State v. Bullins

• Citation: 36 S.E.2d 915,226 N.C. 142
• Decision Date: 27 February 1946
• Docket Number: 1
• Parties: STATE v. BULLINS.
• Court: North Carolina Supreme Court

36 S.E.2d 915

STATE v. BULLINS.

226 N.C. 142

No. 1

Supreme Court of North Carolina

February 27, 1946

The defendant was charged in one bill of indictment with having unlawfully, wilfully and feloniously carnally known and abused Faye Green, a female child over the age of twelve and under the age of sixteen years, she having never before had sexual intercourse with any person, G.S. s 14-26 and in another bill of indictment with having unlawfully wilfully and knowingly encouraged, aided, connived at promoted and contributed to the delinquency of a minor child to wit: Faye Green, a female under the age of sixteen, she having been adjudged a delinquent, he, the said Tom Bullins, on and before said act, having enticed said child away from home and school, and having had sexual intercourse with said child, and having associated with said child for immoral purposes, G.S. s 110-39. The two cases were, upon motion of the Solicitor, consolidated for the purpose of trial.

The jury returned a verdict of guilty on each bill of indictment, and, upon judgment predicated on the verdict being pronounced in each case, the defendant appealed, assigning errors.

Price & Osborne, of Leaksville, and Sharp & Sharp, of Reidsville, for defendant, appellant.

Harry McMullan, Atty. Gen., and Hughes J. Rhodes, Ralph M. Moody, and J. E. Tucker, Asst. Attys. Gen., for the State.

SCHENCK Justice.

The first assignments of error discussed in the appellant's brief, five in number, are grouped and discussed together, and relate to his Honor's reference in his charge to the offense against which the statute, G.S. s 14-26, inveighs as 'what we speak of as statutory rape,' 'or what we call statutory rape,' 'elements of statutory rape,' 'guilty of statutory rape,' and 'the charge of statutory rape.' While it is true his Honor used the term 'statutory rape' in presenting to the jury the law governing the charge on the bill of indictment of having had unlawful and felonious carnal knowledge of a female over the age of twelve and under the age of sixteen years, who had not thereto had sexual intercourse with any other person, the offense charged in the bill and against which the statute, G.S. s 14-26, inveighs was properly defined by the Court, the burden of establishing the essential elements of the offense was properly placed upon the State, and each essential element of such offense was properly presented to the jury. Therefore, the use of the term 'statutory rape,' if error, was harmless error, since the offense against which the statute inveighs was properly charged in the bill, and properly explained in the charge; in truth, any error committed would seem to be favorable to the defendant. The jury could not have been mislead by the name given the offense by the Court, though not accurate. To prevail on appeal the appellant not only must show error, he must show the error was prejudicial, and that but for the error a different result would likely have been reached. State v. Harris, 204 N.C. 422, 168 S.E. 498; State v. Beal, 199 N.C. 278, 154 S.E. 604.

The second assignment of error discussed in appellant's brief is Assignment No. 6, which is directed to that part of the Court's charge as follows: 'So in the year 1944, she was something over 14 years of age in the month of September at which time she testified that the defendant, who also lived on the same farm on which her people lived, induced her to have sexual intercourse with him; and that following that first association in that way she had intercourse with him on frequent occasions--almost every day, as she described it, her evidence tending to show that in January she pretended to get a job and that her ...