State v. Buckley Powder Co., 96SC243

• Decision Date: 15 September 1997
• Docket Number: No. 96SC243,96SC243
• Citation: 945 P.2d 841
• Parties: 97 CJ C.A.R. 1910 STATE of Colorado; Gale A. Norton, in her official capacity as Attorney General of the State of Colorado; Department of Revenue for the State of Colorado; Renny Fagen, in his official capacity as Executive Director, Department of Revenue, Dee Hartman, in his official capacity as Director, Division of Motor Vehicles, Department of Revenue; Larry Huls, in his official capacity as Assistant Director, Motor Vehicle Division, Department of Revenue; Jean Goin, in her official capacity as Program Administrator, Motor Vehicle Division, Department of Revenue; and Jaki Berry, in her official capacity as Administrative Officer, Motor Carrier Services, Motor Vehicle Division, Department of Revenue, Petitioners, v. BUCKLEY POWDER CO., for itself, and on behalf of similarly situated entities, Respondent.
• Court: Colorado Supreme Court

Page 841

945 P.2d 841

97 CJ C.A.R. 1910

STATE of Colorado; Gale A. Norton, in her official capacity

as Attorney General of the State of Colorado; Department of

Revenue for the State of Colorado; Renny Fagen, in his

official capacity as Executive Director, Department of

Revenue, Dee Hartman, in his official capacity as Director,

Division of Motor Vehicles, Department of Revenue; Larry

Huls, in his official capacity as Assistant Director, Motor

Vehicle Division, Department of Revenue; Jean Goin, in her

official capacity as Program Administrator, Motor Vehicle

Division, Department of Revenue; and Jaki Berry, in her

official capacity as Administrative Officer, Motor Carrier Services, Motor Vehicle Division, Department of Revenue, Petitioners, v. BUCKLEY POWDER CO., for itself, and on behalf of similarly

situated entities, Respondent.

No. 96SC243.

Supreme Court of Colorado,

En Banc.

Sept. 15, 1997.

Rehearing Denied Oct. 20, 1997.

Gale A. Norton, Attorney General, Martha Phillips Allbright, Chief Deputy Attorney General, Richard A. Westfall, Solicitor General, Paul Farley, Deputy Attorney General, Larry A. Williams, First Assistant Attorney General, Mark W. Gerganoff, Assistant Attorney General, State Services Section, Denver, for Petitioners.

King & Isaacson, P.C., Scott E. Isaacson, Salt Lake City, UT, Hutchinson Neider Ward & King, Richard C. Hutchison, Murray, UT, for Respondent.

Justice MULLARKEY delivered the Opinion of the Court.

We granted certiorari to determine if the court of appeals erred in Buckley Powder Co. v. State, 924 P.2d 1133 (Colo.App.1996), when it reversed the district court's denial of class certification under C.R.C.P. 23 for lack of need. ¹ Buckley Powder Co. (Buckley) brought suit on behalf of itself and others alleging that the State's motor vehicle registration and tax statutes as amended in 1989 and 1990 violated the commerce clause and seeking injunctive and declaratory relief and refunds of the allegedly improperly collected taxes. Because our intervening decision in Riverton Produce Co. v. State, 871 P.2d 1213 (Colo.1994), rendered Buckley's claims for injunctive and declaratory relief moot, certification of a class under C.R.C.P. 23(b)(2) is likewise mooted. Thus, we reverse that part of the court of appeals' decision directing the trial court to consider class certification under C.R.C.P. 23(b)(2). With respect to C.R.C.P. 23(b)(3), we reject the court of appeals' analysis of need, but uphold its order remanding the case to the district court to determine whether a class should be certified under C.R.C.P. 23(b)(3). Buckley's remaining claim for monetary damages requires the trial court to consider class certification under C.R.C.P. 23(b)(3), and we conclude that the rule does not prohibit consideration of need.

I.

This suit arises from the amendment of Colorado's statutes regarding registration and ownership tax schedules for interstate and intrastate motor vehicle carriers. In 1989, Senate Bill 159 was signed into law, amending section 42-3-123(13)(b) and (b.3), 17 C.R.S. (1990), which provided registration fees schedules for interstate and intrastate motor vehicle carriers. See Ch. 356, sec. 2, § 42-3-123, 1989 Colo. Sess. Laws 1583, 1583-91. In 1990, House Bill 1148 was signed into law, amending section 42-3-105, 17 C.R.S. (1991). See Ch. 301, sec. 4, § 42- 3-105(1)(a), 1990 Colo. Sess. Laws 1792, 1793. The amended subsections 42-3-123(13)(b) and (b.3) provided for differential registration fees for interstate and intrastate trucks. Specifically, while both classes of trucks were assessed registration fees based upon their weight, intrastate trucks were given a reduced rate based on a sliding scale for total miles traveled in the state per year. The fee schedule resulted in intrastate vehicles traveling less than 30,000 miles a year in Colorado being assessed lower fees than similarly situated interstate vehicles.

The amended section 42-3-105 provided for differential ownership taxes for interstate and intrastate motor vehicles ten years old or older. The statute classified vehicles involved in interstate commerce as Tax Class A, while all other vehicle registrants (i.e., intrastate vehicles) were designated as Tax Class B. Tax Class A vehicles ten years old and older were subject to a specific ownership tax of ten dollars. Similarly aged Tax Class B vehicles, on the other hand, were taxed only three dollars.

Buckley is an interstate trucking company which brought suit on January 26, 1993, claiming that the new legislation, sections 42-3-123(13)(b) and (b.3) and section 42-3-105, violated the Commerce Clause, U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 3. Buckley sought injunctive and declaratory relief and a refund of the taxes allegedly collected in violation of the Constitution. At the district court's order, the parties filed cross-motions for summary judgment, including a motion by Buckley to have the action maintained as a class action.

Buckley sought to have three classes certified under C.R.C.P. 23. The denial of class certification for Class I was not appealed, and therefore we address only the denial of the certification of proposed Classes II and III. Class II consists of all owners of trucks and tractor trailers operated in interstate commerce which were registered to travel in Colorado beginning June 1, 1989 and travel less than 30,000 miles per year in Colorado. Class III consists of all owners of trucks, tractor trailers, and trailers operated in interstate commerce which registered to travel in Colorado from April 16, 1990 through the date of the filing of the complaint that were ten years old or older when registered.

On March 30, 1994, the district court issued an order in which it denied Buckley's motion for an order determining that the action be maintained as a class action. However, the district court granted Buckley's motions for summary judgment on its claims that sections 42-3-123(13)(b) and (b.3), and section 42-3-105 were violations of the Commerce Clause on their face. The district court did not order damages at that time, leaving the choice of remedy to the discretion of the state. On May 4, 1994, this court delivered its opinion in Riverton Produce Co. v. State, 871 P.2d 1213 (Colo.1994), in which we held the statutes at issue in this case to be unconstitutional as a violation of the Commerce Clause. Buckley subsequently filed a motion to alter or amend the district court's March 30 order to conform with our decision in Riverton. On July 14, the district court in this case issued its order, once again denying Buckley's motion for class certification and declining to order monetary damages, leaving the form of remedy to the State's discretion.

Buckley appealed the district court's March 30 and July 14 orders to the court of appeals. Buckley specifically appealed the following: (1) the court's denial of class certification for alleged Classes II and III; (2) the court's refusal to order relief under Buckley's prevailing claims of the unconstitutionality of the statutes; (3) the court's dismissal of its claims of alleged violations of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1988) and for attorneys fees under 42 U.S.C. § 1988 (1988); and (4) the court's dismissal of its claims for declaratory relief for Classes II and III.

As to class certification, the court of appeals read the district court's orders as a denial of class certification under both C.R.C.P. 23(b)(2) and 23(b)(3) for lack of need. The court of appeals then determined that the district court erred in denying class certification for lack of need, reasoning that neither C.R.C.P. 23(b)(2) nor 23(b)(3) contained a need requirement. Because the court of appeals believed that the district court had not determined whether the proposed classes otherwise met the requirements of C.R.C.P. 23(b), the court of appeals remanded the case to the trial court to make such a determination. The State then petitioned this court for certiorari to determine if the court of appeals had erred in reversing and remanding the case to the district court on the issue of class certification.

II.

We begin our analysis by outlining the rules governing class certification. The certification of an action as a class action is governed by C.R.C.P. 23. C.R.C.P. 23 is virtually identical to Fed.R.Civ.P. 23, and we often look to a similar federal rule for guidance in interpreting our own. See Mountain States Tel. & Tel. Co. v. District Court, 778 P.2d 667, 671 (Colo.1989); Goebel v. Colorado Dep't of Insts., 764 P.2d 785, 794 n. 12 (Colo.1988). "The decision of whether to certify a class action lies within the discretion of the trial court and will not be disturbed unless the decision is clearly erroneous and an abuse of discretion." Friends of Chamber Music v. City and County of Denver, 696 P.2d 309, 317 (Colo.1985).

To be certified as a class, a party must first meet the requirements of C.R.C.P. 23(a), which states in relevant part:

(a) Prerequisites to Class Action. One or more members of a class may sue or be sued as representative parties on behalf of all only if: (1) The class is so numerous that joinder of all members is impracticable; (2) there are questions of law or fact common to the class; (3) the claims or defenses of the representative parties are typical of the claims or defenses of the class; and (4) the representative parties will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the class.

C.R.C.P. 23(a).

In this case, the trial court found that Buckley had satisfied the C.R.C.P. 23(a) requirements. ² If the requirements of C.R.C.P. 23(a) are satisfied, an action then may be maintained as a class action only if it meets the additional requirements of one of the three subsections of 23(b). See Mountain States Tel. & Tel. Co., 778 P.2d at 671. This case involves possible certification under C.R.C.P. 23(b)(2) and 23(b)(3), which provide in relevant part:

(b) Class Actions Maintainable. Any action may be maintained as a class...