perjure himself as to matters establishing jurisdiction, then escape the consequences of his perjury by reason of its falsity. The exception stated above is sound and the circumstances of this case fall within that exception. Defendant's argument on this point is without merit.

Defendant's next contention is that certain of his admissions to police officers should not have been admitted at trial because they were not preceded by adequate Miranda warnings and waiver of rights. The trial court held a CrR 101.20W hearing into the admissibility of these statements, found as uncontested that that the statements in question were voluntarily made after full Miranda warnings, and concluded that there was no showing of any constitutional impediment to their admissibility. The record before us contains no transcript of the testimony given at the CrR 101.20W hearing, and defendant did not object to the admission of these statements at trial. Defendant, proceeding in forma pauperis, could have provided a more sufficient record. He did not do so. Lacking the CrR 101.20W hearing record, we assume that the trial court's findings and conclusions were supported by the evidence. Tacoma v. Horton, 62 Wash.2d 211, 382 P.2d 245 (1963); State v. Hartness, 147 Wash. 315, 265 P. 742 (1928). In the record before us there is nothing which...