State v. Bullock

Citation235 S.C. 356,111 S.E.2d 657
Decision Date16 November 1959
Docket NumberNo. 17585,17585
CourtUnited States State Supreme Court of South Carolina
PartiesSTATE, Respondent. v. Quincy BULLOCK, Appellant.

Matthew J. Perry, Spartanburg, Lincoln C. Jenkins, Jr., Columbia, Donald J. Sampson, Greenville, for appellant.

Robert L. Kilgo, Sol., Darlington, S. Norwood Gasque, Latta, William H. Smith, Jr., Asst. Atty. Gen., for respondent

MOSS, Justice.

The appellant, Quincy Bullock, was tried upon an indictment charging him with the murder of Mrs. Carolyn Barfield Walshock on August 3, 1958. He was tried on October 24, 1958. The appellant was found guilty as charged and sentenced to death by electrocution.

This appeal followed. The appellant charges error on the part of the trial Judge: (1) In refusing his motion for a continuance; (2) In allowing the introduction into evidence of the alleged confessions of the appellant, it being asserted that the said confessions were obtained in violation of the rights of the appellant under the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution; and that the officers who took the written confession failed to comply with Sections 1-64 and 26-7.1 of the 1952 Code of Laws of South Carolina; (3) In admitting into evidence the slip, dress, pocket book and contents, of the deceased; (4) In admitting as evidence a bullet taken from the body of one Jimmy Horne and allowing testimony concerning the commission of a crime against the said Horne; and (5) In permitting evidence that when the body of the deceased was found it was without undergarments, and in allowing testimony of the physician who examined the body of the deceased that there was some discharge from her vagina.

Upon the call of this case for trial, the appellant moved for a continuance beyond the term upon the ground that his counsel had not had sufficient time in which to prepare for trial. This motion was refused and the appellant alleges error. The body of the deceased was discovered on the afternoon of August 3, 1958, in the woods near Maple Swamp, a distance of approximately 3/4 of a mile from the Latta Highway in Dillon County, South Carolina. The appellant was arrested on August 7, 1958. The State asserts that the appellant did, on August 11, 1958, give to the investigating officers two written statements wherein he confessed that he had killed the deceased, and he gave in the statements the details of how he took the life of the deceased.

It appears from the record that on August 26, 1958, the Honorable J. Woodrow Lewis, Resident Judge of the Fourth Circuit, did issue an order committing the appellant to the South Carolina State Hospital for observation and examination as to his sanity. It further appears that as a result of such examination, at the end of thirty days, the appellant was found sane, and a report to that effect filed in the office of the Clerk of Court for Dillon County, on September 30, 1958. It also appears from the record that on August 26, 1958, that Honorable J. Woodrow Lewis, Resident Judge of the Fourth Circuit, did appoint two able and competent attorneys of Dillon to represent the appellant. These attorneys received written notification from Judge Lewis, in the form of a letter, on August 28, 1958, appointing them to represent the appellant. Counsel for the appellant had notice of the findings of the South Carolina Hospital as to the sanity of the appelant on either October 4 or 5, 1958. It appears that after the completion of the examination of the appellant at the State Hospital he was held as a prisoner in the State Penitentiary. On October 7, 1958, counsel for the appellant, by letter, requested the Solicitor to have 'the Sheriff of Dillon County bring the defendant back to the Dillon County jail several days prior to the convening of the General Sessions Court'. In the same letter these attorneys requested a copy of the alleged confessions made by the appellant. On the day following, the Solicitor directed the Sheriff to brying the appellant back to the Dillon County jail so that his attorneys would have full opportunity to confer with him and prepare his defense. The Solicitor also directed the Sheriff 'to make available to them all statements, confessions, and evidence in our hands'. There is no contention on the part of the appellant that he was not returned to the Dillon County jail in sufficient time to confer with his counsel, nor is it claimed that the State failed to furnish to his counsel a copy of all statements, confessions, and evidence in the hands of the officers. Counsel for the appellant stated in their joint affidavit that they found the appellant to be highly suspicious of them and reluctant to talk to them. They state that he desired other attorneys to represent him but such attorneys were unavailable. This same affidavit shows that on October 16, 1958, that the appellant gave to his attorneys information which repudiated the alleged confessions made by him and asserted that 'he was nowhere near the scene of the alleged crime at the time it was alleged to have been committed'. Attorneys for the appellant assert that the case should have been continued because they had not had sufficient time to adequately prepare the defense of the appellant.

The appellant's defense was one of alibi. He made no showing on the motion for continuance of the absence of any witness who would be material to the establishment of this defense. As a matter of fact, the appellant testified upon the trial of the case that on the night of the homicide that he was alone from about midnight until approximately six o'clock the following morning. We do not see how it is possible, if the appellant was alone during this period of time, for him to obtain witnesses to corroborate this fact.

The appellant also suggests that the witness, Jimmy Horne, should have been present for the trial of this case. Examination of the record reveals that Jimmy Horne was with the deceased on the night of the homicide. He was not present at the time of the trial for the reason that he was a patient in a hospital suffering from injuries in an automobile accident. It is the State's position that this witness could not be considered a defense witness because his full testimony was given at a coroner's inquest, which, from an examination thereof, shows that he could not in any sense be a witness for the appellant. The appellant does not contend that he wished to call Jimmy Horne as a witness in his behalf nor that he had made any attempt to interview such witness.

It appears to us that since counsel for the appellant had been appointed to defend him on August 26, 1958, and received notice thereof on August 28, 1958, and that the appellant was made available to them certainly prior to October 16, 1958, and there being no contention that they were not furnished with all statements, confessions and evidence in the hands of the State concerning this homicide, they had had ample time to prepare this case for trial. The appellant does not suggest the absence of any witness material to his defense.

This Court has held in numerous cases that a motion for a continuance is addressed to the discretion of the trial Judge and his disposition of such motion will not be reversed on appeal unless it is shown that there was an abuse of discretion to the prejudice of the appellant. State v. Lytchfield, 230 S.C. 405, 95 S.E.2d 857, 66 A.L.R.2d 263; State v. Livingston, 223 S.C. 1, 73 S.E.2d 850; State v. Mishoe, 198 S.C. 215, 17 S.E.2d 142; and State v. Livingston, 233 S.C. 400, 105 S.E.2d 73, 76. We quote from the last cited case, the following:

'A motion for continuance is, of course, addressed to the sound discretion of the court. Where such motion has been based upon the contention that defendant's counsel has not had time to prepare his case, its denial by the trial court has rarely been disturbed on appeal. It is axiomatic that determination of such motions must depend upon the particular facts and circumstances of each case. In State v. Middleton, 207 S.C. 478, 36 S.E.2d 742, where counsel, appointed by the court at least eight days prior to the trial, moved for continuance upon the ground that they did not think that time sufficient for preparation of the case for trial, we held that the motion was properly denied. And in State v. Livingston, 223 S.C. 1, 73 S.E.2d 850, 853, denial of a like motion was upheld where counsel for the defendant had been appointed by the court 'three or four' days prior to the date of trial.'

The appellant asserts that under the Livingston case, from which we have quoted, that he was entitled to a continuance. An examination of this case shows that we expressed grave doubt as to whether the trial Judge abused his discretion in denying the motion for a continuance. However, we concluded, in favorem vitae, where the motion for a continuance was on the ground that there was a man residing in Colorado who could testify as to defendant's mental condition during combat service in the Korean War, a new trial should be granted. There is no showing in the instant case of the absence of any witness material to the appellant's defense. We conclude that there was no error on the part of the trial Judge in refusing the motion of the appellant for a continuance.

We next consider the question of whether there was error in permitting the introduction into evidence of the alleged confessions of the appellant.

In the case of State v. Chasteen, 228 S.C. 88, 88 S.E.2d 880, 884, it was said:

'The question of whether a confession is voluntary is one which is addressed to the Court in the first instance. If there is an issue of fact as to the voluntariness of a confession, it should be admitted and the jury, under proper instructions, allowed to make the ultimate determination as to its voluntary character and also its truthfulness. State v. Scott, supra, 209 S.C. 61, 38 S.E.2d 902; State v. Brown, supra, 212 S.C. 237, 47 S.E.2d 521;...

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  • State v. Torrence
    • United States
    • United States State Supreme Court of South Carolina
    • May 1, 1989
    ...v. Brooks, 235 S.C. 344, 111 S.E.2d 686 (1959), appeal dismissed, 365 U.S. 300, 81 S.Ct. 707, 5 L.Ed.2d 689 (1961);State v. Bullock, 235 S.C. 356, 111 S.E.2d 657 (1959);State v. Livingston, 233 S.C. 400, 105 S.E.2d 73 (1958);State v. Daniels, 231 S.C. 176, 97 S.E.2d 902 (1957);State v. Byrd......
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