State v. Buchnoff

Decision Date18 May 2022
Docket NumberA172909
Citation319 Or.App. 599,511 P.3d 438
Parties STATE of Oregon, Plaintiff-Respondent, v. Kevin William BUCHNOFF, Defendant-Appellant.
CourtOregon Court of Appeals

Ernest G. Lannet, Chief Defender, Criminal Appellate Section, and Matthew Blythe, Deputy Public Defender, Office of Public Defense Services, filed the brief for appellant.

Ellen F. Rosenblum, Attorney General, Benjamin Gutman, Solicitor General, and Carson L. Whitehead, Assistant Attorney General, filed the brief for respondent.

Before James, Presiding Judge, and Lagesen, Chief Judge, and Kistler, Senior Judge.

JAMES, P. J.

Defendant appeals a judgment of conviction for one count of felony failure to appear, ORS 162.205(1). That statute makes it a crime to fail to appear at a regularly scheduled court hearing, "[h]aving by court order been released from custody or a correctional facility under a release agreement or security release upon the condition that the person will subsequently appear personally * * *." Defendant argues that his release agreement did not specify "personal" appearance and that the trial court therefore erred in denying his motion for judgment of acquittal. We agree and reverse.

When reviewing the denial of a motion for judgment of acquittal, we view the evidence in the light most favorable to the state to determine whether any rational trier of fact, accepting reasonable inferences and credibility choices, could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. State v. Cervantes , 319 Or. 121, 125, 873 P.2d 316 (1994) ; State v. Evans , 161 Or. App. 86, 89, 983 P.2d 1055 (1999) ; State v. Bivins , 191 Or. App. 460, 462, 83 P.3d 379 (2004).

The operative facts are undisputed. Defendant signed a release agreement that read:

"As a condition of my release from custody, I agree to:
"1. Appear in Court at 8:15 a.m. on the 7th day of June, 2018, at the Marion County Court Annex / 4000 Aumsville Hwy. S.E., Salem, Oregon
"* * * * *
"4. Appear on any future dates set by the Court until discharge or final order of the Court."

Defendant signed a notice acknowledging that he had been "directed by the Court to appear" for a pretrial conference on June 13, 2019, and trial on June 26-28, 2019. Defendant personally appeared for trial on June 26, 2019. At that time, the trial court told defendant, defense counsel, and the jurors that they should be in the courtroom and prepared to proceed at 9:15 a.m. the following morning, June 27, 2019. The next day, defense counsel appeared, but defendant did not. Defendant made no attempt to contact his attorney or the court. The trial court waited until 10:05 a.m., then issued a warrant for defendant's arrest. Defendant was ultimately apprehended two months later and charged with felony failure to appear.

At trial on the FTA count, defendant moved for judgment of acquittal, arguing that the release agreement in this case could not support an FTA conviction under State v. Lobue , 300 Or. App. 340, 346, 453 P.3d 929 (2019), because the agreement failed to unambiguously require defendant's personal appearance. The state responded that the release agreement could be understood to require personal appearance because defendant was required, under ORS 136.040, to personally appear at trial, whereas the defendant in Lobue was not statutorily required to personally appear at a pretrial call hearing. The trial court denied the motion, defendant was convicted, and this appeal followed.

A release agreement is a form of contract. ORS 162.205 is therefore somewhat unusual in that it attaches criminal penalties to a breach of a contract between the state and the criminally accused. Accordingly, in Lobue , we held that

" ORS 162.205(1)(a) makes it a crime to knowingly fail to appear only after [h]aving by court order been released from custody or a correctional facility under a release agreement or security release upon the condition that the person will subsequently appear personally in connection with a charge.’ (Emphasis added.) The specific wording of the statute—requiring the release agreement to condition personal appearance—to justify the failure to appear charge has existed since the statute's original enactment in 1971. See Or. Laws 1971, ch. 743, § 196.
"The statute's requirement of a release agreement that requires personal appearance recognizes that, in criminal cases, just as in civil cases, a party's ‘appearance’ in a legal matter need not always be personal, but often may be accomplished through appearance through counsel.
"* * * * *
" ORS 162.205 must be interpreted to attach a criminal penalty to a knowing failure to appear when the release agreement unambiguously
...

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